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Viewing cable 05SANTIAGO2423, AVIAN INFLUENZA - SANTIAGO, UPDATE ON SEC FOR USMC

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
05SANTIAGO2423 2005-11-28 15:53 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Santiago
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 SANTIAGO 002423 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR DSERCC, DS/IP/WHA, DS/OSAC, CA/ACS/OCS, 
WHA/BSC, WHA/EX 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ASEC EAGR EAID PREL SENV TBIO AVIAN FLU
SUBJECT: AVIAN INFLUENZA - SANTIAGO, UPDATE ON SEC FOR USMC 
BALL 
 
REF: A)STATE 209622 B)02135 
 
1.  SUMMARY: The DCM convened a meeting of the Emergency 
Action Committee (EAC) at Embassy Santiago on 11/22/05 to 
discuss the Avian Influenza Trip wires for Chile.  The EAC 
also reviewed final security preparations for the 230th USMC 
BAll.  The meeting was chaired by the DCM with AMB, RAO, 
E/POL, RSO, DAO, MILGRP, DEA, LEGATT, APHIS, PAO, FCS, CONS, 
MGT, and MSG present.  END SUMMARY. 
 
2.  The EAC discussed security for the 230th USMC Ball that 
will be held on November 26, 2005 at the Marriott Hotel in 
Santiago, Chile.  RSO has coordinated security with local 
police who will use metal detectors, k-9 units, explosive 
detection machines and police special reaction teams.  The 
EAC is confident that sufficient security will be present to 
secure the site.  RSO will also request additional support 
from local police for Embassy residences the night of the 
ball.  The EAC has no information on any potential threats at 
this time. 
 
3.  The following baseline Tripwires were approved by the 
Santiago EAC and in substance by RMO Brooks Taylor. 
The following proposed tripwires address the possibility of 
human cases of avian influenza in Chile and/or evidence of 
the virus demonstrating more efficient human-to-human 
transmission elsewhere in the world. These tripwires are 
based on the following assumptions, should sustained 
human-to-human transmission become a reality.  To avoid 
repetition, only new measures taken under each Tripwire are 
listed - all previous measures under previous Tripwires will 
be maintained. 
 
ASSUMPTIONS: 
 
A.  The disease would spread rapidly, both within a 
particular country and internationally. 
B.  Once the World Health Organization has declared a human 
pandemic - but probably even before then - airlines will 
cancel flights as countries try to control the spread of the 
disease.  Some countries may bar individuals coming from 
infected countries. 
C.  The Embassy must keep in mind "double standard" concerns, 
and will coordinate consular, medical, evacuation, etc. with 
appropriate Department offices. 
D.  The Embassy must keep in mind that many of its children 
attend international schools, which must be kept in the 
information loop as well. 
E.  The Embassy should carefully consider all the 
ramifications of authorized departure and/or ordered 
departure, as in fact it may be safer to actually remain in 
Chile. 
F.  The Embassy should remain in constant contact with 
Clinica Las Condes and Clinica Alemana, as well as with the 
Ministry of Health. 
G.  The Embassy will procure sufficient supplies of Tamiflu, 
N100 Nano-masks, N95 masks, and additional hand cleansers, as 
well as the items recommended in the RMO,s list. 
 
4.  Tripwire 1:  Any case of avian influenza among humans in 
Chile. 
 
Action: Management Section/Health Unit will send an 
information notice to all Mission personnel and the Consular 
Section will send a warden message to all American citizens 
detailing the episode, and suggest preventive measures. The 
notice will also be posted on the Embassy website.  Embassy 
will notify RMO Lima and State Med. 
 
5.  Tripwire 2:  Confirmed human-to-human transmission occurs 
in one or more neighboring countries - singly or in clusters 
- but not in Chile.  This is particularly significant if 
there are multiple, geographically diverse clusters, or if a 
cluster occurs in a major transit hub. 
 
Action: 
a.  Consider immediate authorized departure of U.S. family 
members and non-emergency personnel in consultation with 
State, if the U.S. itself is relatively avian flu-free and if 
the airlines are flying.  Have evacuation plans for both the 
healthy and sick.  Explore evacuation by military airlift. 
b.  Institute screening practices for all visitors to U.S. 
Government facilities, limit their numbers, and refuse entry 
to those visibly ill or who are coughing. 
c.  Order mandatory sick leave for any employee who shows any 
flu-like symptoms or has a family member with flu-like 
symptoms.  The Health Unit will issue detailed flu symptom 
descriptions (also to appear in "Santiago Scene") and monitor 
Embassy employees. 
d.  Issue a warden announcement to American citizens. 
e.  Require use of masks and hand cleansers, AND consider use 
of the prophylactic Tamiflu ( oseltamivir) by U.S. and 
Chilean staff in positions that require contact with the 
public. 
 
6.  Tripwire 3: Significant numbers of human cases of avian 
flu (H5N1, H7N7 or others), presumably transmitted from birds 
or other animals, appear in Chile, but without evidence of 
sustained human-to-human transmission. 
 
Action: 
a.  All official and unofficial travel to affected areas, 
bird markets and similar facilities will be prohibited. 
Outside visitors to the Embassy will continue to be limited. 
Tamiflu will be given as a prophylactic to those U.S. and 
Chilean staff who have regular contact with the general 
public as part of their work. 
b.  Management Section will send a warning announcement to 
Mission personnel.  The Consular Section will send a warden 
message to private American citizens and to tourist hotels 
and cruise ships that are frequented by traveling Americans. 
Embassy will post the warning announcement on the Embassy 
website. 
c.  Health Unit will provide detailed briefing to Embassy 
community, and if appropriate, to the international schools. 
Check with Las Condes and Alemana to ensure that they are 
still able to handle large numbers of avian flu patients. 
d.  Consider authorized departure measures or even ordered 
departure measures - in conjunction with the State Department 
- if the airlines are still flying and if there are any 
recognized safehaven countries who are accepting outsiders. 
Communicate pertinent information and options to the Embassy 
community at town hall meetings or via e-mail, as the 
timeline will be short. 
e.  Issue Travel Warning to Americans considering travel to 
Chile, in conjunction with the Bureau of Consular Affairs. 
f.  Encourage all employees to stock up on food and other 
necessities in the event there is an announcement of an 
imminent pandemic. 
 
7.  Tripwire 4: Sustained human-to-human transmission in 
Chile, but not in Santiago. This is particularly significant 
if there are multiple, geographically diverse clusters. 
 
Action: 
a.  Reduction to emergency consular services only for 
American citizens.  No visa services (except on a severely 
restricted case-by-case basis), as it would be expected that 
commercial airlines have cancelled flights. 
b.  Implement authorized departure. Consider ordered 
departure in conjunction with State Med, at the discretion of 
the Chief of Mission.  If commercial airlines not flying, 
consider use of military airlift.  Ideal would be to have 
enough people leave post so that those left behind equal the 
amount of Tamiflu on hand. 
c.  Consider implementing selective administrative leave for 
those Americans who remain at post and FSN employees. 
Consider other options for minimizing workplace exposure, 
like tele-commuting. 
d.  Continue mandatory sick leave for any employee who shows 
any flu-like symptoms or has a family member with flu-like 
symptoms. 
e.  Consider home quarantine and limiting venues of 
human-to-human contact. 
f.  Mandatory screening of visitors, who shall be limited to 
those whose business absolutely must be conducted in person; 
mandatory use of protective gear, especially N95 masks for 
Embassy screeners. 
g.  Health Unit to initiate appropriate use of prophylactic 
Tamiflu (oseltamivir) for minimal U.S. and Chilean staff 
remaining on the job. 
h.  Update warden message, Travel Warning, and Consular 
Information Sheet. 
 
8.  Tripwire 5: Sustained human-to-human transmission, as 
evidenced by clusters of cases in Santiago. 
 
Action: 
a.  Implement ordered departure, if airlines are still 
servicing Santiago, and if there are any avian flu-free 
countries to fly to.  Consider use of military airlift, if 
the U.S. or any avian flu-free countries are allowing 
incoming flights from affected areas. 
b.  Implement administrative leave for all FSNs.  Consider 
other options for minimizing workplace exposure, like 
tele-commuting. 
c.  Initiate appropriate prophylactic use of Tamiflu for all 
American employees and family members remaining at post. 
d.  Issue warden update and inform American community that 
the Embassy will only offer emergency AmCit services by phone. 
YAMAUCHI