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Viewing cable 05NDJAMENA1616, REFUGEES IN EASTERN CHAD: PRM VISIT TO BAHAI

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
05NDJAMENA1616 2005-11-01 12:32 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Ndjamena
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

011232Z Nov 05

ACTION AF-00    

INFO  LOG-00   NP-00    AID-00   USNW-00  CA-00    CIAE-00  INL-00   
      DODE-00  DOTE-00  DS-00    EB-00    EUR-00   OIGO-00  FAAE-00  
      FBIE-00  UTED-00  H-00     TEDE-00  INR-00   IO-00    LAB-01   
      L-00     M-00     NEA-00   DCP-00   NSAE-00  OIC-00   OMB-00   
      NIMA-00  PA-00    MCC-00   PER-00   GIWI-00  SSO-00   SS-00    
      FMP-00   IIP-00   SCRS-00  DSCC-00  PRM-00   DRL-00   G-00     
      NFAT-00  SAS-00   SWCI-00    /001W
                  ------------------563694  011250Z /38    
FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2556
INFO AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
DARFUR COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY BAMAKO 
AMEMBASSY BANGUI 
AMEMBASSY LONDON 
AMEMBASSY NIAMEY 
AMEMBASSY PARIS 
AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE 
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 
USLO TRIPOLI 
USMISSION GENEVA
UNCLAS  NDJAMENA 001616 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR AF, AF/C, AF/SPG, D, DRL, DS/IP/ITA, 
DS/IP/AF, H, INR, INR/GGI, PRM, USAID/OTI AND USAID/W FOR 
DAFURRMT; LONDON AND PARIS FOR AFRICAWATCHERS; GENEVA FOR 
CAMPBELL, ADDIS/NAIROBI/KAMPALA FOR REFCOORDS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREF CD SU
SUBJECT: REFUGEES IN EASTERN CHAD: PRM VISIT TO BAHAI 
 
REF: KHARTOUM 1624 
 
1.  Summary.  PRM/AFR and P/E Officer visited Bahai, Oure 
Cassoni Refugee Camp, and border areas of Bamina and Tine 
from October 17-19.  The security situation was calm at the 
time of the visit, although fighting in Sudan around October 
21 resulted in nine suspected combatants crossing the border 
in Bamina and seeking urgent medical attention at Bahai and 
Iriba hospitals.  Refugee assistance programs were running 
smoothly in Oure Cassoni, with the PRM-funded International 
Rescue Committee (IRC) much improved from previous PRM 
visits.  Global and severe malnutrition, a problem earlier 
this year, had been significantly reduced with support from 
Action Against Hunger (ACF).  Refugee registration was 
underway in an effort to determine the actual number of 
refugees in Oure Cassoni.  The future of the camp remains in 
question, with no real progress made by the GOC or UNHCR in 
identifying a new site further from the border.  With 
refugees likely to remain in Oure Cassoni for the foreseeable 
future, PRM support will continue to be required for UNHCR 
and NGO programs.  Increased support for host communities 
continues to be a high priority for Chadian officials and 
relief agencies.  End Summary. 
 
------------------------------- 
Security:  A Continuing Concern 
------------------------------- 
 
2.  PRM/AFR (Neil Ahlsten and Mary Lange) and P/E Officer 
visited Bahai and Oure Cassoni Camp October 17-18 to review 
PRM-funded programs and assess the security and assistance 
situation for Oure Cassoni's estimated 29,500 refugees from 
Darfur, Sudan.  On October 19, the PRM/Embassy team visited 
border sites of Bamina and Tine and met with AMIS Observer 
Major Rick Mobey (Amcit).  The situation in Bahai and in the 
camp appeared calm at the time of the PRM visit, and UNHCR 
and partners reported no unusual activity.  While Oure 
Cassoni camp is still suspected of hosting Sudan Liberation 
Movement/Army (SLM/A) rebels from time to time, relief staff 
and local security officials reported no obvious presence of 
rebels in the camp and only two incidences of firearms being 
found (promptly reported by refugees and addressed by Chadian 
security guards). 
 
3.  On the border, in Bamina and Tine, the situation was also 
reported to be calm by Chadians living in the area.  AMIS 
Observer Mobey, however, briefed on AMIS' recent encounters 
with the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) break-away 
faction, National Movement for Reform and Development (NMRD) 
rebels, and Chadian military deserters outside of Tine (Ref 
A) and advised caution while traveling in the area.  Three 
days after the PRM/Embassy visit, on October 22, UNHCR also 
reported two separate security incidences in the area.  The 
first, in Oure Cassoni camp, occurred the morning of October 
22 when a five year old refugee boy was killed by a vehicle 
(apparently privately-owned) in the camp.  An angry crowd 
turned on Chadian security guards who tried to intervene to 
prevent the driver of the car from being killed.  In the 
process, two Chadian guards were wounded, one quite 
seriously.  The situation had calmed by the afternoon but 
forced the temporary evacuation of relief staff from the camp. 
 
4.  That same day, UNHCR reported the arrival of nine wounded 
men from Sudan who crossed into Bamina, Chad.  Three were 
taken to the Bahai hospital and six to the hospital in Iriba. 
 The men claimed to have been attacked by jandjaweed, but it 
became clear that they were instead rebels wounded in 
factional fighting in Sudan.  P/E officer was told that some 
of the current skirmishes between SLM/A and JEM are over 
vehicles given by Libya to the movements.  UNHCR, in 
consultation with ICRC and the Chadian government, evacuated 
three life-or-death cases to N'Djamena for treatment along 
with the two Chadian guards wounded in the Oure Cassoni 
incident. 
 
5.  These incidences, along with earlier reported defections 
of Chadian forces in the Hajar Hadid area (around Bredjing 
and Treguine camps), serve to underscore the uncertainty that 
UNHCR and partner organizations face on a daily basis in 
 
eastern Chad.  UNHCR and partners have developed evacuation 
plans on paper, but with the large number of expatriate staff 
as well as at-risk Chadian national staff, most relief 
workers had serious doubts that a quick and safe evacuation 
could be implemented.  UNHCR noted it would rely on the WFP 
and AirServe aircraft as well as the French military (based 
in Abeche) as much as possible.  However, overland convoys 
were also anticipated.  The looming question, in light of 
potential conflict in N'Djamena as well, was "Where to go?". 
UNHCR will continue to monitor closely the security situation 
in the east and intends to remain in close contact with the 
Embassy and other sources to ensure as much advanced notice 
as possible in the event that the situation heads south. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
Refugee Assistance Programs:  Steady Improvements 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
6.  The PRM/Embassy team also spent time on October 17-18 
reviewing PRM-funded assistance programs (UNHCR, IRC, and 
ACF) as well as a USAID/OFDA-supported project through ACTED 
(French NGO).  UNHCR was implementing Phase One of Project 
Profile, an effort to register all refugees in Oure Cassoni 
and determine the actual number in the camp.  Eventually, the 
collection of more comprehensive information on the 
population along with refugee ID cards is planned.  The 
official figure prior to registration was 29,455 (10,677 men 
and 18,778 women).  However, IRC estimated that the actual 
number residing in the camp on a daily basis was closer to 
19,000.  The over 10,000 "non-residents" were thought to be 
either Chadian (3,000 - 4,000) or refugees living elsewhere 
(e.g., Tine) who only came in for food distribution or, in 
the case of October 17-18, for the registration exercise. 
IRC noted a big surge in water usage during the registration, 
indicating many more inhabitants than usual.  By October 26, 
UNHCR reported that Oure Cassoni count was not yet finalized, 
but was expected to be roughly 28,000. 
 
7.  In terms of assistance to refugees, UNHCR and NGO 
partners have done a tremendous job over the past year in 
bringing programs in the camp up to internationally 
recognized standards.  UNHCR has a strong team (four 
international staff including two protection officers) and 
appears to be playing an effective coordinating role for camp 
activities as well as assistance to host communities.  WFP 
food deliveries have been timely and complete Qull rations) 
over the past several months.  UNICEF support to NGOs has 
also increased and includes funding and material support to 
schools, to IRC's health center, and for water and sanitation 
improvements in the camp. 
 
8.  The PRM team reviewed IRC's programs as well, noting much 
improvement in recent months.  UNHCR/Abeche reported that 
with new management and additional staff, IRC had turned the 
corner and were doing well now.  The PRM team was able to 
confirm this in Oure Cassoni.  IRC's water system was capable 
of producing the standard 15 liters per person per day 
(although actual consumption remained at between 9-12 
liters).  IRC also constructed a number of new latrines this 
year, bringing rates down to an almost acceptable rate of 1 
latrine per 24 persons (the standard being 20) -- the major 
sanitation challenge still faced by IRC is convincing 
refugees to use the latrines and to apply other improved 
hygiene practices.  IRC's health programs, of concern to 
UNHCR in May, were reported to be working better, and UNHCR 
was no longer considering shifting this responsibility to 
another NGO. 
 
9.  UNHCR and IRC both agreed that the July decision to turn 
over responsibility for nutrition to ACF had been a good one. 
 Despite some initial start-up difficulties, ACF was working 
well and appeared to be closely following the 50-some cases 
of moderate malnutrition.  Global malnutrition had been 
brought down to 12.8% (from a high of over 30% earlier in the 
year) and severe malnutrition was reported at 1.5%.  ACF does 
not yet have the capacity to provide 24-hour monitoring of 
severe cases, and these children (one to two per month) are 
transferred either to the Bahai hospital or the Medecins sans 
Frontieres (MSF) hospital in Iriba if parents agree.  ACF 
 
follows up on all cases through its supplementary feeding 
center and home visits.  UNHCR/Abeche reported that a 
steering committee on nutrition had now been formed comprised 
of WFP, UNICEF, WHO, and UNHCR with regular meetings being 
held to review the nutritional situation in all camps.  NGOs 
have also been asked to do monthly screening in the camps 
(although data reported from these screenings by some NGOs 
was not entirely reliable).  UNHCR was optimistic that 
malnutrition rates could be kept within international 
standards (provided continued delivery by WFP of full food 
rations). 
 
10.  Community services and education in the camp, also the 
responsibility of IRC, continue to require more attention. 
Community services, especially, is very underdeveloped in 
comparison to CARE International's efforts further south in 
Iridimi and Touloum.  IRC has developed a good system of 
community protection officers who help identify vulnerable 
cases in the camp and refer these cases to appropriate camp 
services.  However, very little in the way of organized camp 
activity for youth or women was taking place.  IRC hoped that 
with its new Gender Based Violence coordinator now on board, 
it could begin more activities for women through community 
centers that it hoped to construct.  These centers would 
offer a forum for women to discuss issues as well as engage 
in small income-generating activities.  PRM suggested that 
IRC look at CARE's programs as a model for its new program. 
In terms of education, schools were closed during the PRM 
visit but IRC reported 5,800 children (out of 7,400) enrolled 
in school.  UNICEF is providing teacher training and is 
working on importing Sudanese text books.  IRC still has 
difficulty recruiting qualified female teachers, and girl 
participation at higher levels remains low.  IRC's Education 
Coordinator departed last month, leaving yet another 
management gap in this program until a new Coordinator is 
recruited and on board. 
 
11.  The PRM team also visited some of ACTED's activities, 
including the provision of firewood and metal cooking stoves 
to refugee women.  No statistics were available on the number 
of women attacked while searching on their own for wood, but 
refugee women cited this as their major security concern. 
ACTED's programs were intended to counter this threat, 
although refugee women said the support provided was 
insufficient and that most were still required to do their 
own searching for scarce wood in the region.  ACTED is 
providing 640 drums of cooking fuel to refugees in Bahai each 
month (5 liters per person).  ACTED was also implementing an 
FY2004 project funded by USAID/OFDA to promote gardening for 
refugees and host villages.  Land had been allocated 
alongside nearby Lake Cariari and preparations were underway 
to allocate plots.  ACTED hoped that with the arrival of 
seeds later this month, planting could begin soon. 
 
------------------------- 
Host Community Assistance 
------------------------- 
 
12.  UNHCR remains committed to allocating 5 percent of its 
program budget for host population projects, although 
implementation of these projects has been slowed primarily 
due to the long negotiation process required with the Chadian 
government and host communities over which projects to 
implement.  The team met with the Sultan of Bahai (half 
brother to President Deby) who complained that nothing had 
been yet (although UNHCR reported that he himself was one of 
the major obstacles to progress, insisting on projects that 
would benefit him personally but not necessarily the people 
in the region).  The team did see some progress in the Bahai 
area. UNHCR, through ACTED, had constructed some wells for 
nearby host villages.  International Relief and Development 
(IRD), funded by USAID/OFDA, had also been in discussion with 
Bahai partners about expanding its Iriba-based program to 
Bahai to provide veterinary support for host community animal 
herds.  Considerable effort had also been invested, through 
IRC and the Polish Medical Mission (PMM), in rehabilitating 
the Bahai hospital.  All essential medicines and supplies 
were being provided by IRC.  The hospital has been 
functioning well in recent months, but with PMM now  pulling 
 
out and turning over responsibility to the Chadian Ministry 
of Health, the level of service could very well decline.  The 
Chadian doctor assigned to the hospital had only recently 
returned from an extended vacation and did not inspire 
confidence.  Without a real commitment or investment on the 
part of the GOC, Bahai hospital will continue to rely on the 
support of the relief community. 
 
------------------------------------------- 
Future of Oure Cassoni and Bahai Operations 
------------------------------------------- 
 
13.  The future of Oure Cassoni camp remains unclear. 
Located only 17 kilometers from the border, the camp is too 
close for comfort to Sudan and could easily become more 
militarized or become the target of attack by Sudanese 
rebels.  UNHCR reported that the issue of camp security for 
both Oure Cassoni and AmNabak camps was raised by HCR 
Guterres with President Deby during his August visit to Chad. 
 Deby pronounced that both camps "should be moved".  No 
action has taken place yet on this pronouncement (and given 
other internal Chadian concerns, it is unlikely).  UNHCR 
itself is ambivalent about the move.  In principal, it knows 
both camps should be relocated to at least 50 km from the 
border.  In practice, however, UNHCR faces constraints in (a) 
finding suitable new sites with water and a welcoming host 
population, (b) convincing the refugees themselves to move, 
most of whom have said they do not want relocation, and (c) 
financing the move in a budget year that already sees 
available funding for programs decreasing from $55 million in 
2005 to $40 million in 2006.  UNHCR will press forward on 
developing a plan for relocation of the camps, perhaps 
starting first with AmNabak, but acknowledged that the move 
might never take place unless a serious security incident 
occurred to precipitate action. 
 
------------------------------- 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
------------------------------- 
 
14.  Based on their visit to Bahai and Oure Cassoni, as well 
as their discussions with UNHCR and partner agencies, the PRM 
team offers the following recommendations: 
 
(a)  UNHCR security planning should continue, with detailed 
evacuation plans developed and shared with all relief 
organizations working in eastern Chad.  NGOs, in particular, 
need to be brought into the process and need to be reassured 
that their safety andsecurity will be considered in any 
UN-led evacuaton effort.  Plans will also need to 
incorporate elocation of Chadian national staff who are not 
rom the eastern area. 
 
(b)  UNHCR should continu with plans for the relocation of 
Oure Cassoni and AmNabak, in light of security concerns. 
However, given GOC uncertainties and other constraints, 
actual relocation is unlikely to take place in 2006.  UNHCR 
will need to support some investments in camp infrastructure 
in Oure Cassoni itself in 2006. 
 
(c)  PRM should continue to support UNHCR, IRC, and ACF 
programs in Bahai.  With IRC's performance much improved 
since the last PRM visit, the PRM team would agree with UNHCR 
that additional NGOs for Oure Cassoni camp are no longer 
required. 
 
(d)  Additional support is still required for Chadian host 
communities in the Bahai area.  Any projects that require 
commitment or investment by the GOC (health clinics or 
schools for example) should be scrutinized carefully with 
respect to the GOC's capacity to ensure their sustainability. 
 However, projects such as the IRD-proposed veterinary 
support or ACTED-sponsored wells should be considered by 
USAID/OFDA for FY2006 support. 
WALL 
 
 
NNNN