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Viewing cable 05MADRID4053, SPAIN: GOS APPROVAL SLIPS TO LOWEST LEVEL SINCE

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
05MADRID4053 2005-11-22 17:19 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Madrid
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 MADRID 004053 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV SP
SUBJECT: SPAIN: GOS APPROVAL SLIPS TO LOWEST LEVEL SINCE 
2004 ELECTION 
 
REF: MADRID 3976 
 
 1. SUMMARY. Recent poll data shows GOS at lowest level of 
popular support since coming to office in 2004. A massive 
protest on November 12, organized mainly to protest GOS's 
proposed reform of the Education Law drew between 400,000-2 
million. This also reflects discontent with recent GOS 
policies. The issue which has most effected the support of 
GOS is the reform of the regional autonomy Statute for 
Catalonia, which the main opposition party PP characterizes 
as a constitutional reform in disguise and a danger to 
national unity. The polls show that the GOS is loosing 
support but former PSOE voters are apparently not defecting 
to the PP, which is seen as having leadership problems and 
being isolated and uncooperative. END SUMMARY. 
 
2. According to the latest poll from CIS (the official 
government pollster), an immediate general election would 
give PSOE 39.7 percent of the vote, and PP 37.7 percent 
(estimated 2 percent margin of error).  In the March 2004 
elections, PSOE won 42.64 percent of the vote and PP 37.64 
percent. Also according to the poll, Zapatero,s average 
rating on a scale of one to ten has dropped to under five (to 
4.86) for the first time since the beginning of his 
presidency, which the media characterizes as a "failing 
grade" (the Spanish academic grading system gives a "pass" to 
anything over 4.9 and a failure to anything under). A large 
number of other recent polls show a decline in the rating of 
the GOS. A November 7-8 poll published in liberal daily El 
Pais gave PSOE 41 percent and PP 40 percent (estimated 3.1 
percent margin of error), and a poll done by Noxa (headed by 
prominent socialist Julian Santamaria) gave PP the lead, with 
42.5 percent, whereas PSOE came in at 40.1 percent. See also 
reftel section "Public Opinion" for more poll data and 
analysis. 
 
3. The slippage in support for the GOS is not being taken 
advantage of by the PP, as dropping percentages for the PSOE 
are not translating into comparable increases in support for 
the PP. The PP faces internal problems of leadership since 
Jose Maria Aznar left Mariano Rajoy as a successor. According 
to a poll by the conservative newspaper "ABC," 73 percent of 
Spaniards think that the PP needs "new faces" (an opinion 
shared by 61 percent of PP voters); and another 61 percent 
believe that PP leader Mariano Rajoy has not yet solidified 
his leadership in the PP. Also, the PP often votes in 
Congress against all other political parties, giving it the 
reputation of an isolated and often uncooperative opposition 
party.  The above-cited ABC poll concluded that 61 percent of 
Spaniards believe that the PP has frequent problems with the 
way in which it presents its proposals. Fifty-three percent 
of Spaniards surveyed for a poll published in "La Vanguardia" 
said that they thought that the PP's behavior as an 
opposition party was "bad" or "very bad," and only 28 percent 
said that it was either "good" or "very good." 
 
4. Also reflecting the public discontent with GOS's recent 
policies, a massive protest against Zapatero's proposed 
reform to the Education Law took place in Madrid on November 
12 drawing between 400,000 and 2 million people (400,000 by 
police estimates, 2 million according to the organizers). The 
reform is opposed by many conservative groups, including the 
Catholic Church, because it would make the study of 
Catholicism optional rather than mandatory in Spanish public 
schools, it would allow students failing three subjects to 
pass to the next grade level in some circumstances, it would 
allow students to strike, and it would cut the core 
curriculum between autonomous communities to only 55 percent. 
The demonstration received the support of 839 associations, 
58 of which are international. Although it was not officially 
called by the Catholic Church or the PP, a number of 
important PP leaders, as well as six Bishops, attended. The 
protest was supposedly against a GOS proposed reform to laws 
regulating the Spanish educational system, but is better 
understood as a sign of a growing public discontent with GOS 
on a variety of contentious issues, especially the reform of 
Catalonia's Autonomy Statute, and immigration problems, 
especially surrounding huge numbers of migrants jumping the 
fence into Ceuta and Melilla. Embassy personnel who saw the 
protest noted the prominence of banners against a variety of 
GOS policies and for the protection of the Spanish 
Constitution. After the high turnout for the demonstration 
against the reform of the education law, the PP announced 
that it is now preparing for a demonstration in Madrid on 
December 3 in defense of the Spanish Constitution, which will 
focus on the Catalan statute. 
 
5. COMMENT: The coming months will be a critical time for the 
PSOE, as issues such as the Catalonia reform come to a head, 
and public opinion of the GOS may drop further, possibly even 
giving an advantage to the opposition, depending the PP's 
ability to take advantage of the turning tide of public 
opinion. Popular support of the GOS will likely depend on 
what concessions the GOS is eventually willing to make to the 
Catalan regional government regarding the statute reform. 
Adding to Zapatero's difficulties with Catalonia, two more 
issues are complicating the GOS relationship with the region 
and the way the GOS is seen in the rest of Spain: a) an 
attempted takeover of the electricity company Endesa by 
Catalan-based Gas Natural and b) the accusations of 
corruption in the Catalan branch of the socialist party (PSC) 
relating to loans from Catalan bank la Caixa. The PSOE's 
reliance on Catalan nationalist parties in its governing 
coalition has prevented it from taking a hard line on many 
issues having to do with Catalonia - even on issues as 
contentious as whether Catalonia will be allowed to define 
itself as a "nation." Zapatero's management of the issues 
surrounding the region and especially the statute reform in 
the coming months will likely be a determining factor in 
whether the GOS is able to maintain its advantage over the 
PP. Although an ETA truce, if it ever happens, could save the 
GOS's day. 
AGUIRRE