Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 97115 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
ETRD EAGR ETTC EAID ECON EFIN ECIN EINV ELAB EAIR ENRG EPET EWWT ECPS EIND EMIN ELTN EC ETMIN EUC EZ ET ELECTIONS ENVR EU EUN EG EINT ER ECONOMICS ES EMS ENIV EEB EN ECE ECOSOC EK ENVIRONMENT EFIS EI EWT ENGRD ECPSN EXIM EIAD ERIN ECPC EDEV ENGY ECTRD EPA ESTH ECCT EINVECON ENGR ERTD EUR EAP EWWC ELTD EL EXIMOPIC EXTERNAL ETRDEC ESCAP ECO EGAD ELNT ECONOMIC ENV ETRN EIAR EUMEM ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID EREL ECOM ECONETRDEAGRJA ETCC ETRG ECONOMY EMED ETR ENERG EITC EFINOECD EURM EENG ERA EXPORT ENRD ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EGEN EBRD EVIN ETRAD ECOWAS EFTA ECONETRDBESPAR EGOVSY EPIN EID ECONENRG EDRC ESENV ETT EB ENER ELTNSNAR ECHEVARRIA ETRC EPIT EDUC ESA EFI ENRGY ESCI EE EAIDXMXAXBXFFR EETC ECIP EIAID EIVN EBEXP ESTN EING EGOV ETRA EPETEIND ELAN ETRDGK EAIDRW ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ENVI ELN EAG EPCS EPRT EPTED ETRB EUM EAIDS EFIC EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM EAIDAR ESF EIDN ELAM EDU EV EAIDAF ECN EDA EXBS EINTECPS ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EPREL EAC EINVEFIN ETA EAGER EINDIR ECA ECLAC ELAP EITI EUCOM ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID EARG ELDIN EINVKSCA ENNP EFINECONCS EFINTS ECCP ETC EAIRASECCASCID EINN ETRP EAIDNI EFQ ECOQKPKO EGPHUM EBUD ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ENERGY ELB EINDETRD EMI ECONEFIN EIB EURN ETRDEINVTINTCS EIN EFIM ETIO ELAINE EMN EATO EWTR EIPR EINVETC ETTD ETDR EIQ ECONCS EPPD ENRGIZ EISL ESPINOSA ELEC EAIG ESLCO EUREM ENTG ERD EINVECONSENVCSJA EEPET EUNCH ECINECONCS ETRO ETRDECONWTOCS ECUN EFND EPECO EAIRECONRP ERGR ETRDPGOV ECPN ENRGMO EPWR EET EAIS EAGRE EDUARDO EAGRRP EAIDPHUMPRELUG EICN ECONQH EVN EGHG ELBR EINF EAIDHO EENV ETEX ERNG ED
KMDR KPAO KPKO KJUS KCRM KGHG KFRD KWMN KDEM KTFN KHIV KGIC KIDE KSCA KNNP KHUM KIPR KSUM KISL KIRF KCOR KRCM KPAL KWBG KN KS KOMC KSEP KFLU KPWR KTIA KSEO KMPI KHLS KICC KSTH KMCA KVPR KPRM KE KU KZ KFLO KSAF KTIP KTEX KBCT KOCI KOLY KOR KAWC KACT KUNR KTDB KSTC KLIG KSKN KNN KCFE KCIP KGHA KHDP KPOW KUNC KDRL KV KPREL KCRS KPOL KRVC KRIM KGIT KWIR KT KIRC KOMO KRFD KUWAIT KG KFIN KSCI KTFIN KFTN KGOV KPRV KSAC KGIV KCRIM KPIR KSOC KBIO KW KGLB KMWN KPO KFSC KSEAO KSTCPL KSI KPRP KREC KFPC KUNH KCSA KMRS KNDP KR KICCPUR KPPAO KCSY KTBT KCIS KNEP KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNNB KGCC KINR KPOP KMFO KENV KNAR KVIR KDRG KDMR KFCE KNAO KDEN KGCN KICA KIMMITT KMCC KLFU KMSG KSEC KUM KCUL KMNP KSMT KCOM KOMCSG KSPR KPMI KRAD KIND KCRP KAUST KWAWC KTER KCHG KRDP KPAS KITA KTSC KPAOPREL KWGB KIRP KJUST KMIG KLAB KTFR KSEI KSTT KAPO KSTS KLSO KWNN KPOA KHSA KNPP KPAONZ KBTS KWWW KY KJRE KPAOKMDRKE KCRCM KSCS KWMNCI KESO KWUN KPLS KIIP KEDEM KPAOY KRIF KGICKS KREF KTRD KFRDSOCIRO KTAO KJU KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KEN KO KNEI KEMR KKIV KEAI KWAC KRCIM KWCI KFIU KWIC KCORR KOMS KNNO KPAI KBWG KTTB KTBD KTIALG KILS KFEM KTDM KESS KNUC KPA KOMCCO KCEM KRCS KWBGSY KNPPIS KNNPMNUC KWN KERG KLTN KALM KCCP KSUMPHUM KREL KGH KLIP KTLA KAWK KWMM KVRP KVRC KAID KSLG KDEMK KX KIF KNPR KCFC KFTFN KTFM KPDD KCERS KMOC KDEMAF KMEPI KEMS KDRM KEPREL KBTR KEDU KNP KIRL KNNR KMPT KISLPINR KTPN KA KJUSTH KPIN KDEV KTDD KAKA KFRP KWNM KTSD KINL KJUSKUNR KWWMN KECF KWBC KPRO KVBL KOM KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KEDM KFLD KLPM KRGY KNNF KICR KIFR KM KWMNCS KAWS KLAP KPAK KDDG KCGC KID KNSD KMPF KPFO KDP KCMR KRMS KNPT KNNNP KTIAPARM KDTB KNUP KPGOV KNAP KNNC KUK KSRE KREISLER KIVP KQ KTIAEUN KPALAOIS KRM KISLAO KWM KFLOA
PHUM PINR PTER PGOV PREL PREF PL PM PHSA PE PARM PINS PK PUNE PO PALESTINIAN PU PBTS PROP PTBS POL POLI PA PGOVZI POLMIL POLITICAL PARTIES POLM PD POLITICS POLICY PAS PMIL PINT PNAT PV PKO PPOL PERSONS PING PBIO PH PETR PARMS PRES PCON PETERS PRELBR PT PLAB PP PAK PDEM PKPA PSOCI PF PLO PTERM PJUS PSOE PELOSI PROPERTY PGOVPREL PARP PRL PNIR PHUMKPAL PG PREZ PGIC PBOV PAO PKK PROV PHSAK PHUMPREL PROTECTION PGOVBL PSI PRELPK PGOVENRG PUM PRELKPKO PATTY PSOC PRIVATIZATION PRELSP PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PMIG PREC PAIGH PROG PSHA PARK PETER POG PHUS PPREL PS PTERPREL PRELPGOV POV PKPO PGOVECON POUS PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PWBG PMAR PREM PAR PNR PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PARMIR PGOVGM PHUH PARTM PN PRE PTE PY POLUN PPEL PDOV PGOVSOCI PIRF PGOVPM PBST PRELEVU PGOR PBTSRU PRM PRELKPAOIZ PGVO PERL PGOC PAGR PMIN PHUMR PVIP PPD PGV PRAM PINL PKPAL PTERE PGOF PINO PHAS PODC PRHUM PHUMA PREO PPA PEPFAR PGO PRGOV PAC PRESL PORG PKFK PEPR PRELP PREFA PNG PGOVPHUMKPAO PRELECON PINOCHET PFOR PGOVLO PHUMBA PRELC PREK PHUME PHJM POLINT PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PGOVE PHALANAGE PARTY PECON PEACE PROCESS PLN PRELSW PAHO PEDRO PRELA PASS PPAO PGPV PNUM PCUL PGGV PSA PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PGIV PRFE POGOV PEL PBT PAMQ PINF PSEPC POSTS PHUMPGOV PVOV PHSAPREL PROLIFERATION PENA PRELTBIOBA PIN PRELL PGOVPTER PHAM PHYTRP PTEL PTERPGOV PHARM PROTESTS PRELAF PKBL PRELKPAO PKNP PARMP PHUML PFOV PERM PUOS PRELGOV PHUMPTER PARAGRAPH PERURENA PBTSEWWT PCI PETROL PINSO PINSCE PQL PEREZ PBS

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 05HANOI3031, MPS TO FBI: LET'S UPGRADE RELATIONS

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #05HANOI3031.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
05HANOI3031 2005-11-15 10:24 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Hanoi
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 HANOI 003031 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
STATE FOR S/CT, EAP/MLS, L, INL/AAE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PTER ASEC VM CNARC CTERR
SUBJECT:  MPS TO FBI: LET'S UPGRADE RELATIONS 
 
This is an action request.  Please see para 17. 
 
1. (SBU) SUMMARY: The early November visit of an FBI 
delegation to Hanoi, led by Ms. Deborah Pierce, Deputy 
Assistant Director, Criminal Investigative Division (CID), 
and Mr. Thomas Fuentes, Special Agent-in-Charge, Office of 
International Operations, offered the opportunity for the 
Mission to stage two high-level meetings with the Ministry 
of Public Security (MPS) that resulted in groundbreaking 
proposals from MPS for increased direct cooperation. 
Interspersed in the routine exchanges were several pointed 
suggestions from MPS that the U.S. Embassy and MPS develop 
working-level documents, either memoranda of understanding 
or letters of agreement, to permit us to, in the words of a 
senior police general, "upgrade relations to more real and 
practical cooperation."  The general's proposals, made in 
front of a group of a dozen policy-level Vietnamese MPS 
officers and then seconded by the senior Vice Minister, were 
significant steps forward from the previous Vietnamese 
position, which was to reject practical law enforcement 
cooperation on legalistic grounds. 
 
2. (SBU) Summary, cont'd: Both the Vice Minister and the 
general requested assistance in three areas:  provision of 
training and equipment; cooperation and assistance in 
returning Vietnamese fugitives to Vietnam and in overcoming 
agency-level obstacles to returning those fugitives; and, 
working to help Vietnam apprehend its "terrorist enemies" 
such as Kok Ksor, Nguyen Huu Chanh, Vo Van Duc and Ly Tong. 
The next step is up to us to push our law enforcement 
cooperation agenda forward by proposing the working-level 
agreements that will give MPS the legal framework it needs 
to allow real-time cooperation.  We recommend freeing the 
draft DEA-MPS MOU from its current limbo at State Department 
and presenting it to MPS.  Following that, we should draft 
and present documents to allow FBI and DHS similar 
privileges.  End Summary. 
 
3. (SBU) The FBI delegation visited Vietnam from November 2- 
4, 2005 (see list in paragraph 18).  The Mission 
participants included DEA's Hanoi Country Office head Jeff 
Wanner, RSO Peter Gibbons, and Poloff in the group that met 
with MPS, and the DCM led the discussion.  This emphasized 
to MPS that the priorities and issues raised at the meetings 
concern the entire Mission, not just FBI. 
 
Session One:  Police Major General Thao 
--------------------------------------- 
 
4. (SBU) The Vietnamese assembled an impressive set of 
counterparts for the meetings.  The leader of the Vietnamese 
delegation for the main meeting was Police Major General 
Tran Van Thao, supported by a team of 12 MPS officials, 
listed in paragraph 19. 
 
5. (SBU) FBI and DEA both made presentations that laid out 
the USG's key concerns in Vietnam: the expanding network of 
relationships and activities between criminal groups in the 
United States and Vietnam and the lack of real, operational 
cooperation between USG and GVN law enforcement agencies, 
due largely to bureaucratic and political unwillingness on 
the part of the GVN. 
 
6. (SBU) In contrast to many previous meetings where MPS 
mouthed platitudes about increased cooperation while laying 
down insurmountable obstacles to real engagement, General 
Thao started out positive and got more specific and 
practical as the meeting progressed.  He opened the meeting 
by highlighting Vietnamese Prime Minister Phan Van Khai's 
June visit to the United States, Vice Minister of Public 
Security Nguyen Van Huong's meetings with security and law 
enforcement agencies in Washington on the margins of the 
PM's trip and the recent letter of appreciation from former 
Presidents Bush and Clinton thanking Vietnam for its USD 
100,000 donation to the victims of Hurricane Katrina.  After 
a recitation of MPS' accomplishments in fighting narcotics 
in Vietnam, Thao added, "I understand that the war on drugs 
needs international cooperation and support.  I highly 
appreciate the views of DEA, and am someone who supports 
upgrading our relations to include more real, practical 
cooperation on drug crimes.  I see that this kind of 
cooperation is confined to a small level dealing with money 
laundering, but it also needs to reach criminals 
themselves." 
 
7. (SBU) Later in the meeting, responding to a briefing by 
the FBI representatives, Thao expanded his offer further. 
"If American criminals of any kind have connections or 
networks in Vietnam, we are more than willing to help you. 
We can give you their identification information if we have 
it, or whatever else is in our files.  If a Vietnamese 
person commits a crime in your country and escapes, you will 
have our support in pursuing him and then handing him back 
over to you. 
 
8. (SBU) Thao then focused on the issue that has held up all 
offers of cooperation in the past:  Vietnamese legal 
obstacles.  "We are both law enforcement agencies, and we 
have to abide by the law.  Everything we do together has to 
be in strict compliance with the law.  This means that we 
need a legal framework for both sides to facilitate 
cooperation, such as a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty or 
some other mutual agreement to combat crimes together." 
 
9. (SBU) Explicitly recognizing that an MLAT is not a short- 
term possibility, Thao proposed a practical short-term 
alternative:  "In the long term, yes, we want a State-to- 
State MLAT.  But we know that takes a very long time.  For 
the short term, we can come up with an MOU or LOA at a lower 
level to fix problems in our cooperation.  In our 
cooperation with other countries, we have found that we can 
find a more simple and convenient method to create a direct 
MOU or LOA or other arrangement for cooperation.  In terms 
of the legal procedures, it is much simpler.  And it would 
suffice to allow our experts to work together directly." 
 
10. (SBU) Clearly reading a well-prepared talking point, and 
with the representative from the General Department of 
Security nodding in agreement, Thao concluded:  "I want to 
deliver this message:  MPS has come to absolute agreement to 
upgrade its relations with the United States to a higher 
level."  He then assigned his International Cooperation 
Department to work with the U.S. Embassy to discuss the 
details of the necessary arrangements. 
 
11. (SBU) Thao raised two issues as Vietnamese concerns: 
MPS lack of equipment and capacity, and the need for the USG 
to reciprocate when MPS assists in handing over wanted 
fugitives.  Thao's request for training and assistance was 
somewhat perfunctory, delivered hurriedly.  He was more 
concerned about the reciprocity issue.  "When we hand over a 
criminal," he said, "we do so unconditionally.  But when we 
ask you for assistance in returning a wanted fugitive, we 
get lots of conditions before you will give him up."  Thao 
cited the case of Nguyen Khac Son as an example.  "You may 
not understand that, when it comes to finding and returning 
a U.S. fugitive, there are many agencies involved in the 
process.  MPS becomes the advocate for the United States and 
takes charge of the process of obtaining interagency 
consensus on the decision to return a fugitive.  We need you 
to be the advocate for us that way, instead of telling us 
that other agencies are preventing you from helping us." 
 
12. (SBU) Thao also touched on the issue of anti-GVN 
activists operating from the United States and asked for 
continued U.S. assistance in these cases.  He expressed his 
appreciation for what he called "encouraging developments" 
concerning the case of Nguyen Huu Chanh, Vietnam's public 
enemy number one and the patron of the anti-Vietnam 
organization Government of a Free Vietnam. 
 
Session Two:  Vice Minister Toan 
-------------------------------- 
 
13. (SBU) Later, the delegation, led by the Ambassador, met 
with Standing Permanent Vice Minister of Public Security 
Nguyen Khanh Toan.  Toan, himself a former investigator, 
received the delegation warmly and expressed explicit 
support for Thao's earlier proposals.  "I find these 
proposals necessary and practical and in accordance with 
Vietnam's needs," Toan said.  "I think that with this first 
high-level FBI visit, there is a good chance for us to meet 
and raise understanding on both sides for real functional 
cooperation."  He cautioned, however, that "any cooperation, 
police or security, will be in accordance with the 
principles of sovereignty and noninterference in internal 
affairs.  We have orders to protect the Vietnamese 
population, and you should keep in mind that we have only 
modest experience in dealing with outsiders." 
 
14. (SBU) Toan was even more concerned with the issue of 
anti-Vietnam activists, launching into a long diatribe about 
Montagnard Foundation head Kok Ksor, Nguyen Huu Chanh and 
convicted bomber Vo Van Duc.  He reserved his most bitter 
vitriol for AMCIT Ly Tong, currently imprisoned in Thailand 
for having hijacked a small plane and using it to drop pro- 
democracy leaflets over Ho Chi Minh City during President 
Clinton's visit there in 2000.  Towards the end of his rant, 
Toan revealed that he had been in charge of security for the 
Clinton visit, which would explain his vehemence on the 
subject.  "I explained to Ambassador Pete Peterson that I 
would take care of everything on security for the visit. 
But I never expected that," he said.  The Ambassador noted 
that the USG has no higher priority than the war on terror, 
and that the United States "absolutely supports" the 
sovereignty and territorial integrity of Vietnam.  The USG 
is aware of the statements and activities of some of the 
anti-Vietnam groups and continues to monitor them to ensure 
that political speech does not become political violence, he 
added. 
 
Next Steps 
---------- 
 
15. (SBU) General Thao and Vice Minister Toan delivered the 
most positive message we have heard on the subject of law 
enforcement cooperation.  The next step, however, is to test 
their sincerity by actually proposing letters of agreement 
or memoranda of understanding that would accomplish what the 
two generals promised.  We have one MOU already in the 
pipeline:  a draft DEA-MPS MOU that we submitted to 
Washington for Circular 175 authority in early August of 
this year.  We understand that this MOU is still under 
discussion between the legal offices of DEA and State, but 
we hope that Washington will be able to expedite approval of 
this MOU so we can propose it to MPS as soon as possible. 
 
16. (SBU) The next step we can take is to modify the MOU 
that FBI recently signed with China for use in Vietnam.  We 
will work with LEGATT in Bangkok to obtain a copy of that 
MOU and then submit our proposed modifications to the FBI, 
EAP and L for clearance before we bring it to the GVN.  If 
that works, we can then apply the same language to a 
document that would cover DHS/ICE-MPS interaction.  We 
understand that these MOUs would likely not address the 
GVN's concerns regarding smoothing the process of returning 
their most wanted criminals to Vietnam.  This outcome does 
not require (or, probably, allow) an MOU-centered approach, 
unless it is to provide simple assurances that the USG will 
do its best under U.S. law to facilitate returns.  The main 
benefit of any document is to free up the Vietnamese 
agencies to work with us; we are already free to work with 
them. 
 
17. (SBU) ACTION REQUEST:  Please advise as to the timetable 
for completion of Washington consultations on the DEA-MPS 
draft MOU we submitted for consideration. 
 
LIST OF PARTICIPANTS 
-------------------- 
 
18. (SBU) The senior officials in the FBI delegation were 
Ms. Pierce and Mr. Fuentes.  Charles Cunningham, Section 
Chief, Transnational Criminal Enterprises, CID; James Stern, 
Unit Chief, Asian Criminal Enterprises (ACE), CID; Kevin 
Humphreys, Supervisory Special Agent, ACE, CID; Charles 
Bevan, Unit Chief, Office of International Operations; 
Michael Reilly, Foreign Operations Specialist, Office of 
International Operations; Truc Kim Dang, Language 
Specialist; Robert Cahill, Legal Attache, Bangkok; Robert 
Burkes, Assistant Legal Attache, Bangkok; and Daniel Kelly 
Supervisory Special Agent, Bangkok, also attended. 
 
19. (SBU) The MPS participants were: 
 
- Senior Colonel Tran Gia Cuong, Director, Department of 
International Cooperation; 
- Senior Colonel Hoang Cong Tu, Director, Counter-Terrorism 
Department; 
- Senior Colonel Nguyen The Cong, Deputy Department 
Director, General Security Department; 
- Senior Colonel Nguyen Xuan Bich, Deputy Director, Office 
of the General Police Department; 
- Senior Colonel Nguyen Manh Te, Deputy Director, Criminal 
Investigation Department; 
- Senior Colonel Le Van Nghenh, Deputy Director, Office of 
the Investigation Bureau; 
- Senior Colonel Bui Van Ha, Deputy Director, Economic 
Investigation Department; 
- Senior Colonel Le Van Ngenh, Deputy Director, National 
Investigative Agency and Counternarcotics Department (C-17) 
- Senior Colonel Cong Van Hieu, Expert on External 
Relations, Department of International Cooperation; 
- Colonel Tran Van Thanh, Interpol Office; 
- Lieutenant Colonel Nguyen Van Chieu, Deputy Division 
Chief, Department of International Cooperation; 
- Captain Le Hoang Duong, Expert, Department of 
International Cooperation (interpreter). 
 
MARINE