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Viewing cable 05HANOI2918, AFTER ACTION MEETING WITH MINISTRY OF DEFENSE AND

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
05HANOI2918 2005-11-03 08:33 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Hanoi
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

030833Z Nov 05
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 HANOI 002918 
 
SIPDIS 
 
UNCLASSIFIED   U-290-05 
 
SIPDIS 
 
TAGS: VM
SUBJECT: AFTER ACTION MEETING WITH MINISTRY OF DEFENSE AND 
VIETNAM VETREANS OF AMERICA FOUNDATION'S PARTNERSHIP. 
 
 
PASS: PM/WRA PLEASE PASS TO MR. ED TRIMAKAS (U) 
 
1. SUMMARY: ON 14 OCTOBER 2005, THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE 
(MOD) OF THE SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM (SRV) CONDUCTED 
AN AFTER-ACTION MEETING TO REVIEW THE RESULTS OF PHASE ONE 
OF THE LEVEL ONE LANDMINE AND UNEXPLODED ORDNANCE (UXO) 
IMPACT ASSESSMENT AND TECHNICAL SURVEY CONDUCTED IN 
PARTNERSHIP WITH THE VIETNAM VETERANS OF AMERICA FOUNDATION 
(VVAF) FROM MAY TO NOVEMBER 2004.  THIS ASSESSMENT, AND 
ASSOCIATED CLEARANCE EFFORTS, WERE SPONSORED BY THE U.S. 
DEPARTMENT OF STATE'S OFFICE OF WEAPONS REMOVAL AND 
ABATEMENT. THIS AFTER ACTION MEETNG WAS CONDUCTED FOR THE 
BENEFIT OF THE DONOR, AS WELL AS TO INTRODUCE OTHER 
CONCERNED ORGANIZATIONS, BOTH GOVERNMENTAL AND NON- 
GOVERNMENTAL, TO THE RESULTS OF THIS PROJECT. DEPUTY CHIEF 
OF MISSION AND MARINE AND NAVAL ATTACHE REPRESENTED THE 
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT IN THIS MEETING. 
 
2. ON 14 OCTOBER, THE MOD OF THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM 
(GVN) CONDUCTED AN AFTER ACTION REVIEW OF PHASE ONE OF A 
LEVEL ONE LANDMINE AND UXO IMPACT ASSESSMENT AND TECHNICAL 
SURVEY CONDUCTED IN PARTNERSHIP WITH VVAF. THIS PROJECT WAS 
THE PILOT PHASE OF AN INTENDED MULTI-PHASE EFFORT DESIGNED 
TO PRODUCE A NATION-WIDE IMPACT ASSESSMENT OF ALL SIXTY- 
FOUR PROVINCES OF VIETNAM.  ADDITIONALLY, A TECHNICAL 
SURVEY WAS CONCURRENTLY CONDUCTED TO CLEAR HIGH-PRIORITY 
UXO/LANDMINE CONTAMINATION PRESENTING AN IMMEDIATE DANGER. 
FOR THE PILOT PHASE, THE ASSESSMENT AND SURVEY FOCUSED ALL 
ACTIVITIES ON THE THREE MOST-HIGHLY CONTAMINATED PROVINCES 
OF QUANG TRI, QUANG BINH, AND HA TINH.  APPROXIMATELY SIXTY 
PERSONS WERE IN ATTENDENCE AT THIS MEETING, INCLUDING 
REPRESENTATIVES OF SEVERAL FOREIGN EMBASSIES IN HANOI, NON- 
GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS, VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT 
MINISTRIES, AND NUMEROUS MEDIA ORGANIZATIONS.  THE HIGHEST 
RANKING GVN REPRESENTATIVES IN ATTENDENCE WERE SRCOL HOANG 
KIEN, COMMANDING OFFICER OF THE MOD'S ENGINEERING COMMAND, 
AND MR. PHAM VAN QUE, DEPUTY DIRECTOR THE AMERICA'S 
DEPARTMENT OF THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS. 
 
3. PHASE ONE SURVEY BACKGROUND: DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN THE 
U.S. GOVERNMENT (USG) AND THE GVN CONCERNING THIS PROJECT 
BEGAN IN 2001. A PARTNERSHIP ACCORD BETWEEN VVAF AND THE 
GVN'S IMPLEMENTING PARTNER (MOD) WAS SIGNED IN JANUARY 
2002, BUT A MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING (MOU) WAS NOT 
SIGNED UNTIL JANUARY 2003 FOLLOWING THE EXCHANGE OF 35 
DRAFTS. VIETNAM'S PRIME MINISTER PHAM VAN KHAI SIGNED A 
PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION PLAN IN FEBRUARY 2004, AUTHORIZING 
THE EXECUTION OF THE PROJECT. EXTENSIVE DELAYS IN PRODUCING 
THESE DOCUMENTS CAUSED SIGNIFICANT COST OVERRUNS AND 
NECESSITATED ADDITIONAL FUNDING FOR VVAF IN FY05 
(APPROXIMATELY $200 K). SURVEY TEAM TRAINING AND FINAL 
COORDINATION TOOK PLACE BETWEEN MARCH AND MAY OF 2004. 
 
4. PHASE ONE SURVEY EXECUTION: THE PILOT ASSESSMENT AND 
SURVEY OF THE THREE PROVINCES BEGAN IN MAY 2004 AND WAS 
CONCLUDED IN NOVEMBER 2004. DURING THE PILOT SURVEY, MORE 
THAN 5,000 PEOPLE WERE INTERVIEWED (IN 344 OUT OF 558 
COMMUNES IN THE THREE PROVINCES).  MORE THAN 421 HECTARES 
OF LAND WERE CLEARED, AND MORE THAN 6,000 PIECES OF 
ORDNANCE AND RELATED MATERIAL WERE CLEARED AND DESTROYED BY 
TEAMS FROM THE MOD'S TECHNOLOGY CENTER FOR BOMB AND MINE 
DISPOSAL (BOMICEN). 
 
5. DATA ENTRY INTO THE INFORMATION MANAGEMENT SYSTEM FOR 
MINE ACTION (IMSMA) DATABASE WAS CARRIED OUT IN DECEMBER 
2004, AND FROM JANUARY UNTIL OCTOBER 2005, VVAF AND MOD 
COORDINATED THE ANALYSIS OF THE DATA, AS WELL AS THE 
CONTENT AND FORMAT OF THE FINAL REPORT.  THIS WAS A PERIOD 
OF CONTENTION BETWEEN THE PARTNERS LARGELY DUE TO DIFFERING 
IDEAS ABOUT THE NATURE OF THE REPORT, THE INTENDED USERS OF 
THE DATA, AND THE RELATIVE SENSITIVITY OF THAT DATA WITH 
RESPECT TO NATIONAL SECURITY.  CONSEQUENTLY, THE DATE FOR 
THIS MEETING WAS REPEATEDLY ADJUSTED FROM AN INITIAL DATE 
SET FOR MID-JULY. THE MEETING WAS FINALLY CONDUCTED ONCE 
ALL OF THE OUTSTANDING DISAGREEMENTS HAD BEEN RESOLVED TO 
VARYING DEGREES OF SATISFACTION BY THE PARTNERS. 
 
6. THE PHASE ONE AFTER ACTION MEETING WAS CONDUCTED IN LESS 
THAN TWO HOURS.  FOLLOWING INTRODUCTIONS, THE COMMANDING 
OFFICER OF BOMICEN, SENIOR COLONEL (SRCOL) NGUYEN TRONG 
CANH PROVIDED A POWERPOINT BRIEFING, DESCRIBING THE DESIGN, 
EXECUTION AND RESULTS OF THE PILOT PROJECT. HIS BRIEFING 
INCLUDED A HANDFUL OF RECOMMENDATIONS TO BE DISCUSSED 
FURTHER FOR POSSIBLE IMPLEMENTATION DURING PHASE TWO OF THE 
PROJECT. HE CONCLUDED HIS PRESENTATION BY STATING THAT THE 
PROJECT DATA COULD BE MADE AVAILABLE TO STAKEHOLDER'S AND 
DONORS FOLLOWING SUBMISSION OF A VALIDATED REQUEST. 
 
7. SRCOL CANH'S BRIEFING WAS FOLLOWED BY COMMENTS BY SRCOL 
KIEN, THE COMMANDING OFFICER OF MOD'S ENGINEERING COMMAND, 
THE PARENT ORGANIZATION OF BOMICEN.  SRCOL KIEN'S COMMENTS 
HIGHLIGHTED THE PROBLEM OF UXO/LANDMINE CONTAMINATION IN 
VIETNAM AND THE ENORMITY OF THE FINANCIAL COMMITMENT THAT 
WOULD BE REQUIRED TO SOLVE THE PROBLEM.  HE SUGGESTED THAT 
IT WOULD TAKE QUOTE 12 BILLION U.S. DOLLARS UNQUOTE TO 
ADEQUATELY ADDRESS THE PROBLEM, AND HE URGED CONTINUED U.S. 
FINANCIAL SUPPORT. 
 
8. SRCOL KIEN'S COMMENTS WERE FOLLOWED BY EMBASSY DEPUTY 
CHIEF OF MISSION (DCM), WHO REAFFIRMED THE USG'S COMMITMENT 
TO PHASE II OF THIS PROJECT.  STATING THE NECESSITY OF A 
NATIONAL MINE ACTION STRATEGY FOR VIETNAM, THE DCM OPINED 
THAT THIS SURVEY WAS AN ESSENTIAL FIRST STEP TOWARDS 
ACHIEVING THAT END. 
 
9. THE DIRECTOR OF VVAF'S INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND MINE 
ACTION PROGRAMS (IMMAP) WAS THE FINAL SPEAKER. HE BRIEFLY 
HIGHLIGHTED THE UNIQUENESS OF THE WORKING RELATIONSHIP 
BETWEEN VVAF AND THE VIETNAMESE MOD, BEFORE DELVING INTO A 
SUBSTANTATIVE ENUMERATION OF MANY OF THE LESSONS LEARNED 
FROM THE PILOT PROJECT, MANY OF WHICH BUTTRESS ARGUMENTS 
CALLING FOR A MORE-DETAILED PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION PLAN 
PRIOR TO PROCEEDING ONTO PHASE II.  HE ALSO SUGGESTED THAT 
THE GOAL SHOULD NOT BE TO MAKE VIETNAM UXO/LANDMINE 
CONTAMINATION FREE, BUT RATHER TO MAKE VIETNAM IMPACT FREE 
FROM SUCH CONTAMINATION. 
 
10. ACCORDING TO THE PUBLISHED AGENDA, THIS MEETING WAS 
SUPPOSED TO HAVE ENDED WITH A PERIOD OF QUESTIONS AND 
ANSWERS OPEN TO ALL ATTENDEES.  HOWEVER, FOLLOWING THE VVAF 
REPRESENTATIVE'S COMMENTS, A BOMICEN REPRESENATIVE 
INDICATED THAT THE MEETING WAS OVER. HE DIRECTED THE 
ATTENDEES TO ADJOURN TO THE CORRIDOR OUTSIDE OF THE MEETING 
ROOM, WHERE FOLLOW-UP QUESTIONS COULD BE DISCUSSED OVER 
LIGHT REFRESHMENTS. UPON QUESTIONING, SRCOL KIEN INDICATED 
THAT BOMICEN HAD BEEN CONFUSED BECAUSE THE QUESTION AND 
ANSWER SESSION HAD NOT BEEN LISTED ON THEIR VERSION OF THE 
AGENDA. 
 
11. AS REGARDS PHASE II, VVAF HAVE PROPOSED TO WORK AGAIN 
WITH THE MOD UNDER A NEW AGREEMENT TO CONDUCT A FOLLOW-ON 
UXO/LANDMINE IMPACT SURVEY OF THE REMAINING SIXTY-ONE 
PROVINCES IN VIETNAM.  THEIR ESTIMATED COST OF THIS PROJECT 
IS $6.3 MILLION FOR THE SURVEY OVER A PERIOD OF THREE 
YEARS.  VVAF AND MOD WOULD ALSO LIKE TO ADD A MORE 
SUBSTANTIAL TECHNICAL RESPONSE CAPABILITY TO THE SURVEY 
TEAMS TO IMMEDIATELY DISPOSE OF CRITICAL LANDMINE/UXO ITEMS 
FOUND DURING THE SURVEY.  VVAF ESTIMATES THAT TECHNICAL 
RESPONSE CAPABILITY OF TWENTY TEAMS WOULD ADD APPROXIMATELY 
$2.8 MILLION OVER THE SAME THREE-YEAR PERIOD.  RECENT USDAO 
HANOI DISCUSSIONS WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF THE AUSTRALIAN 
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT (AUSAID) INDICATE AN 
INTEREST IN SUPPLEMENTING U.S. SPONSORSHIP OF PHASE II IN 
THE AREA OF CLEARANCE. 
 
12. COMMENTS: THE AFTER-ACTION MEETING WAS LESS 
COMPREHENSIVE THAN SUGGESTED BY ORGANIZERS. IT WAS A 
POSITIVE MILESTONE IN THE PROCESS OF DEALING WITH VIETNAM'S 
UXO HOWEVER, IF FAILED TO RESOLVE LINGERING CONCERNS BY 
MANY PARTIES ABOUT THE GOVERNMENT OF VEITNAM'S COMMITMENT 
FOR PHASE ONE. 
 
13. LESSONS FROM PHASE I INDICATE THAT THE GVN HAS NOT YET 
FULLY SUBSCRIBED TO THE LEVEL OF MINISTERIAL INTEGRATION 
NECESSARY TO DEVELOP AND EXECUTE A SURVEY OF THE MAGNITUDE 
OF PHASE II WITHOUT A PROLONGED PERIOD OF NEGOTIATIONS. A 
PERIOD OF NEGOTIATIONS THAT EXTENDS BEYOND THE TIME FRAME 
ENVISIONED BY VVAF'S OPTIMISTIC SCHEDULE IS LIKELY TO 
RESULT IN COST OVERRUNS THAT MAY JEOPARDIZE THE LONG-TERM 
SUSTAINABILITY OF THIS PROJECT, AND SIMULTANEOUSLY DENY 
MUCH-NEEDED FUNDING TO OTHER WORTHY PROJECTS. 
 
14. THE CHIEF OF MISSION'S FY06 COUNTRY PLAN RECOMMENDED 
THAT YEAR ONE FUNDING FOR THE EXECUTION OF PHASE II OF THE 
LANDMINE IMPACT ASSESSMENT AND TECHNICAL SURVEY PROJECT 
($3,036,798) BE MADE CONTINGENT UPON SATISFACTION OF A FIRM 
TIMETABLE FOR COMPLETING NEGOTIATIONS LEADING TO THE 
ISSUANCE OF A GVN APPROVED PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION PLAN AND 
A LIST OF PROJECT DELIVERABLES. THE INABILITY OF THE 
PROJECT PARTNERS TO SATISFY THIS TIMETABLE WOULD LIKELY 
NECESSITATE A RE-EVALUATION OF THE FUTURE VIABILITY OF THIS 
PROJECT. 
 
15. IT WAS  UNLIKELY THAT BOMICEN DID NOT HAVE THE QUESTION 
AND ANSWER PERIOD LISTED ON THEIR SCHEDULE. THEIR RETICENCE 
TO OPEN THE MEETING TO QUESTIONS PROBABLY INDICATES THAT 
BOMICEN FELT UNPREPARED TO ANSWER DETAILED QUESTIONS ABOUT 
THE DESIGN OF THE SURVEY OR ABOUT PLANS FOR SUBSEQUENT 
PHASES OF THE EFFORT. 
 
16. THE TIMIDITY OF BOMICEN TO ANSWER HARD QUESTIONS DURING 
THIS MEETING AS WELL AS THEIR CONTINUED APPEAL TO QUESTIONS 
OF NATIONAL SECURITY TO POSTPONE DIFFICULT DECISIONS MAY 
NOT AUGUR WELL FOR ACHIEVING THE AMBITIOUS MILESTONES OF 
PHASE II. 
 
17. FINALLY, WHILE MOD LEADERSHIP CONTINUES VERBALLY TO 
REAFFIRM THEIR BELIEF IN THE STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF THIS 
PROJECT, MID-LEVEL LEADERS RESPONSIBLE FOR EXECUTING THE 
GVN'S INCUMBENT RESPONSIBILITIES APPEAR DECIDELY LESS 
ENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT THE PROSPECTS FOR OR NECESSITY OF PHASE 
II.  THE RATE OF PROGRESS IN PLANNING FOR PHASE TWO BEARS 
CLOSE WATCHING TO ENSURE THAT U.S. GRANT DOLLARS ARE BEING 
WISELY DISPENSED COMMENSURATE WITH MILESTONES ACHIEVED. 
 
18. THE MOD PRESENTATION AND ASSOCIATED VVAF SUPPORTING 
DOCUMENTATION, AS WELL AS THE FINAL REPORT FOR PHASE I IS 
AVAILABLE IN ELECTRONIC FORMAT AND CAN BE E-MAILED UPON 
REQUEST. 
 
19. POC FOR THIS MESSAGE IS MAJ ROBERT LUCIUS, USMC, 
MARA/ALUSNA, 84-4-772-1500, EXT 2307, LUCIUSRE@STATE.GOV.