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Viewing cable 05BEIRUT3670, MGLE01: DEFENSE MINISTER MURR SAYS ARMY UNABLE TO

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
05BEIRUT3670 2005-11-14 08:51 2011-07-21 00:00 SECRET Embassy Beirut
Appears in these articles:
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/16545
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/16461
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/16545
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/16546
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/16605
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/16606
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/16703
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/16793
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/16794
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/16636
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/16635
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/17148
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/17149
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/17150
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/17152
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/17155
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/17156
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/17157
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/17158
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/17159
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/17160
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/17161
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/17163
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/17164
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/17165
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/17166
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/17167
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/17169
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/17170
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/17171
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/16723
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/16635
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/16636
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/16637
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/16638
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/16639
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/16640
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/16641
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/16642
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/16643
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/16644
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/16645
P 140851Z NOV 05
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0645
INFO ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
S E C R E T  BEIRUT 003670 
 
 
NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/WERNER/SINGH 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/08/2015 
TAGS: KPAL MARR MASS MCAP MOPS PGOV PTER SY LE
SUBJECT: MGLE01:  DEFENSE MINISTER MURR SAYS ARMY UNABLE TO 
CONFRONT MILITIAS 
 
Classified By: Christopher W. Murray, Charge d'Affaires. 
Reason:  Section 1.4 (d). 
 
1.  (S)  In a November 8 meeting with NEA DAS Elizabeth 
Dibble, the Ambassador, the defense attache, and econoff, 
Deputy Prime Minister and Defense Minister Elias Murr said 
that he is trying to transform the Lebanese military after 15 
years of Syrian direction.  He wanted to change the "Syrian 
mentality" present in training and procedure.  Syria 
continues to support terrorist groups in Lebanon, said Murr, 
including the "well-trained, well-equipped army" of 
Hizballah.  Lebanon cannot enjoy security until the Syrian 
regime changes its mentality, said Murr.  When Dibble 
mentioned the continued existence of militias, Murr asserted 
that the Lebanese military is not ready to take on the 
militias.  Murr estimated that it will take another six to 
eight months of reform and rebuilding until the military 
could be "counted on."  Murr agreed with the idea of 
low-profile U.S. military teams to assess the needs of the 
Lebanese military.  His hand still bandaged from a car bomb 
attack, Murr mentioned that he still needs three more 
operations to repair the damage of the assassination attempt 
on him in July.  Murr also said that he has passed on to 
Hizballah his awareness of a potential threat against him, in 
hopes of warding off Hizballah following Syrian orders to 
kill him.  Murr also claimed to have seen an intercepted 
telephone conversation that suggests Hizballah will adopt a 
dangerously aggressive stance in the period immediately 
following the next report of UNIIIC Chief Detlev Mehlis.  End 
summary. 
 
THE SYRIAN EFFECT LINGERS 
------------------------- 
 
2.  (C)  On 11/8, NEA DAS Elizabeth Dibble, the Ambassador, 
the defense attache, and econoff met with Deputy Prime 
Minister and Defense Minister Elias Murr.  Murr began by 
listing the lingering effects of the Syrian occupation. 
Fifteen years of Syrian domination of the military and 
security services has left poor training and an old 
mentality.  New security techniques and a new mentality must 
be learned by the armed forces.  Murr said that the process 
of transitioning from a "Syrian mentality" is about 70 
percent complete.  The military is open to change; no one is 
resisting.  Military personnel want to be trained in the 
United States and in Europe.  Murr estimated that about half 
of Lebanese military equipment was American-made and about 
half Soviet-made, and all is very old. 
 
3.  (C)  More importantly, Murr continued, Syria continues to 
manage several terrorist groups.  Murr cited Palestinian 
armed groups both in and out of the camps, as well as 
Hizballah with its "well-trained and well-equipped army." 
Lebanon will never enjoy good security and real change 
without change in Syria, Murr said.  "I am not talking about 
regime change," Murr immediately clarified, "I talking about 
a change in mentality."  Once the Syrian regime changes the 
way it thinks, Syrian allies in Lebanon will be cut off from 
support, asserted Murr. 
 
NOT READY TO TAKE ON MILITIAS 
----------------------------- 
 
4.  (C)  Dibble pointed out that any progress in Lebanon will 
be difficult as long as private armies, such as Hizballah, 
operate freely.  Murr replied that, while he agreed, the 
Lebanese military is not ready deal with the militias.  It 
doesn't have the necessary equipment, training, or mentality. 
 Murr estimated that the military would need six to eight 
months before "we can count on the Lebanese Armed Forces." 
Currently, the military can be expected to show its presence, 
but not to take any action.  (Comment:  Murr appeared to be 
referring to the increased army presence near Palestinian 
militant bases in October.  The army did not enter the bases, 
however, even after a civilian army surveyor was shot and 
killed.  End comment.) 
 
5.  (C)  The Ambassador asked Murr about a proposed liaison 
between the military and foreign countries who are willing to 
provide assistance.  Murr, claiming that this was his first 
day back to work since the attempt on his life in July, asked 
about the status of this plan.  (Note:  Murr's secretary told 
econoff after the meeting that this was not really Murr's 
first day back.  End note.)  The Ambassador replied that 
Prime Minister Fouad Siniora, in Murr's absence, had agreed 
to a U.S. assessment of the Lebanese military's needs as long 
as it kept a low profile.  The first teams will arrive in 
November.  Murr agreed with this approach and promised to 
raise the issue with the Lebanese commander-in-chief, with 
whom he will meet later that afternoon. 
 
MORE ON MURR 
------------ 
 
6.  (C)  Murr said that he was still facing three more 
operations to repair the damage of the assassination attempt. 
 He will have another operation on his (still-bandaged) hand, 
and an operation on each of his ears in the December/January 
timeframe.  Murr preferred to greet us with a gesture over 
his heart with his damaged right hand rather than shake 
hands.  He said that he had been training for 15 days to sign 
his name.  Murr's head of security also had visible scars on 
the side of his head. 
 
Private Aside 
------------- 
 
7.  (S)  Privately, Murr took aside DAS Dibble and the 
Ambassador to discuss what he believes is recent threat 
information against him.  He said that he had Georges Khoury, 
head of the LAF's G-2 (military intelligence) branch visit 
Hizballah security chief Wafiq Safa' to share with Safa's 
Murr's information, which in Murr's view implicates Hizballah 
in a Syrian-inspired plot to murder him.  Murr said that he 
was awaiting an "official response" to Hizballah.  Murr also 
expressed considerable concern that Hizballah will adopt a 
more aggressive stance once Detlev Mehlis issues his 12/15 
report.  At that point, Murr said, Hizballah, under Syrian 
orders, will attempt to provoke Sunni-Shia fighting in 
Lebanon.  Murr claimed to have learned of Hizballah's plans 
through an intercept of a telephone conversation between 
Hizballah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah and As-Safir 
journalist Ibrahim Amin.  In dangerous and aggressive ways, 
Hizballah will show its "true face" after 12/15, Murr 
claimed.  In his view, while this "true face" will be 
dangerous for Lebanon, at least the other Lebanese will 
understand at last what they are facing. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
8.  (C)  Murr seems to be another example of a formerly 
"pro-Syria" figure making a post-occupation conversion.  We 
note that little more than a year ago, Murr, as Interior 
Minister, told the Ambassador that Sunni extremists and the 
Palestinian camps could not be controlled without the help of 
the Syrian military and intelligence.  Now he is talking 
about ridding the Lebanese military of the vestiges of the 
Syrian occupation.  Of course, Murr's "conversion" was 
sparked by the 7/12 car bomb attack intended to kill him -- 
and which Murr believes to be a Syrian-backed operation.  End 
comment. 
 
9.  (U)  This message has been cleared by DAS Dibble. 
 
MURRAY