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Viewing cable 05ADDISABABA3941, DARFUR POLITICAL TALKS: AU PSC DEMANDS SLM/A FOCUS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
05ADDISABABA3941 2005-11-23 14:36 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Addis Ababa
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ADDIS ABABA 003941 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR AF/FO, AF/SPG, AF/RSA, AF/E. 
LONDON AND PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHERS. 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL SU XA AF UNION
SUBJECT: DARFUR POLITICAL TALKS:  AU PSC DEMANDS SLM/A FOCUS 
 
 
1. (SBU) Summary:  According to African Union (AU) mediator 
for the Darfur Political Talks Amb. Sam Ibok, the Seventh 
Round of talks will resume in Abuja on November 28.  On 
November 22, the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) urged 
all parties to ensure that the Seventh Round is the "decisive 
round" with a comprehensive peace agreement consistent with 
the North-South Comprehensive Peace Agreement of January 
2005.  The PSC "strongly" demanded that SLM/A leaders put 
aside their differences to focus on negotiations to end the 
conflict.  The PSC also decided to work with the UNSC to 
consider appropriate measures, including sanctions, against 
any party that undermines the peace process.  The AU appears 
to be redoubling efforts on Abuja in order to create more 
favorable conditions for a mid-January PSC decision on the 
future of AMIS, including arrangements for a transition to a 
UN mission.  (Note:  The PSC Communique and accompanying 
report were forwarded to AF/SPG and Embassy Khartoum.  End 
note.) 
 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
AU OFFICIALS SEEK ABUJA SAVING GRACE, FEAR SLM/A SPOILER 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
 
2. (SBU) With the transition of AMIS to UNMIS on AU and 
partner minds, AU officials express dismay that the October 
SLM/A "elections" have deepened divisions within the 
movement, making a political settlement, and impression of AU 
success, all the more difficult.  Peace and Security 
Commissioner Amb. Said Djinnit indicates that the AU is 
putting even more emphasis on achieving a timely political 
settlement in Darfur.  Amb. Ibok told Addis-based partners 
November 16 that the AU team continues to promote an 
all-inclusive process as excluding Abulwahid El Nur could 
prompt him to "misbehave" in order to secure a seat at the 
table.  Ibok noted that the AU seeks to ensure that any 
agreement reached in Abuja is implementable and said that 
details on security arrangements "will make or break" a 
settlement.  Ibok also stated his personal view that Mini 
Minawi may not be ready to negotiate and may still be 
pursuing a military solution to Darfur. 
 
3. (SBU) AU Special Representative Baba Gana Kingibe observed 
on November 16 that the long-overdue arrival of Canadian APCs 
will improve AMIS force posture but that AMIS still lacks the 
capability to "take on the parties" if they refuse to 
cooperate.  Following the October 10 PSC Communique on 
Darfur, Kingibe had expressed disappointment that the UNSC 
did not issue a presidential statement supporting the AU 
Commission's hard-won achievement of a PSC communique 
mentioning the possibility of UNSC sanctions on 
non-cooperative parties. 
 
4. (SBU) Comment:  The AU undoubtedly hopes to point to signs 
of progress in Abuja ahead of the "planning mission" to 
assess AMIS requirements and its future, which will inform a 
mid-January PSC decision on the AMIS mandate.  AU Darfur 
Integrated Task Force officials indicate that the PSC should 
also address the issue of transition from an AU to a UN-led 
military mission, but AU leaders remain wary on timing. 
Addis-based partners are seeking a meeting with Peace and 
Security Commissioner Djinnit the week of November 28 to come 
to agreement on planning mission dates, composition and 
objectives.  End comment. 
 
-------------- 
PSC COMMUNIQUE 
-------------- 
 
5. (U) BEGIN TEXT OF COMMUNIQUE 
 
The Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the African Union 
(AU), at its 43rd meeting, held on 22 November 2005, adopted 
the following decision on the preparation for the 7th Round 
of Inter-Sudanese Peace Talks on the conflict in Darfur: 
 
Council, 
 
1. Expresses concern over recent developments on the ground, 
particularly violations of the Ceasefire Agreement, under any 
pretext whatsoever, and calls upon all the parties to 
exercise maximum restraint and to abide by their commitments; 
 
2. Urges all the Parties to return immediately to Abuja for 
the 7th Round of the Talks, without any preconditions, and to 
ensure that the 7th Round is the decisive one, with a 
comprehensive peace Agreement to end the conflict in Darfur, 
as was agreed at the end of the 6th Round. 
 
3. Reminds the leaders of the SLM/A of their heavy 
responsibility not to prolong the suffering of their people 
in Darfur and, in this respect, strongly demands that they 
put aside their differences and personal ambitions and focus 
on the negotiations to end the conflict; 
 
4. Further demands that, as soon as practicable, the 
leadership crisis in the Movement should be addressed 
collectively and resolved in a manner that is democratic, 
transparent and fair; 
 
5. Requests the Commission to ensure that invitations to the 
7th Round of the Talks are extended to the two groups in the 
SLM/A, as may be deemed appropriate; 
 
6. Commends all countries and institutions that have taken 
initiatives to overcome the divisions within the SLM/A and 
requests them to pursue their efforts in close cooperation 
and consultation with the AU; 
 
7. Decides, in close cooperation and consultation with the UN 
Security Council, to consider future appropriate measures, 
including sanctions, to be taken against any party that will 
undermine or constitute an obstacle to the peace process in 
Darfur, including the Abuja Talks, as well as violations of 
the N'djamena Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement and the Abuja 
Protocols; 
 
8. Appeals to all international partners to lend their strong 
support to the AU position on an all-inclusive peace process 
that will address the legitimate grievances of the people of 
Darfur and to continue to support the Peace Talks, as well as 
the AMIS deployment in Darfur, with financial and material 
resources; 
 
9. Encourages the Special Envoy and Chief Mediator and his 
Team, the Chadian co-Mediation, the Facilities and Observers, 
to spare no efforts to speedily conclude a Comprehensive 
Peace Agreement on the conflict in Darfur that is consistent 
with the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) of January 2005, 
the Interim Constitution of the Sudan and the Declaration of 
Principles (DoP) adopted by the parties in Abuja during the 
5th Round of Talks; 
 
10. Decides to remain seized with the developments in the 
peace process in Abuja and the efforts to stabilize the 
security situation in Darfur. 
 
END TEXT OF COMMUNIQUE. 
 
6. (U) Minimize considered. 
HUDDLESTON