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Viewing cable 05ADDISABABA3844, ENGAGING THE AU - THOUGHTS AHEAD OF THE AF COM

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
05ADDISABABA3844 2005-11-14 13:45 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Addis Ababa
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 ADDIS ABABA 003844 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR AF/FO, AF/RSA, S/P. LONDON AND PARIS FOR 
AFRICA WATCHERS. EUCOM FOR POLAD. 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL XA AF UNION
SUBJECT: ENGAGING THE AU - THOUGHTS AHEAD OF THE AF COM 
MEETING 
 
REF: A. ADDIS ABABA 3010 
 
     B. ADDIS ABABA 3461 
     C. ADDIS ABABA 3313 
 
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED.  PLEASE TREAT ACCORDINGLY. 
 
1. (SBU) Summary:  The African Union (AU) is displaying 
tremendous political will to address the continent's 
problems, which differentiates it from the OAU, its defunct 
predecessor organization.  The AU is also serving as the 
coordinating body for positive change in Africa by playing a 
more proactive role in international fora and in promoting 
member state implementation of continental and international 
legal instruments.  As many of the AU's programs are in their 
beginning stages, now is the right time to engage the AU to 
help ensure continental programs and policies are in line 
with U.S. objectives.  Despite positive developments, the 
AU's ability to act remains constrained by inadequate 
institutional capacity, which threatens to undermine critical 
efforts to pursue peace and security and other objectives. 
Post offers these comments ahead of the November 16 
Washington COMs discussion on the future of U.S.-Africa 
relations.  End summary. 
 
-------------------- 
WHY FOCUS ON THE AU? 
-------------------- 
 
2. (SBU) The AU is positioning itself as Africa's premier 
continental organization.  It  holds member states to a 
higher standard on a range of issues while promoting peace, 
security, development and prosperity.  The AU sees peace and 
security in Africa as necessarily linked to development and 
good governance. 
 
3. (SBU) AU responses to events in Darfur, Mauritania and 
Togo are examples of the AU's conscious decision to adopt a 
stance of "non-indifference" regarding problems afflicting 
the continent.  Senior AU officials argue that 
"non-indifference" distinguishes the AU from the OAU and its 
ineffective policy of "non-interference."  The AU is striving 
to prove that it is no longer a pure rubber stamp of member 
state whims, but rather seeks to develop the institutional 
capacity and legal basis to be a proactive leader. 
"Non-indifference" translates to a more attentive partner; 
but, as evidenced by Somalia, also to a partner that may 
attempt to move ahead on its own absent international 
community support and dialogue. 
 
4. (SBU) 53 member states increasingly look to the AU to 
coordinate African positions in international fora such as 
the UN and WTO.  AU efforts are geared at bringing about more 
positive outcomes for Africa.  Member states look to the AU 
to harmonize and bolster their efforts to implement 
continental and international commitments in areas such as 
counter-terrorism, health, infrastructure, peace and 
security, etc. 
 
-------- 
WHY NOW? 
-------- 
 
5. (SBU) The AU is in the beginning stages of developing 
policy and implementation plans for a wide range of issues 
intersecting with the USG's own priorities for Africa.  These 
plans will set the continent's agenda, so providing technical 
and financial assistance now will help ensure Africa's 
programs are more in line with U.S. objectives. 
 
6. (SBU) Doors are currently open for USG engagement.  The AU 
has requested USG assistance to develop a continental 
"roadmap" for counter-terrorism and to provide technical and 
other assistance to the Algiers-based African Center for 
Study and Research on Terrorism.  The AU has also requested a 
U.S. health attache to help guide the institution's response 
to HIV/AIDS, malaria, polio and other health threats.  These 
are but two specific examples of the AU's actively seeking 
out USG engagement and input. 
 
-------------------------- 
EXAMPLES OF KEY ACTIVITIES 
-------------------------- 
Regional Integration 
-------------------- 
 
7. (SBU)  Key to the AU's ability to project a positive 
stance is a draft MOU with its regional economic communities 
(RECs) to better define continental and regional roles and 
responsibilities.  The AU also seeks to harmonize membership 
in the RECs.  To improve the AU's outreach capability and 
response time, various partners, including the USG, are 
working to upgrade AU communications infrastructure. 
 
Peace and Security 
------------------ 
 
8. (SBU) The AU was forced to establish an ad-hoc mission in 
Darfur, because it did not yet have a viable continental 
peace and security architecture.  Now the AU is making great 
strides in concert with the G8 and other partners to develop 
the African Standby Force (ASF).  ASF efforts are geared 
towards ensuring five regional brigades are formed and 
possess sufficient doctrine; standard operating procedures; 
training and evaluation mechanisms; command, control, 
communication and information systems (C3IS); and logistics 
capability to undertake progressively more complex peace 
support operations.  The USG is leading assistance for C3IS. 
Other elements of the peace and security architecture under 
development include a conflict early warning system, AU field 
offices, and a Panel of the Wise. 
 
9. (SBU) The African Center for Study and Research on 
Terrorism (ACSRT) and the nascent CT cell in Addis Ababa seek 
to assist member states with harmonizing CT efforts and 
implementing both continental and international CT 
commitments.  The NDU's Africa Center for Strategic Studies 
has been working with the AU in this pursuit. 
 
10. (SBU) The AU is seeking to carve out a complementary role 
for itself in post-conflict reconstruction and stabilization. 
 
 
Good Governance 
--------------- 
 
11. (SBU) The AU is leading a review of the Lome Declaration 
on Unconstitutional Changes of Government, which may give the 
AU a greater say in addressing poor governance and other 
factors which may lead to coups. 
 
12. (SBU) Ongoing integration of the New Partnership for 
African Development (NEPAD) into AU structures and 
streamlining NEPAD's focus is expected to increase the 
effectiveness of the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) and 
streamline AU efforts to build African infrastructure. 
 
13. (SBU) The AU is working to field more capable elections 
monitors at each African election. 
 
Trade 
----- 
 
14. (SBU) The AU sees improving infrastructure as key to 
increasing African trade and development.  To this end, the 
AU promotes harmonization of policies and strategies for 
development of land and maritime transport infrastructure, as 
well as member state adherence to maritime security standards. 
 
15. (U) The AU is also spearheading programs to harmonize 
policies and regulations in the information and 
telecommunications technologies fields, and to develop a 
general energy policy. 
 
16. (SBU) The AU seeks to harmonize member state positions in 
the Doha round of the WTO. 
 
Health 
------ 
 
17. (U) Efforts are underway to develop an Integrated Health 
System in Africa to confront HIV/AIDS, malaria, tuberculosis 
and other infectious diseases. 
Institutions 
------------ 
 
18. (SBU) The AU continues work to establish the African 
Central Bank, African Investment Bank, African Monetary Fund, 
and African Court of Justice and Human and Peoples' Rights. 
In addition, the AU is developing a strategic plan for the 
Pretoria-based Pan African Parliament.  The Economic and 
Social Council was established in March 2005 to serve as the 
principal interface between the AU and civil society. 
 
---------- 
CHALLENGES 
---------- 
 
19. (SBU) The AU is an organization of 53 member states 
ranging in attitude and influence from South Africa to 
Nigeria to Libya to Comoros.  The AU Commission is often 
constrained by the need to secure member state buy-in each 
step of the way.  The need to not stretch too far beyond 
member states' vision can render the AU slow to accept some 
forms of assistance from outside Africa, though the United 
States and other partners can build upon the AU's ultimate 
positive experience with partner technical assistance for 
Darfur.  The Commission can also be hindered (Togo) or 
prematurely pushed (Somalia) into action by strong member 
states. 
 
20. (SBU) Currently, the AU lacks sufficient administrative 
and financial structures to implement many of its programs. 
The lack of a separate DPKO-like mechanism to support 
missions such as AMIS in Darfur negatively impacts the AU's 
ability to meet contractor commitments or ensure adequate 
staffing.  Encouragingly, the AU is working with a group of 
partners to undergo an institutional assessment and implement 
follow-up recommendations to streamline processes and 
procedures.  The UN is also assisting the AU with improving 
its peacekeeping support structures. 
 
21. (SBU) Lack of full compliance by member states in paying 
assessed and voluntary contributions renders the AU overly 
dependent on contributions from outside the continent and 
produces delays in program implementation. 
 
22. (SBU) The AU lacks sufficient database collection, input 
and analysis capability, hindering its ability to make 
informed decisions to target initiatives with member states. 
 
23. (SBU) The AU sees its leadership in the military and 
political aspects of finding a solution to the Darfur crisis 
as a test of its credibility and partnership both with the 
international community and its member states.  Perception of 
AU failure in Darfur will negatively impact the AU's ability 
to serve as intervening agent of first resort to address 
other African conflicts. 
 
--------------- 
KEEPING ENGAGED 
--------------- 
 
24. (SBU) Ensuring that Embassy Addis, and indeed the 
eventual U.S. Mission to the AU, is properly staffed is 
crucial to USG ability to track the ever-increasing scope of 
AU activities and to positively influence outcomes.  Proper 
staffing at this stage includes the assignment of additional 
senior foreign service officers, including additional USAID 
officers, a permanent U.S. Military Liaison Officer, and a 
Health Attache. 
 
25. (SBU) The U.S. should continue to build on its lead 
partner role in the niche area of communications support to 
the AU, and work to ensure the AU takes advantage of NATO 
expertise for peace and security capacity-building.  The U.S. 
should also expand its focus to direct support efforts at 
institutional capacity building through ESF and other 
mechanisms.  Without proper institutional structures, even 
peace and security efforts will falter.  U.S. support to the 
AU should also continue to expand beyond peace and security 
to health, development, political affairs, economic affairs 
and other areas. 
 
26. (SBU) More positive outcomes of AU Peace and Security 
Council (PSC) decisions could be fostered by working more 
closely with key AU member states, including the 15 PSC 
members. 
 
27. (SBU) Engaging senior AU leaders through regular U.S.-AU 
Policy Talks will better target USG interaction with and 
support to the AU. 
 
 
 
 
HUDDLESTON