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Viewing cable 05ADANA216, SOUTHEAST REMAINS SKEPTICAL ABOUT GOT REFORM PROMISES AFTER

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
05ADANA216 2005-11-23 06:57 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Consulate Adana
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ADANA 000216 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
NOT FOR INTERNET DISTRIBUTION 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM TU
SUBJECT: SOUTHEAST REMAINS SKEPTICAL ABOUT GOT REFORM PROMISES AFTER 
PM VISIT TO REGION 
 
REF: A) ADANA 207, B) ANKARA 6772 
 
1. (SBU) Summary and comment:  Reaction in Turkey's 
heavily-Kurdish southeast to PM Erdogan's November 21 visit to 
Semdinli, Yuksekova and Hakkari was positive, but skepticism 
about the government's ability to bring the perpetrators of the 
Semdinli bombings to justice remains high.  Erdogan did not 
offer specifics about how the government's handling of the 
Semdinli issue would differ from past  inquiries, which the 
regional public considers whitewashes.  The PM's speeches 
disappointed the local public.  Erdogan has not built 
confidence in his commitment to new democracy initiatives for 
the region.  End Summary and Comment. 
 
PM Visits Region Most Affected by Post-Bombing Violence 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
-------------- 
 
2. (U) Erdogan, accompanied by Minister of Justice Cicek and 
Minister of Interior Aksu, made a "surprise" visit to the 
southeastern cities of  Semdinli, Yuksekova and Hakkari on 
November  21.  The visit came after a week of violence in those 
cities following the implication of jandarma in a November 9 
bookstore bombing in Semdinli (reftels A and B).  The PM's visit 
was an attempt by the government to resolve tensions in the 
region.  Erdogan used photo opportunities in front of damaged 
Semdinli buildings, promising locals repayment for damage done 
to their property in the blast, to try to cast a sympathetic 
image of the national government to skeptical Hakkari residents. 
 Erdogan emphasized that issues in southeast Turkey needed to be 
addressed by economic development and called for national unity 
based on a common Turkish identity.  He  called for patience and 
commitment to judicial due process and denounced terrorism.  The 
PM's remarks in Semdinli clung closely to the line set by TGS 
Chief Ozkok rather than the more forward-leaning language 
regarding a "Kurdish question" that Erdogan used in a Diyarbakir 
speech in August.  Regional Kurdish activists clearly believe 
that reform suggestions based mainly on economic development are 
inadequate; they want to see political change.  The PM also 
deflected questions about why F-16s had flown low over funeral 
ceremonies remembering those killed in recent clashes; he said 
he would look into why the overflight had happened. 
 
Visit Appreciated, but GOT Must Follow-up with Action 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
--------- 
 
3. (SBU)  Van attorney Abdulmenaf Kiran told us the visit was a 
positive step, but confidence in the government had deteriorated 
since authorities released two of three jandarma suspects 
directly implicated in the bombing incident (reftel B).  Kiran 
emphasized that the PM needs  to demonstrate his decisiveness 
with concrete actions, but that, so far, the government had done 
nothing. 
 
4. (SBU) Former Semdinli Mayor Selahattin Ciftci told us that 
the PM was warmly received during his visit to Semdinli.  Ciftci 
said that while the PM was touring the bombed out shops he 
instructed local civilian officials to compensate the citizens 
for their losses and promised to bring the perpetrators to 
justice.  Ciftci stated that local youths were constrained by 
police for security reasons from going near the PM as he 
addressed the crowd.  Ciftci emphasized that efforts by the GOT 
to prosecute the perpetrators will play a key role in building 
confidence between the government and local citizens. 
 
5. (SBU) Hakkari Chamber of Commerce and Industry (CCI) 
President Ahmet Sen told us people were happy to see the PM in 
the region, and interpreted his visit as an indication that the 
government would keep its promise to bring the Semdinli bombers 
to justice.  Sen said that the visit would contribute to 
confidence building.  Sen added that life in the region had 
returned to normal after the violent, post-bombing 
demonstrations, and that "people with common sense" applauded 
the PM's visit and his pledge to ensure a thorough 
investigation.  (Comment:  Sen's assessment is at odds with 
reports of continuing protests throughout SE Turkey.  End 
Comment.) 
 
Can GOT Fulfill Promises? 
--------------------------------- 
 
6. (SBU) Yuksekova pro-Kurdish Democratic People's Party (DEHAP) 
Mayor Salih Yildiz told us that the PM's promises of a thorough 
investigation pleased Hakkari residents, but people still have 
serious doubts about what Erdogan could do about the "deep 
state." (Note:  A term commonly used referring to a supposed 
government-within-the-government allegedly comprised of 
ultra-nationalist security and justice officials, bureaucrats, 
and PKK defectors who carry out illegal, sub rosa activities to 
protect and preserve the  state.  Many people believe that the 
Semdinli bombers were "deep state" agents. End Note.)  Yildiz 
said that Erdogan's visit to Yuksekova raised some expectations 
among the local populace for government recognition of their 
Kurdish identity and greater application of justice for the 
Kurdish population.  Yildiz believes the purpose of the PM's 
visit was to show the EU and the rest of the world that the GOT 
is not indifferent to the bombings, while seeking to reduce 
tensions in the region. 
 
7. (SBU) Diyarbakir's Southeastern Industrialists and 
Businessmen Association (GUNSIAD) President Sahismail 
Bedirhanoglu told us that no prime minister had visited places 
in the southeast where similar incidents had occurred in the 
past, and that Erdogan's visit to the region showed sensitivity. 
 Bedirhanoglu is encouraged by the PM's promise to bring the 
perpetrators to justice, and by his remark that "Turkey is not 
the Turkey in 1991."  (Note: This refers to the "state of 
emergency" period when many mysterious killings occurred, and 
the perpetrators were never brought to justice.  End Note) 
Bedirhanoglu emphasized that people in the region would maintain 
a wait and see attitude regarding the PM's promises. 
 
Comment 
------------ 
 
8. (SBU)  Our interlocutors are pleased with the PM's efforts to 
build confidence between the government and the people of the 
region.  At the same time, most of  the regional public remains 
doubtful about the government's ability to penetrate what they 
see as a wall  thrown up by the security establishment.  Much of 
the regional public actually believes that the security 
establishment  wants to keep the PKK/Kurdish terrorism threat 
alive through such activities as terrorist-type bombings staged 
by security forces to undermine the EU reform process, 
protecting their current privileged position in the Turkish 
state.  Jandarma may have been involved in dirty tricks in 
Hakkari, but the extent of these alleged incidents elsewhere in 
southeast Turkey and how high up involvement runs is unclear.  A 
transparent investigation is sorely needed, both to answer local 
questions about jandarma involvement and to  rebuild regional 
public confidence in the government.  Erdogan's visit offered 
little concrete evidence that the GOT will turn a new leaf in 
handling the Semdinli affair. 
REID