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Viewing cable 05ACCRA2287, UNHCR DISCUSSES RESETTLEMENT, KRISAN CAMP,

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
05ACCRA2287 2005-11-08 11:31 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Accra
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ACCRA 002287 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREF PREL GH TO CI
SUBJECT: UNHCR DISCUSSES RESETTLEMENT, KRISAN CAMP, 
REPATRIATION, AND CONTINGENCY PLANNING FOR COTE D'IVOIRE 
 
1.  (SBU) SUMMARY:  During their initial courtesy call, 
Ambassador Bridgewater and Acting UNHCR Representative Luc 
Stevens discussed resettlement issues, the brewing unrest at 
Krisan Camp, the possible repatriation of Togolese refugees, 
and contingency planning for Cote d'Ivoire.  Stevens said the 
hub would refer 700 refugees over the next two months, but 
did not offer any numbers from among the Ghana refugee 
population.  He advised that 600 refugees from Krisan Camp 
were still camped at the Ghanaian/Ivoirian border, demanding 
resettlement on the basis of false information, but 
apparently tiring of their predicament.  Stevens agreed that 
the GOT's calls for assistance with repatriation of Togolese 
refugees was premature.  Finally, he discussed the possible 
use of three reception centers in case large numbers of 
TCN's, refugees, and Ghanaians had to flee to Ghana from Cote 
d'Ivoire.  END SUMMARY. 
 
----------------------------------------- 
Resettlement:  Still Too Little, Too Late 
----------------------------------------- 
 
2.  (U) Acting UNHCR Representative Luc Stevens called on 
Ambassador Bridgewater on December 4, with DCM Jerry Lanier 
and Ref Coord Nate Bluhm present.  When asked directly about 
the declining resettlement activity in the region, Stevens 
proffered some good news:  the hub estimated that five branch 
offices would be submitting referrals for another 700 
refugees between now and December 31.  These numbers would 
come from CAR, Cameroon, Gabon, and Nigeria (about 100 from 
each location), and from Sierra Leone (300). 
 
3.  (SBU) On the Sudanese, Stevens said the Minister of the 
Interior (MOI) was generating confusion by telling the press 
they would either be resettled or moved to a third country. 
UNHCR was reluctant to refer them for resettlement at this 
time because of the possible pull factor, and no other 
country had agreed to accept them on an interim basis. 
Nevertheless, Stevens acknowledged that High Commissioner 
Guterres had told his office to consider resettlement as a 
durable solution for the Sudanese, an order he took 
seriously.  Stevens noted that Sudanese continue to trickle 
into Ghana at the rate of five to ten per week.  It was 
ironic that after moving 250 Sudanese from Central Accra to 
Krisan Camp in August, the MOI now had to contend with them 
in his own backyard, since he represented the nearby city of 
Takoradi in parliament. 
 
----------------------- 
Consternation in Krisan 
----------------------- 
 
4.  (SBU) The MOI's inaccurate public pronouncements on the 
Sudanese were triggering resentment at Krisan Camp, home to a 
polyglot community of 2,000 Sudanese, Togolese, Ivoirians, 
Rwandans, and others.  The Togolese in this camp arrived in 
Ghana as early as 1993 and believe they should be given 
consideration for resettlement before the Sudanese.  Stevens 
reminded us that resettlement is based on need, not 
nationality.  Other refugees heard that enrollment in a 
vocational training program would be tantamount to local 
integration and thus disqualify them for resettlement. 
Emotions came to a head on November 1, when Stevens tried to 
visit the Camp for the first time.  He turned back after 
learning that refugees had packed their bags in the 
expectation that UNHCR would transport them to Accra's 
international airport for immediate resettlement.  Still 
other rumors circulated that the UNHCR offices in Ghana would 
be closed and all assistance would cease.  Some 600 angry 
refugees thus began the long, 40-mile walk to the 
Ghanaian/Ivoirian border, where they demanded entry into Cote 
d'Ivoire.  Some succeeded in contacting RFI and BBC to 
complain of the UNHCR's alleged mistreatment of them. 
Bewildered border officials eventually decided not to allow 
the refugees to cross the border, since there was no legal 
basis for admitting them. 
 
------------ 
The Togolese 
------------ 
 
5.  (SBU) Stevens shared that he had been in touch with the 
GOT's Commissioner for Repatriation, who unconvincingly 
stated that everything was now fine in Togo and it was time 
to begin repatriating the refugees.  Stevens reminded him 
that repatriation had to be voluntary, and the 11,900 
recently arrived refugees in the Volta Region were in no mood 
to return home yet.  Ref Coord pointed out that Ghana is home 
to another 4,000 Togolese who fled during unrest in the 
1990's.  While there may be conceptually an "ideal" time for 
resettlement to begin, waiting for "perfection" should not 
serve as a pretext for inaction.  Someone may have missed the 
boat by not resettling this group earlier; now we face the 
prospect that resettling the older caseload would unsettle 
the new arrivals in the Volta Region.  Stevens agreed to 
check into unconfirmed reports that the older Togolese 
caseload had already been referred for resettlement years ago 
but had been rejected. 
 
-------------------------------------- 
Contingency Planning for Cote d'Ivoire 
-------------------------------------- 
 
6.  (SBU) Contingency plans had been drafted in case events 
turned sour in Cote d'Ivoire, Stevens said.  The GOG had 
identified three possible reception centers located near the 
Ivoirian border and the various players had drafted emergency 
budgets for sharing among potential donors.  UNHCR would not 
issue an appeal until such time as refugee flows actually 
began; otherwise, the Ivoirians could think that UNHCR had 
already concluded that violence was inevitable.  The UN's 
OCHA office in Dakar was taking the lead in coordinating 
regional contingency planning. 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
7.  (SBU) COMMENT:  Stevens was forthright and appeared to be 
well versed in refugee issues, despite having become Acting 
Representative only one month ago.  The 700 submissions for 
resettlement Stevens promised would bring the regional UNHCR 
total to approximately 2,400 P-1's for this calendar year, 
still short of the 3,000 to which Geneva committed when it 
accepted five PRM-funded resettlement positions.  Still, the 
700 anticipated over the next two months would restore 
resettlement activity to an acceptable level, following the 
dismal months of September and October, when UNHCR referred 
only 25 cases.  As for the Sudanese, despite their exemplary 
behavior, the MOI will continue to regard them as a thorn in 
his side.  We hope UNHCR will eventually refer most of the 
vulnerable Sudanese to the U.S. Resettlement Program, an 
action that would please both the GOG and UNHCR's largest 
donor.  We will continue to monitor the stand-off at the 
Ivoirian border; by most accounts, the refugees are tiring of 
this publicity stunt and many have already asked for 
transportation back to Krisan.  END COMMENT. 
BRIDGEWATER