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Viewing cable 05RANGOON1204, BURMA: SMALL EXPLOSION AT TRADERS HOTEL ON OCTOBER

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
05RANGOON1204 2005-10-24 11:08 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Rangoon
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 RANGOON 001204 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
DEPT FOR S/ES, DS, OBO, INR, EAP, S/CT, CA/OCS/ACS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ASEC PTER CASC PGOV PREL BM
SUBJECT: BURMA: SMALL EXPLOSION AT TRADERS HOTEL ON OCTOBER 
21, 2005 
 
REF: A. LARSON/DS OPS TELCON 
     B. CT03-1005-150-1748 
     C. IIR 6 812 0006 06 
 
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED, PROTECT ACCORDINGLY. NOT FOR 
INTERNET. 
 
1. SUMMARY: On Friday, October 21, at around 1838 hours 
(local time), a small explosion occurred near Traders Hotel, 
which is located less than a mile from the Chancery. (Note: 
Embassy TDYers and long-term Overseas Building Operations 
(OBO)/New Embassy Compound (NEC) personnel reside at this 
location.) No one was injured and only minimal damage 
reported. All official Americans (to include TDYers, OBO and 
Bill Harbert company employees) were contacted and accounted 
for and American mission security personnel were placed on 
alert. At this time, no one has claimed responsibility and no 
one is in custody. Regional Security Office (RSO) personnel 
met with local police and Traders Hotel security on Friday 
night and Monday morning and offered assistance. More 
information will be provided once known. Following FSNI's 
eyewitness report the explosion was small, contained and 
isolated, and there were no injuries, Charge, RSO and Conoff 
discussed the advisibility of activating the warden system 
and concluded the situation did not merit this action. Should 
this situation change, the subject would be revisited. END 
SUMMARY. 
 
2. A small, but loud, explosion occurred in front of Traders 
Hotel at around 1838 hours on Friday, October 21, 2005. The 
explosion was heard and reported by OBO security staff who 
reside at the hotel; the explosion was also heard by the 
Marine on Post One (the Chancery is a kilometer away), and at 
the Grand Meeyahta (an apartment complex housing official 
Americans, located two blocks from the hotel) and at the 
Sakura Apartments (where a number of official Americans 
reside, about three-four kilometers away). No one was injured. 
 
3. The location of the explosion was at the northeast corner 
of the hotel, at the intersection of Bogyoke Aung San Road 
and Sule Pagoda Road. The hotel has a large sign at the 
corner and the device was placed between the sign and the 
street in an area covered by a lot of foliage. The Government 
of Burma (GOB) police and military immediately closed down 
the adjacent roads and began a clean-up effort and started 
the investigation. The explosion appears to have mainly been 
intended as a "noise-maker," causing large holes in the 
ground and scattering dirt and pebbles over the area. 
Side-view mirrors on a few nearby vehicles broke, but neither 
the hotel windows nor building itself shook or suffered 
damage. 
 
4. Post's Foreign Service National Investigator (FSNI) 
responded at once to the scene, where police informed him 
that the device was placed in a black, plastic type satchel 
and traces of TNT were found (verified at the police meeting 
on October 24). (Note: Traders security staff reported 
observing a bright light and smoke emanating from the site, 
just after the noise of the explosion.) No initial 
information as to who placed the device, and no more 
information on the device is known at this time. GOB has 
augmented hotel security with Armed Battalion and uniformed 
police. 
 
5. This area has heavy foot traffic, as the hotel is located 
near the main market, one of the main bus stops and the 
central train station. The fact that the explosion occurred 
when no one was in the immediate vicinity is likely not a 
coincidence. Eyewitnesses place a few young girls, who were 
selling postcards, at that location just beforehand. Once 
they walked away, the device detonated (the girls were not 
involved). Police surmise someone either walked by and threw 
the satchel in the bushes and remotely detonated the device 
or threw it from a passing car (the former seems more likely 
given angles and location). The sheer volume of foot and 
vehicle traffic in that location at that time of day makes it 
probable that the device was remote detonated and not set on 
a timing device, since no one was standing next to the bomb 
when it detonated and the traffic light was red from the side 
where there would have been heavy traffic flow. 
 
6. RSO staff and Defense Attache met with GOB Special Branch 
officials on Monday, October 24. RSO and DATT offered 
forensic and investigative assistance. GOB officials 
appreciated the offer and said they would "raise it up the 
ladder." (Note: The GOB often agrees to pass our offers up 
their chain of command, but normally never takes us up on 
offers of support.) GOB ordered Traders staff to cover up the 
holes that same night of the blast, so no one could see the 
site the next morning, another sign they want this event to 
disappear quickly. Special Branch Colonel Win Naing Tun said 
the GOB was still interviewing eyewitnesses, but had no 
suspects in mind and no suspects in custody. He also said the 
explosives used were not the same type of explosives used on 
the May 7 attacks, nor were there any apparent links to those 
events, stating, "this event was to destabilize and sow fear." 
 
7. Separately, in a press conference the GOB held on October 
23, GOB officials alluded they had received "intelligence" 
that two students from the All Burma Students Democratic 
Front (ABSDF, which operates out of Thailand and is outlawed 
in Burma) had infiltrated Burmese borders to conduct 
"disruptive acts against key locations." No more specifics 
were provided and police told us no known suspects were in 
mind at the October 24 meeting. 
 
8. RSO staff, DATT, and OBO Site Security Manager (SSM) staff 
met with Traders Hotel Security and Management personnel just 
after the police meeting on the 24th. RSO saw Armed Battalion 
in front of the hotel, but no damage remained visible and the 
scene had returned to "business as normal." Traders security 
provided RSO with rough photographs of the site (police 
wouldn't allow Traders staff close to the scene) and some 
CCTV (closed circuit television cameras) photos that captured 
still images about the same time as the blast. However, CCTV 
coverage stopped a few feet shy of capturing the actual area 
of detonation. No evidence of significant shrapnel/fragment 
damage was found. It appears this device was designed to make 
a lot of noise vice creating bodily harm. 
 
9. The current security posture at Traders appears to be 
adequate. As a result of the May 7 bombings in Rangoon, 
visitors (but not hotel guests) are screened and searched; 
these searches tend to be no more than a quick, cursory 
search of personal items. As a result of the October 21 
explosion, additional police assets have been deployed to the 
hotel, including an Explosive Ordinance Detection (EOD)-type 
team that conducts daily sweeps of the compound, two 
plain-clothed officers and additional uniformed police. 
Traders has nine uniformed security officers both inside and 
outside of the hotel, they conduct vehicle screening of 
already parked cars in the hotel parking area, and security 
coverage is augmented by CCTV. Traders security mentioned 
exploring the addition of Mylar to their ground floor 
windows. RSO and SSM recommended a number of additional 
options to consider for security operations and will continue 
to work with Traders and other hotels and apartment complexes 
in this same regard. 
 
10. Traders is also the planned location of the Marine Corps 
Ball on November 19. Security arrangements were again 
reviewed with the police and Traders security. Post will 
continue to review its security posture and will make any 
changes as needed, right up until the day of the Ball. 
 
11. OBO and TDY personnel residing at Traders did not want to 
leave the hotel and felt comfortable remaining there after 
the explosion. The Local Guard Force and Surveillance 
Detection personnel were notified and instructed to increase 
their patrols, coverage of perimeters, and to report any 
suspicious incidents or packages immediately. 
 
12. Separately, police informed our FSNI that on the morning 
of October 21, a large gasoline fire occurred at the Hmawbi 
military petrol depot and that police suspect arson. Also on 
October 21, police allegedly discovered a cache of arms, 
ammo, bombs and other explosives (no further information 
known) at the Takone train station, which is close to 
Mandalay (hundreds of kilometers north of Rangoon). 
 
13. Comment: The government raised fuel and transportation 
costs between 600-900 percent this past week (septel); in 
some cases, this means the average Burmese will have to pay 
about half of his or her daily salary in transportation costs 
now. This explosion could have been political in nature, 
since the government does not allow public protests or 
demonstrations. Post will continue to follow events and 
report via septel. 
STOLTZ