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Viewing cable 05PARIS7352, FRENCH MFA READOUT ON CHAVEZ VISIT, COLOMBIA, AND

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
05PARIS7352 2005-10-27 11:12 2011-04-29 00:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Paris
Appears in these articles:
http://www.semana.com/wikileaks/Seccion/168.aspx
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
id: 43788
date: 10/27/2005 11:12
refid: 05PARIS7352
origin: Embassy Paris
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination: 05PARIS5211|05PARIS7124|05STATE192336
header:
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.



----------------- header ends ----------------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 007352 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/26/2015 
TAGS: PREL PGOV FR VE BL CO
SUBJECT: FRENCH MFA READOUT ON CHAVEZ VISIT, COLOMBIA, AND 
BOLIVIA STATEMENT 
 
REF: A. STATE 192336 
     B. PARIS 7124 
     C. PARIS 5211 
 
Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt, reasons 
1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
1.  (C) Summary: MFA DAS-equivalent for South America 
provided a frank and unapologetic readout October 24 of 
French policy toward Venezuela and the recent visit of 
President Chavez.  The MFA highlighted France's economic 
interests in Venezuela, downplayed concerns about human 
rights, regional stability, and arms purchases, and professed 
to view Bolivian elections with more concern than those to 
take place in Venezuela.  According to the MFA, GoF strategy 
is to act discretely to steer Chavez to act responsibly and 
to counsel prudence rather than confrontation.  The one 
exception is on Iran, where FM Douste-Blazy delivered a 
strong message to FM Rodriquez Araque warning against 
dealings with Iran given its interest in acquiring nuclear 
technology.  The MFA said it was only interested for the 
moment in selling spare parts for French-origin equipment 
already in Venezuela but hinted at an interest in other arms 
sales. 
 
2.  (C) Separately, the MFA affirmed that the French agreed 
in substance with the Bolivia Support Group text, but 
indicated it would await and support an EU statement.  End 
Summary. 
 
3.  (U) Deputy Political Counselor and Poloff met October 24 
with MFA DAS-equivalent for South America Michel Pinard and 
Venezuela Desk Officer Lionel Paradisi to seek a readout of 
Venezuelan President Chavez's October 21-22 visit to Paris 
and his meetings with President Chirac as well as Foreign 
Minister Rodriguez's meetings with French FM Douste-Blazy. 
They also raised ref A demarche on the Bolivia Support Group 
statement. 
 
France's Economic Interests 
--------------------------- 
 
4.  (C) Pinard highlighted at the outset extensive French 
economic interests in Venezuela, adding that Chavez had met 
with a broad array of public and private sector 
representatives in order to encourage increased French 
engagement in Venezuela.  Chavez, he said, was seeking to 
diversify its partners in the oil industry and had met toward 
that end with Total, which already has a 5 billion USD 
investment in Venezuela.  Other discussions focused on 
possible French involvement in the transport sector, social 
housing, and student exchanges (Colombian students in France 
number 1800, as opposed to only 200 French students in 
Venezuela).  Pinard indicated that the situation in Haiti had 
been discussed in the context of Chavez's Petro-Caribbean 
initiative; queried by Deputy PolCouns whether France had any 
concerns about Venezuelan use of oil diplomacy, Pinard 
characterized it as completely beneficial, arguing that Haiti 
was not a country likely to become Chaviste or Bolivarian in 
its outlook simply because of oil provided at favorable 
prices.  Pinard nonetheless asserted that French associate 
membership in the Amazonian Cooperation Treaty Organization 
(ACTO) on November 24 would provide a useful balancing 
factor.  The only critical note was Pinard's acknowledgment 
that the GoF had counseled Chavez on the need for judicial 
guaranties for companies to preserve international 
investment. 
 
Chavez Here to Stay 
------------------ 
 
5.  (C) Pinard noted that he recently met with a member of 
the Venezuelan NGO Sumate and had carefully listened to that 
organization's concerns about human rights and democracy in 
Venezuela.  However, he characterized Sumate essentially as 
an oppositionist political organization.  The problem with 
the opposition, Pinard continued, was that it lacked 
organization and provided no real alternative or direction; 
moreover, the various opposition groups were united only in 
their opposition to Chavez.  Pinard downplayed our concerns 
about human rights and civil society, stating that, while 
France remained watchful of the situation, it saw no reason 
for immediate alarm.  He dismissed Chavez's famed 
revolutionary speeches as mere rhetorical fireworks that were 
part of the region's political traditions, and said there was 
no real threat behind the rhetoric. 
 
Colombia a Bigger Problem 
------------------------- 
 
6.  (C) Pinard expressed GoF frustration that the Uribe 
government in Bogota had not been able to achieve greater 
progress in its efforts to secure a humanitarian exchange of 
prisoners with the FARC.  This was a French priority that 
included private GoF interactions with the FARC, Pinard said. 
 If the Israelis could negotiate with Hizbollah for a 
prisoner exchange, he reasoned, then Colombia should be able 
to do the same with the FARC.  Pinard indicated that the 
French had asked for Venezuelan help in passing messages to 
both the Uribe government and the FARC to press them to seek 
a military accord that would allow for the humanitarian 
exchange of prisoners.  The FARC posed a problem for 
Venezuela as well, Pinard said, given its activities along 
the border.  Pinard said he knew that there were some in the 
Venezuelan government who, despite their claims that they 
were no longer associated with the FARC, still had ways of 
communicating with the organization.  It was through these 
channels that Pinard hoped to have the Venezuelans press the 
FARC to come to the bargaining table with the Colombian 
government. 
 
Kid Gloves, Except on Iran 
-------------------------- 
 
7.  (C) Chavez was skilled in using international criticism 
of his regime to his domestic political advantage, according 
to Pinard.  As a result, the French approach was one that 
privileged discrete counsel to Chavez over open criticism or 
confrontation.  Comments like those made recently by Pat 
Robertson (despite his position as simply a private citizen) 
only played into Chavez's hands, Pinard argued.  When 
queried, Pinard said that only on Iran had the French 
delivered a strong message to Chavez.  Specifically, French 
Foreign Minister Douste-Blazy had been clear with his 
Venezuelan counterpart, Ali Rodriguez Araque, that Iranian 
pursuit of nuclear military weapons capability was 
unacceptable. 
 
Arms Sales 
---------- 
 
8.  (C) Asked directly whether the French, like Russia and 
Spain, were interested in arms sales to Venezuela, Pinard 
acknowledged that the subject had arisen.  Venezuela 
currently has 1960's-era French tanks, Mirage fighters, and 
older model helicopters, according to Pinard, and France was 
interested in supplying spare parts and refurbishing the 
equipment.  Asked again directly whether France was 
interested in the sale of more modern equipment, Pinard 
initially protested that "Venezuela is not interested in 
buying the Rafael," but then conceded that the general 
subject of future arms sales had been raised, although this 
was an issue the French would have to study.  Pinard was 
categorical that Chavez's arms acquisitions were not a threat 
to his neighbors, however, as Pinard was convinced that 
Chavez could have no possible interest in an external war. 
When Deputy PolCouns rejoined that arms build-ups were, at a 
minimum, instruments of influence, Pinard speculated that 
Chavez was more concerned with managing Venezuela's internal 
situation.  Pinard argued that purchases of heavy arms were 
intended primarily to placate bored generals, whose support 
Chavez needed internally; he nonetheless conceded that this 
would also give Chavez more clout within South America. 
Asked about light arms, such as the Kalishnakovs being 
purchased from Russia, Pinard suggested they had less to do 
with arming a population against external forces than with 
arming Chavez supporters to put down any internal 
insurrection. 
 
EU Observers in Venezuela, Support for Elections in Bolivia 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
 
9.  (C) When asked about French support for EU observers in 
upcoming Venezuelan elections, Pinard indicated that he did 
not know what decision Brussels had reached, but that the GoF 
recognized a potential need for election observers, "although 
the only risk would be in the margin of victory by which 
Chavez would win."  Pinard argued that it was in fact more 
important to send observers to Bolivia, where the results of 
elections were less than certain.  In response to ref A 
points (provided on October 17), Pinard stated that the GoF 
fully agreed in substance with the statement of the Bolivia 
Support Group.  However, for reasons of bureaucratic form, 
the GoF is waiting for the EU statement.  Again citing 
bureaucratic technicalities, Pinard did not know if EU 
observers would be possible for Bolivian elections (he 
implied that the system of EU allotments might force it to 
abandon observation of elections at another location), but 
indicated that he believed it was important to have a 
presence there. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
10.  (C) France sees no downside for now in pushing its 
economic interests over human rights and other 
considerations, especially since U.S.-Venezuelan tensions 
offer possibilities for new sales.  We thus can expect the 
French to continue to pursue investment and arms sales 
opportunities.  French toughness on Iran is more a reflection 
of its own involvement in the EU3 negotiations than its 
concerns about Venezuela per se.  The only surprise was just 
how warmly Chavez seems to have been welcomed.  Pinard 
attributed this to a friendship that has developed between 
members of the GoF and Chavez, as well as genuine 
appreciation for Venezuelan assistance following the deaths 
of 162 French passengers of an airliner that crashed in 
Venezuela over the summer.  There are also personal factors: 
Prime Minister Dominique de Villepin spent part of his 
childhood in Venezuela, and Chavez's back-slapping, 
"Caribbean" expansiveness is a match for Chirac's, according 
to Pinard. 
 
11.  (C) French attitudes towards Colombia and Venezuela seem 
mirror images of U.S. views.  GoF attempts to bring Venezuela 
into Colombian negotiations with the FARC are disturbing, and 
appear to be driven almost entirely by the GoF's focus on the 
captivity of Franco-Colombian Ingrid Betancourt.  The 
presence of Chirac at an October 24 solidarity concert for 
Betancourt, Villepin's personal involvement in a failed 2003 
attempt to negotiate her release, and the reported civil 
union of MFA A/S-equivalent for the Americas Daniel Parfait 
to Betancourt's sister auger poorly for any real change in 
French policy until the situation is resolved.  End Comment. 
Please visit Paris' Classified Website at: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm 
Hofmann 

=======================CABLE ENDS============================