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Viewing cable 05BAGHDAD4448, IRMO DIRECTOR'S MEETINGS WITH

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
05BAGHDAD4448 2005-10-30 15:00 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Baghdad
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 004448 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR NEA/I 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: N/A 
TAGS: EAID PGOV PNAT PREL IZ
SUBJECT: IRMO DIRECTOR'S MEETINGS WITH 
COALITION AMBASSADORS TO DISCUSS NEW U.S. 
INITIATIVES 
 
REFS: SECSTATE 81769, BAGHDAD 02052, BAGHDAD 04045, 
MNF-I FRAGO 05-120 
 
1.  Summary.  During the period of October 16-25, 
IRMO Director Daniel Speckhard met separately with 
Ambassadors from the Republic of Korea, Japan, 
United Kingdom, Italy, Poland, and Australia.  The 
IRMO Director briefed the ambassadors on three 
initiatives:  U.S. plans to establish the first 
three Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in 
Hilla (Babil), Mosul (Ninewa), and Kirkuk (Tamim); 
plans to launch an intensive ministerial capacity 
development program; and the planned deferral of 
IRRF-funded projects totaling $1 billion.  USAID 
Deputy Mission Director John Groarke detailed the 
creation of Ministerial Assistance Teams (MATs) and 
Core Functions Teams (CFTs) as part of the capacity 
development program. End summary. 
 
2.  On October 16, 2005, Ambassador Khalilzad and 
the IRMO Director met with Ki-Ho Chang, Ambassador 
of the Republic of Korea, to discuss the prospects 
of Korean participation in the Regional 
Reconstruction Team (RRT)--the equivalent of a PRT 
that is planned to operate in the three northern 
Kurdish-majority governorates.  Ambassador Chang 
noted that the ROK military is planning to vacate a 
limited amount of space at its forward operating 
base in Irbil and suggested that the future RRT 
could use this vacated space.  He expressed his 
intent to consult with Seoul to determine Seoul's 
receptivity to the participation of ROK government 
personnel in the RRT. 
 
3.  On October 19, 2005, IRMO Director and IRMO 
Acting Senior Consultant for Planning met with 
Ambassador Toshiro Suzuki of Japan.  IRMO Director 
invited Suzuki to join U.S. efforts in building 
national and provincial government capacity and to 
consider financing deferred IRRF projects.  Suzuki 
echoed the importance of building ministerial 
capacity but explained Tokyo's policy prohibiting 
deployment of its civilian employees in Iraq. 
Suzuki also noted that no decision has been made by 
Tokyo on extending Japan's Self-Defense Force 
presence in Samawa; so he cannot comment at this 
moment on possible Japanese participation in a PRT. 
He stressed the need to secure the buy-in of the 
United Nations, World Bank, and donor nations for 
these new initiatives.  For its part, Japan 
recently received a formal request from Baghdad to 
launch its $3.5 billion soft loan program, which is 
expected to begin by March 2006.  In principal, 
Suzuki said Japan can consider financing deferred 
IRRF projects that the Iraqi government considers 
priorities and agreed to a meeting next month in 
Amman with Iraqi and U.S. officials to discuss 
these projects in greater detail for funding 
through the yen loan program. 
 
4.  On October 20, 2005, IRMO Director, USAID 
Deputy, and IRMO Planning met with Ambassador 
William Patey of the United Kingdom.  Patey 
highlighted the need to ensure that the U.S. 
ministerial capacity development initiative be 
sufficiently flexible to permit Iraqi buy-in and 
other donor participation, especially that of the 
United Nations and the World Bank.  He noted that, 
as U.S. and U.K. reconstruction funds decline, the 
role of other donors becomes increasingly 
important.  He explained that the UK can add value 
by using its position within the donor community to 
encourage it to pick up more of the reconstruction 
costs, and he advised that the U.S. initiative 
should rely on existing donor coordination 
structures, including the Iraqi Strategic Review 
Board (ISRB) and other donor aid programs.  Patey 
remarked that provincial governance-building 
programs such as the PRTs should be coordinated 
with federal capacity-building efforts, especially 
existing ministerial structures, and offered to 
share lessons learned on the U.K. success in 
establishing Iraqi-led, regional donor coordination 
structures in the four southern governorates.  He 
also wanted to see how existing structures in MND 
South-East, specifically the U.K.-mentored Southern 
Iraq Reconstruction and Development Coordination 
Group (SIRDCG), could fit into the PRT concept. 
 
5.  On October 24, 2005, IRMO Director, USAID 
Deputy, MNF-I Rep, and POLOFF briefed Italian 
Ambassador de Martino on PRT implementation.  IRMO 
Director cited the need to improve governance 
building within provincial governments and 
explained how the plan to build PRTs responds 
specifically to the needs of those provincial 
governments.  De Martino thought the initiative was 
well conceived and recognized the need for all 
coalition partners to join in this initiative.  He 
also noted the need for the Iraqi government to 
acknowledge and contribute support for the program. 
De Martino offered the possibility that the Italian 
Government might be interested in playing a role in 
the process and requested information about the 
possible role of the Italian Embassy on the 
National Coordination Team (NCT).  He also stated 
that the Italian Government might be able to offer 
assistance in the training and operations of police 
forces.  Finally, he suggested that, with the 
approval of the Iraqi Government, the Italian 
Government may be able to support or lead a PRT in 
Dhi Qar Province. 
 
6.  On October 24, 2005, IRMO Director, USAID 
Deputy, and MNF-I Rep met with Ambassador Ryscard 
Kyrstosick of Poland.  IRMO Director began the 
discussion by describing the initial stages of the 
PRT proposal, and the USAID Deputy added that the 
national capacity-building effort aims to 
strengthen the core functions of the Iraqi 
Government.  The Polish Ambassador expressed 
support for the capacity-building initiative and 
inquired whether training outside of Iraq would be 
part of the initiative, such as the extant EU rule 
of law training program.  He welcomed the planned 
consultations with the Polish commander in the MND 
Center-South region and emphasized the important 
role of the PRTs in facilitating communications 
between the provinces and the central government, a 
key problem area in his view. 
 
7.  On October 25, 2005, IRMO Director, 
PolMilCouns, USAID Deputy, and IRMO Planning met 
with Ambassador Howard Brown of Australia.  Brown 
supported the PRT's "holistic and integrative 
approach to helping Iraq" and believes that 
Canberra would consider participating in the 
initiative by providing experts to Baghdad. 
Although he does not see a near-term prospect of 
Australian participation in the PRTs (due to 
Canberra's strict policy of prohibiting the 
deployment of civilians in the field), he did not 
rule out the provision of a military liaison 
officer from its current military contingent in 
Iraq.  Australia would be interested in receiving 
information from the PRTs in order to help Canberra 
reassess its deployment policy and offer technical 
assistance to provincial officials, particularly in 
the agriculture sector.  Brown was pleased that the 
planned MATs would dovetail with other donor 
programs, particularly since they would improve 
information flows between donor nations.  In 
response to Brown's observation that some 
ministries preferred "Arabists," IRMO Director 
noted that the initiative envisions the use of 
Iraqi expatriates when possible to deliver 
technical assistance to the ministries.  Brown 
cautiously accepted the IRMO Director's invitation 
to join post's weekly Capacity Building Working 
Group meeting to help shape the capacity-building 
initiative, noting that, due to staff limitations, 
Australian participation must be limited. 
 
Satterfield