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Viewing cable 05ABUJA1987, LONGTIME NIGERIA OBSERVER ON KANO'S SOCIO-ECONOMIC

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
05ABUJA1987 2005-10-17 16:30 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Abuja
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

171630Z Oct 05
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 ABUJA 001987 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PHUM PGOV ECON EAID KIRF NI
SUBJECT: LONGTIME NIGERIA OBSERVER ON KANO'S SOCIO-ECONOMIC 
CONDITIONS 
 
 
------- 
Summary 
------- 
 
1. (SBU) Embassy officers met Sept. 1 with Professor Paul 
Lubeck, who recently visited Kano State.  Lubeck formerly 
lived in Kano and has visited Nigeria for more than 40 
years.  Lubeck's observations about Kano were: 
 
- anti-Americanism there is at its highest point in more 
than 40 years; 
 
- the United States has hurt itself badly among northerners 
with the perception that it is not opposed to President 
Obasanjo's apparent quest for a third term; 
 
- because most northerners perceive federal politics and 
their own influence as meaningless, they feel "isolated, 
rejected, and marginalized"; 
 
- there likely will be trouble in the north if Obasanjo 
seeks another term; and 
 
- Shari'a has improved law and order and is economically 
redistributive to the poor, but Kano lacks the leadership to 
restore it to economic prosperity.  End Summary. 
 
2. (SBU) Ambassador Campbell and embassy officers met on 
September 1, 2005, in Abuja with Professor Paul Lubeck at 
the conclusion of Lubeck's research project in Kano.  Lubeck 
is a professor of sociology at the University of California, 
Santa Cruz; he formerly lived in Kano, and has been visiting 
Nigeria for more than 40 years.  In his current research, 
Lubeck focuses on the relationship between globalization and 
the Islamic revival in urban-industrial contexts.  Lubeck 
offered the following observations on his visit to Kano. 
 
--------------------------------------------- - 
Northern Nigerians' Views of the United States 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
3. (SBU) Anti-Americanism in Kano is higher than at any time 
in Lubeck's more than 40 years of visits to Nigeria.  Much 
of this unpopularity results from the U.S. policy on Iraq 
and the United States' perceived support for President 
Obasanjo in the 2003 election and since.  Northerners see 
the United States as being "enormously influential" over 
Obasanjo, and are unhappy with the United States over the 
perception that it is not opposed to Obasanjo's pursuing a 
third term as president. 
 
4. (U) Kano is the focal point in Nigeria for citizens who 
feel neglected and who oppose the Obasanjo government. 
Additionally, most northerners perceive federal politics and 
their own influence as virtually meaningless.  There is a 
"widespread sense of despair" in Kano but also the 
acknowledgement that Northern Nigeria offers no alternative 
leadership.  According to Lubeck, Kano's inhabitants did not 
consider the Nigerian military a factor in their political 
assessment.  While there is nostalgia for the period of 
military rule and its resulting stability, the Nigerian 
military today is "irrelevant" in the north.  Said Lubeck, 
"The Army runs itself, and even [federal] ministers know 
that they don't matter."  Instead, this is a "one-person 
government" in the form of Obasanjo, and there are 
"selections, not elections."  Lubeck predicted there likely 
"will be trouble" in the north if Obasanjo pursues a third, 
currently unconstitutional, term - even if Obasanjo manages 
to make such an act "constitutional" by changing the current 
document's two-term presidential limit or by reinterpreting 
the Constitution. 
 
5. (SBU) Conspiracy theories are common in the north, 
ranging from the United States' perceived unconditional 
backing of Obasanjo, to why the Nigerian Government 
apparently has no policy for reviving industry in Nigeria, 
and especially in Kano.  Educated northerners are very aware 
of the U.S. military's heightened interest in the Gulf of 
Guinea and Nigerian oil, which concerns them greatly and 
contributes to a general suspicion of U.S. intentions. 
Lubeck recommended the United States should consider no 
longer sending U.S. Special Forces to Sokoto for training 
and be selective in other parts of the north.  "Sokoto is 
viewed as a religious city (similar to Mecca)," and the 
presence of foreign military forces can be inflammatory, he 
said.  This attitude can fuel strong anti-American sentiment 
there and contributes to the arguments of conspiracy 
theorists, however implausible. 
 
6. (U) The closure of the U.S Consulate and U.S. Information 
Service office in Kaduna was very harmful to U.S. interests 
in northern Nigeria, according to Lubeck.  He commented that 
U.S. officers posted there had been "enormously influential" 
in the region, and they provided an open and welcome face of 
America that northerners could easily identify.  This lack 
of a full-time American presence continues to contribute to 
northern feelings of isolation and rejection.  Northerners 
point to the cost and inconvenience of traveling to the U.S. 
Consulate in Lagos for U.S. visas, as well as the "growing" 
refusal rate and the added security requirements.  (Note: 
Embassy Abuja's consular staffing level is expected to 
increase sufficiently in the indeterminate future to permit 
the embassy to issue nearly all types of U.S. visas.  End 
note.) 
 
--------------------------------------- 
Motivations for the Adoption of Shari'a 
--------------------------------------- 
 
7. (U) The north's adoption of Shari'a is an idealistic 
response to try and heal sectarian conflicts within Nigerian 
Islam, and to reestablish law and order.  Northerners feel 
they tried Western democracy and military rule, both of 
which failed, and that at least they know Shari'a.  Shari'a 
is the "republic of virtue" and the "stoic acceptance of 
poverty, but with dignity and social order."  Shari'a is in 
fact conservative, not radical.  Even if Shari'a does not 
"succeed," it is about morality and not about delivering a 
short-term economic benefit.  It is not a rational-actor 
model; instead, it is a restorationist, Muslim model which 
follows chronologically the British conquest of Nigeria. 
 
8. (U) Shari'a is a political system and a class system.  It 
also is economically redistributive in nature and because of 
this is highly popular with the poor of Kano.  No one in 
Kano is opposed to Shari'a, but no one knows exactly what it 
is, either.  Lubeck described it as a Rorschach test, within 
which each adherent sees the characteristics and benefits of 
Shari'a in his or her own way. 
 
9. (U) Despite Kano State's adoption of Shari'a, there is no 
support for the Nigerian Taliban in Kano in any 
institutional way, and the common people consider members of 
that organization to be "criminals."  Probably because of 
their commercial interests and prosperity, Kano's Lebanese 
are "modernizers," and excepting the United States' position 
on Iraq, they are pro-American.  Kano's Lebanese also fear 
the rise of more fundamentalist elements.  Religion - of all 
types - is now the "growth industry" of Nigeria, Lubeck 
said. 
 
10. (U) Shari'a is producing some degree of law and order 
following the Judiciary's collapse after Nigeria's civil war 
and its oil boom.  Crime is vastly lower in Kano than in 
Nigeria's south; according to Lubeck, Kano is safe even 
throughout the night.  Kano's hizbah, or Islamic police, are 
not concentrating on regulating social behavior but instead 
are mainly occupied with directing traffic, in an employment 
initiative of the governor of Kano State. 
 
-------------------------------------- 
Economic and Social Conditions in Kano 
-------------------------------------- 
 
11. (U) Kano's Muslim brotherhoods are very strong in the 
commercial sector.  These associations provide trust and 
rituals, which make possible loans and credit - in a society 
in which there is no possibility of legal recourse.  The 
problem is Nigerians' lack of access to credit, in a country 
where commercial interest rates range from 20 to 30 percent. 
These Muslim brotherhoods therefore aid long-distance credit 
as well as trade, and act as a form of privatization in 
providing services no longer supplied by a failing state. 
 
12. (U) Lubeck says the north should be concentrating on 
producing food but instead is trying to control national oil 
rents.  Some Lebanese have left Kano because of the 
prevailing poor economic conditions there.  Commerce in Kano 
has been harmed severely by the fact that people are too 
poor to buy most kinds of products.  As a result, northern 
Nigeria is now using only 20 percent of its industrial 
capacity, as compared to 1985.  New construction is evident 
in Kano, but there is no other evidence of wealth or of 
benefits from Nigeria's very substantial oil revenues. 
Because of the complete breakdown of the government's 
ability to provide services, electricity in Kano has now 
been privatized - but very inefficiently - in the form of 
power produced by generators.  According to Lubeck, if 
things worked as they should, Kano would act as the Chicago 
of this part of West Africa, rather than being economically 
devastated.  With new and visionary leadership, Kano has the 
potential to regain its place as the import-export waypoint 
of the pan-Sahel region - but this leadership is lacking, 
and there are no potential leaders waiting on the sidelines. 
 
13. (U) Fertility in Kano is very high, in part because the 
term "family planning" fails on its face.  Instead, it must 
be renamed "reproductive health" if it is to succeed. 
Improved health care has led to a "soaring" population - 
despite a likely concurrent increase in the infant mortality 
rate.  As a result, Kano City's population could now be as 
high as 4 million.  Lubeck noted that people in Kano are 
embarrassed by the outbreak of polio in Nigeria's north. 
There is also, however, popular resentment over the very 
public efforts of the World Health Organization and the U.S. 
Agency for International Development to devote resources to 
eradicate polio, rather than combat the more widespread 
problems of malnutrition and malaria. 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
14. (SBU) Embassy Abuja generally agrees with Professor 
Lubeck's observations about Kano and Nigeria's north. 
Northerners clearly feel estranged from Nigeria's political 
process, and they perceive U.S. policy as being almost 
completely in line with the Christian-dominated Obasanjo 
government.  Unlike the South-South's objections to the 
Obasanjo government, which focus much more on questions of 
oil-revenue distribution, the north's alienation is cultural 
and deep-rooted.  As the leader of the north, Kano will be 
the likely location of any violent Nigerian expression of 
dissatisfaction with the Obasanjo administration or his 
increasingly credited pursuit of a third presidential term. 
 
CAMPBELL