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Viewing cable 05WELLINGTON739, NZ FOLLOW-UP: HSPD-6 TERRORIST LOOKOUT INFORMATION

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
05WELLINGTON739 2005-09-23 03:24 2011-04-28 00:00 SECRET Embassy Wellington
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 WELLINGTON 000739 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR CA A/S HARTY, CA/VO/BIP (NEGAH ANGHA), INR/IC 
(TSC DEPUTY DIRECTOR JOSIE PANEDICK), EAP/FO, AND EAP/ANP 
NCTC/TIG FOR DAVID WIGMORE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/22/2015 
TAGS: CVIS PTER PINR PGOV PREL NZ
SUBJECT: NZ FOLLOW-UP: HSPD-6 TERRORIST LOOKOUT INFORMATION 
SHARING INITIATIVE 
 
REF: A. SECSTATE 173539 
 
     B. STATE 158827 
 
Classified By: Charge D'Affaires David R. Burnett, 
for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
1.  (S) Post IWG agencies met to discuss Ref A and B.  We 
also discussed the possibility of the terrorist lookout 
information sharing pilot with Conoff in Auckland.  Agencies 
all agree that GNZ would be a good candidate for the proposed 
pilot project, and would likely be receptive should we make 
this request.  If Washington decides to pursue this project, 
we recommend that, as a first step, Post raise the issue with 
Mary Anne Thompson, Deputy Secretary at the Department of 
Labour.  Thompson is currently charged with overseeing much 
of NZ's immigration policy, including counter-terrorism 
measures.  She is an invaluable behind-the-scenes Embassy 
contact.  Thompson has worked as a staffer for two Prime 
Ministers and has in the past provided us with valuable 
insights about how best to sell U.S. policies within GNZ. 
She is also generally sympathetic with USG counter-terrorism 
policies in the region. 
 
2.  (S) Agencies also reviewed the questions provided Ref B, 
and offer the following preliminary answers.  We should be 
able to provide more detailed information if and when we are 
instructed to approach GNZ on this issue: 
 
A.  (SBU) What, if any, arrangements already exist for the 
systematic sharing of terrorist lookout information with GNZ? 
 
--  (S) Post Liaison officers, PE, and DCM all regularly 
share information with GNZ at Washington's request.  GNZ 
regularly, and informally, shares information with CONS in 
Auckland at the working level.  NSA and GCSB (NZ's NSA 
equivalent) also regularly share information.  With the 
exception of NSA/GCSB exchanges, which are automated, all 
post/GNZ information is exchanged through person-to-person 
contacts. 
 
B) Does the GNZ currently maintain unclassified lookout 
information on individuals based on terrorist-related 
information? Does the GNZ maintain classified or restricted 
lookout information on individuals based on terrorist-related 
information? 
 
-- (S) Airlines maintain unclassified passenger lists. 
Customs maintains an unclassified database for use by 
Immigration's border control agents.  The data includes tips 
for identification, and may also advise agents to contact 
authorities if a person in the data base is positively 
identified.  Customs also maintains classified data bases. 
 
C) If the answer to either or both question is yes, how is 
this information maintained? Is it consolidated in one 
database or are there multiple databases with this 
information? Are these databases automated? 
 
-- (S) As noted above, there are separate databases, all of 
which are automated. The unclassified Customs/Immigration 
databases include unclassified instructions based on 
information contained in the classified Customs database. 
Many of the "tips" for identification included in the 
unclassified databases are based on information that post 
 
SIPDIS 
liaisons have provided to GNZ via the NZ Security Services 
(NZSIS). GNZ agencies are currently trying to improve their 
internal data sharing.  Our Consular Section Chief notes that 
the data GNZ has provided the Consulate is usually of high 
quality and seems readily retrievable. 
 
D) Which biographic elements are included in the GNZ's 
terrorist-related lookout system(s) (examples: name, date of 
birth, citizenship, passport number, mother's maiden 
name). Are biometrics, specifically fingerprints, associated 
with the lookout system(s)? 
 
-- (S) All the referenced data points are included in GNZ's 
classified databases, assuming the agencies have that 
information.  Most information is included in the 
unclassified databases as well.  The classified databases 
 
SIPDIS 
also include individual's distinguishing marks.  Although 
police have some biometrics (fingerprints) in their database, 
to our knowledge these are not included in the lookout system 
databases. 
 
E) Which biographic and/or biometric elements on an 
individual are considered mandatory for the GNZ to use that 
information in the country's terrorist-related lookout 
system(s)? What are the definitions and evidentiary standards 
used by the GNZ to determine whether an individual gets 
placed on the terrorist-related lookout system? 
 
-- (S) Post is not familiar with GNZ procedures in this area. 
F) With the GNZ under which department or entities are the 
terrorist-related lookout systems maintained? What are the 
internal sharing arrangements? Does the host-country 
share terrorist information with other countries, i.e. Brunei 
and Singapore? 
 
-- (S) See above for information regarding which agencies 
maintain lookout systems, as well as internal sharing 
systems.  From time to time, GNZ officials have told us that 
they are sharing terrorist information with other countries, 
but we are not familiar with any formal mechanisms that may 
be in place to facilitate such exchanges. 
 
G) How does the GNZ use terrorist-related lookout information 
in screening processes? For the screening of visa applicants? 
For screening at ports of entry? For internal law enforcement 
purposes? For any other screening purposes? 
 
-- (S) GNZ uses its terrorist-related lookout information to 
screen visa applicants and applicants at the port of entry. 
Recently, GNZ missions abroad made a couple of high-profile 
immigration errors concerning former members of Saddam's 
regime.  As a result, GNZ is in the process of changing its 
visa-processing system so that all visa decisions involving 
countries of concern will be adjudicated by GNZ officials in 
Wellington. (SBU) During the recent election campaign, GNZ 
officials said that 63 individuals had been barred entry into 
New Zealand over the past two years because they had been 
positively identified in GNZ lookout systems as security 
risks. 
 
H) Which legal authorities guide the GNZ's use of 
terrorist-related lookout information? 
 
-- (S) The Counter-terrorism Act of 2002, as amended, is the 
primary legislation guiding GNZ's counter-terrorism lookout 
data bases and related policies. 
 
I) How do any of the GNZ's privacy laws or their equivalent 
influence the use of terrorist-related information? 
 
-- (S) GNZ's counter-terrorism provisions have been 
criticized by some, including the Green Party, as being an 
infringement of privacy.  However, the Attorney General sent 
a report to Parliament in 2002 that said nothing in New 
Zealand's primary Counter-terrorism legislation (The 
Counter-terrorism Bill 2002) appeared inconsistent with the 
New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990. 
 
J) Does the GNZ have legal authorities or instruments to make 
terrorist-related lookout information accessible to other 
countries? Are there impediments that could inhibit 
making this terrorist-related information accessible to other 
countries? Does the GNZ have an equivalent entity to the 
Terrorist Screening Center? 
 
-- (S) Given our intelligence-sharing relationship with New 
Zealand, we are not aware of any impediments to GNZ's sharing 
with us of any terrorist-related lookout information.  As we 
have noted, such exchanges already take place.  We are not 
familiar with NZ policies concerning exchanges with other 
countries.  There is no GNZ equivalent to the Terrorist 
Screening Center, although as we noted above GNZ is making an 
effort to improve screening coordination among its various 
agencies. 
Burnett