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Viewing cable 05TELAVIV5364, SHARON'S POST-DISENGAGEMENT DILEMMA: POLLS SHOW

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
05TELAVIV5364 2005-09-01 12:04 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Tel Aviv
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 TEL AVIV 005364 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PINR IS GOI INTERNAL
SUBJECT: SHARON'S POST-DISENGAGEMENT DILEMMA: POLLS SHOW 
SHARON LOSING BUT WINNING 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
1.  A welter of political polling prompted by the eve-of- 
disengagement resignation of cabinet minister Binyamin 
Netanyahu indicates that while Prime Minister Sharon is 
capable of  "taking the country" in national elections, some 
factions within his Likud party would like to deny him the 
chance.  The polls conducted in the immediate aftermath of 
settler evacuation from the Gaza Strip, have been uniform in 
predicting Netanyahu as the victor of Likud leadership 
primaries.  Faced with this scenario, Sharon can continue 
fighting the Netanyahu faction in an effort to stave off 
early primaries, while hoping tangible benefits of 
disengagement will turn the Likud membership in his favour. 
Ultimately, however, with primaries already set for April 
2006, Sharon must face a Likud leadership vote, at which 
juncture his best option -- according to the latest polls -- 
may be to bypass the Likud primaries altogether by forming 
his own party. 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
DISENGAGEMENT DERAILS THE ELECTIONS TIMELINE 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
2.  Israel's next parliamentary elections are scheduled for 
November 2006, but the immediate impact of disengagement has 
been to prompt serious expectations of a much earlier 
election date.  In anticipation, and despite the party 
chairman's efforts to delay any action to advance that date 
of party primaries, the Likud Central Committee will meet 
September 25-26 to vote on a proposal to bring forward to 
November the scheduled April 2006 party leadership primaries 
in which an estimated 150,000 registered Likud members may 
vote.  One week into the disengagement process, Channel Ten 
of Israel Television still had good news for Sharon when it 
canvassed 502 Likud members who gave him 36% support, 
compared to 28% for Netanyahu.  Two days later, on 24 
August, Ha'aretz newspaper published a poll among Likud 
members in which a three-way primary between Sharon, 
Netanyahu and Uzi Landau returned a reduced 30.6% for 
Sharon, 26.3% for Netanyahu and 24.2 percent for Landau, 
with 8.7% rejecting all three candidates.  In such a 
scenario, in which no single candidate gains 40% or more of 
the vote, a second-round run-off would be held between the 
two front-runners.  The Ha'aretz poll of Likud members on 
just such a two-way contest gave an impressive 46.9% of 
their support to Netanyahu against 30.5% for Sharon. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------------- 
NETANYAHU WINS THE BATTLE BUT MAY LOSE THE CAMPAIGN 
--------------------------------------------- ------------- 
 
3.  Netanyahu's supremacy within Likud swiftly assumed 
axiomatic status, with the mass-circulation newspaper 
Ma'ariv citing the earlier Ha'aretz poll and its near-17- 
point lead for Netanyahu over Sharon as the premise for a 
poll of 528 adult members of the population who were asked 
to consider various election scenarios.  Polled as to the 
likely results if Sharon is removed from the arena by a 
Likud primaries defeat, leaving Netanyahu to head Likud in 
parliamentary elections, the sample came up with a near tie 
between a Netanyahu-led Likud winning 32 Knesset seats (down 
from Likud's current 40 seats) against Labor's 31 (up from 
Labor's current 21 seats).  The anticipated Knesset 
alignment of coalition and opposition parties from such a 
result proves to be of precisely equal strength: 60 seats 
each and no majority for either.  At the other end of the 
scenario spectrum, Ma'ariv polled the likely outcome of what 
is considered the most unlikely option: "the big bang" or 
formation of a mega-party comprising a Sharon-led Likud, 
Labour and Shinui.  According to the poll, that alignment 
would yield 54 seats for Sharon's bloc against 23 for 
Netanyahu's Likud, but would damage Sharon's credibility 
with the Likud core and could spell the end of Likud as the 
powerful super-party in which Sharon says he still believes. 
 
----------------------- 
SHARON VERSUS THE LIKUD 
----------------------- 
 
4.  Ma'ariv's other most likely scenario, "the small bang" 
or fragmentation of Likud into a Sharon-led breakaway party 
pitted against Netanyahu involves real risks for Sharon, but 
greater returns if he can survive the split from the party 
he himself created.  Polling a sample of the general public 
on this scenario, Ma'ariv found 34 seats for a Sharon-led 
breakaway Likud compared with 20 for a Netanyahu-led Likud 
hardline faction.  The polling showed Labor dropping to 17 
Knesset seats from its current 21, with the centrist Shinui 
reduced to 9 from 15.  That outcome would benefit Sharon by 
downsizing Labor and Shinui to the stature of possible 
junior coalition partners with everything to gain from 
participation in government and very little to lose. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
LIKUD CAN CHOOSE: A LEADER OR THE NEXT PRIME MINISTER 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
5.  Netanyahu's clear ascendancy within the ranks of Likud 
members and the inner circle of the powerful central 
committee is not matched by his broader electoral magnetism. 
The Ma'ariv poll of August 25 shows that in parliamentary 
elections Sharon simply delivers more votes than Netanyahu 
can hope for: A Sharon-led Likud pulls in 38 Knesset seats 
compared to 32 for a Netanyahu-led Likud.  The August 26 
Yediot poll that has Netanyahu beating Sharon 42% to 35% in 
Likud primaries also notes that 23% of those polled were 
undecided -- a factor that renders the poll of limited 
encouragement to the Netanyahu camp. 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
6.  In short, Likud members will need to decide whether they 
would rather be "right" or in power.  Likud as a party that 
seeks to lead the next government must decide whether 
Sharon's proven ability to garner support across the 
political spectrum makes him a greater electoral asset to 
Likud than the charismatic, volatile Netanyahu.  Sharon will 
have to exercise all his combative talents to subdue the 
central committee, but he is a sitting prime minister in a 
government that is winning international praise, and  he 
will not be wholly alone in the task.  Likud pragmatists 
will be looking for compromise formulae to retain Sharon 
while reining him in on future policy decisions.  The hard- 
line rebels and all those who have little or nothing to seek 
in the way of gratitude from Sharon will work to unseat him 
by means of early primaries.  The clear schism in the polls 
to date -- which reveals Netanyahu as a potential primaries 
winner but an overall leadership liability -- is not lost on 
either his supporters or detractors.