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Viewing cable 05LIMA4132, FAR LEFT, INSPIRED BY CHAVEZ, SEEKING TO RIDE

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
05LIMA4132 2005-09-22 19:23 2011-05-13 00:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Lima
Appears in these articles:
elcomercio.pe
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 LIMA 004132 
 
SIPDIS 
 
WHA FOR JMONSERRATE, BFRIEDMAN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/20/2015 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR PE
SUBJECT: FAR LEFT, INSPIRED BY CHAVEZ, SEEKING TO RIDE 
OLLANTA HUMALA'S COAT-TAILS INTO CO...

id: 41148
date: 9/22/2005 19:23
refid: 05LIMA4132
origin: Embassy Lima
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination: 05LIMA3379|05LIMA3784|05LIMA424|05LIMA4968|05LIMA93
header:
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.



----------------- header ends ----------------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 LIMA 004132 
 
SIPDIS 
 
WHA FOR JMONSERRATE, BFRIEDMAN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/20/2015 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR PE
SUBJECT: FAR LEFT, INSPIRED BY CHAVEZ, SEEKING TO RIDE 
OLLANTA HUMALA'S COAT-TAILS INTO CONGRESS 
 
REF: A. LIMA 3784 
     B. LIMA 3379 
     C. LIMA 424 
     D. LIMA 93 
     E. LIMA 4968 (03) 
 
Classified By: Political Counselor Alexander Margulies.  Reason:  1.4 ( 
b,d). 
 
---------- 
SUMMARY 
---------- 
 
1.  (C) Most of Peru,s far-left Marxist parties, movements, 
and labor organizations are attempting to unite forces for 
the 2006 general elections under the banner of a "Frente 
Amplio" (Broad Front).  They hope their standard bearer will 
be Ollanta Humala, leader of the fascistic Nationalist 
Peruvian Party and brother of Antauro Humala, who led the 
abortive January 2005 armed uprising in Andahuaylas.  Ollanta 
Humala, however, is insisting that the left sign up with his 
own "National Front for the Salvation of the Republic." 
Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez is reportedly conditioning 
the provision of funds to the leftist Frente on its making 
common cause with Ollanta Humala.  Frente Amplio elements 
believe they can obtain 10-15 percent of the popular vote and 
a sizable congressional bloc with Humala at the top of their 
ticket, an estimate with which we concur.  End Summary. 
 
-------------------------- 
FRENTE AMPLIO'S OBJECTIVES 
-------------------------- 
 
2.  (C) Peru,s far-left Marxists, divided many times over 
since the Sino-Soviet split of 1965 and the break-off of 
Sendero Luminoso in the early 1980s, are now trying to 
overcome their marginal political status by creating the 
Frente Amplio, a grouping that includes the Communist Party 
Red Fatherland (CP-PR), the Teachers Union (SUTEP), and the 
General Central of Peruvian Workers (CGTP), the country,s 
largest union federation.  Poloff interviewed SUTEP 
International Relations Secretary (and former SUTEP 
President) Nilver Lopez, SUTEP President Caridad Montes, and 
CGTP Secretary General Juan Jose Gorritti on 9/13 regarding 
the status of the Frente Amplio. 
 
3.  (C) According to SUTEP's Nilver Lopez, the Frente Amplio 
will support Ollanta Humala's presidential bid.  Ollanta and 
his brother Antauro led a military rebellion against the 
Fujimori regime in 2000.  Sacked from the military by 
Fujimori, interim President Valentin Paniagua reinstated 
Ollanta and President Toledo sent him as military attache to 
Paris and then Seoul.  Ollanta was then forcibly retired in 
December 2004.  After 2000, Ollanta's brother, Antauro, 
formed the radical, nativist, quasi-racist, pro-coca 
Ethno-Cacerista movement (Ref E).  Antauro led a January 2005 
armed uprising in Andahuaylas, which was quickly put down by 
the GOP,  Since the rebellion, the Ethno-Caceristas have 
largely disappeared from public view. 
 
4.  (C) SUTEP's Lopez said the Frente Amplio would have 
preferred to cement an electoral alliance with Congressman 
Javier Diaz Canseco and his Decentralized Democratic Party 
(PDD), but Diaz Canseco, in Lopez' words, "wants to ally with 
Paniagua" as part of a leftist/centrist front.  Consequently, 
the Frente Amplio shifted its gaze to Ollanta Humala, hoping 
that Ollanta's ultra-nationalism will help them surmount 
their image as discredited old-line leftists.  With Ollanta 
as their front man, Lopez continued, the Frente Amplio could 
score between 10 and 15 percent of the vote and thereby gain 
a base in the next Congress. 
 
------------------------------ 
NEW MAGAZINE PUSHES NEW FRIEND 
------------------------------ 
 
5.  (U) Other evidence corroborates the far left's courtship 
of Ollanta Humala.  "Wankar" is an increasingly slick monthly 
magazine that first came out in July, apparently timed to 
coincide with Hugo Chavez visit to Lima.  The publication 
sports leading Marxists on its masthead (Ref A).  Wankar's 
second issue featured a long article on Ollanta Humala, 
quoting from Humala's comments to the Frente Amplio's 
National Directorate.  "Wankar" commented that it was 
publishing the excerpts to show the "national vision" of "a 
noteworthy political leader," whose "eventual alliance with 
democratic forces (i.e., the Frente Amplio) that are headed 
in the same direction (as he is)." 
 
6.  (U)  According to the article, Ollanta lamented the 
foreign takeover of the Peruvian economy, stressed the 
weakness of Peru,s armed forces (which, he said, had the 
lowest budget in eighty years), and warned that Chile and the 
U.S. were "historic partners" while, in contrast, Peru and 
the U.S. (during the Velasco era) had experienced "periods of 
confrontation."  Ollanta upheld production of coca leaf and 
said that Peru should pursue a solution to its foreign debt 
along the style of President Kirchner of Argentina. 
 
7.  (C) CGTP Secretary General Juan Jose Gorritti signaled 
the direction for the Frente Amplio in a conversation with 
Poloff on 9/13.  Gorritti said that the Frente would take up 
"national defense" issues like port privatization, stressing 
the risk that Chilean investors might seize control of Peru's 
docks and loading areas.  SUTEP's Nilver Lopez put the point 
even more bluntly.  When questioned about some of the 
non-leftist elements in the Humala family's Ethno-Cacerista 
ideology, Lopez replied that the hard left needed to use 
nationalism if it was to successfully project its social 
justice message.  Lopez told Poloff that even with Ollanta at 
the top of the ticket, people who understand "the class 
struggle" would run the campaign.  In the end, the 
ideological differences didn't matter to Lopez, since the 
Marxists' goal in 2006 is not/not to win the presidency, but 
rather to score 10-15 percent of the vote and place a sizable 
bloc of their members in Congress. 
 
8.  (U) Recent developments indicate that Ollanta Humala and 
the far left are both closing on one another and positioning 
for advantage.  Rolando Brena, far left presidential 
candidate from the 2000 elections and member of both Patria 
Roja and the Frente Amplio, said on 9/19 that the Frente was 
negotiating with Humala.  On 9/20, Ollanta Humala stated that 
he was not interested in leading the Frente Amplio, but in 
forming his own movement, the National Front for the 
Salvation of the Republic (FNSR), and that this group would 
welcome the participation of the far left as well as elements 
from across the political spectrum. 
 
--------------------------- 
A CHAVEZ/CASTRO CONNECTION? 
--------------------------- 
 
9.  (C) The marriage between the old left and the pro-coca 
nationalist right is being encouraged by outsiders. 
Presidential advisor Juan de la Puente told Polcouns on 8/8 
that the GOP intelligence indicates that Venezuelan President 
Hugo Chavez and Cuban President Fidel Castro are pushing 
Humala and Peru's far-left parties together.  De la Puente 
stated that Peruvian Communist Party - Patria Roja Secretary 
General Alberto Moreno admitted as much in a recent 
conversation the two had.  De la Puente added that other 
elements indicated this new dynamic.  He noted that the 
far-left and Humala have celebrated Bolivarian events 
together in Lima, that Humala's movement has likely received 
funding from Chavez, and that, for the first time in anyone's 
memory, the far-left's previous standard-bearer, Javier Diez 
Canseco, was not/not invited to Cuba this year while the rest 
of the far-left leadership was. 
 
10.  XXXXXXXXXXXX
 
11.  (C)  When Poloff asked CGTP General Secretary Gorritti 
about possible Chavez financial support for "Wankar," the 
latter hesitated pointedly before denying any such 
assistance.  When Poloff asked SUTEP's Lopez about Venezuelan 
monetary support for the Frente Amplio, the union official 
replied matter-of-factly, "We haven't gotten any help so far, 
but we are looking for it." 
 
12.  (C)  While they may deny receiving financial assistance 
from Chavez, the Frente Amplio's members openly admit that 
the self-proclaimed Bolivarian leader inspires them. 
Gorritti, a member of the formerly pro-Soviet faction of 
"orthodox" Peruvian Marxists, waxed admiringly about Chavez' 
unique brand of socialism, which he said was really a form of 
Christianity.  For Nilver Lopez and Caridad Montes, Hugo 
Chavez runs "the most democratic government in the 
hemisphere," an assertion they said was proven by the fact 
that Chavez "has won five elections." 
 
---------- 
COMMENT 
---------- 
 
13.  (C) Despite differences in ideological origin, an 
alliance between Peru's traditional far-left Marxists and 
Ollanta Humala's brand of Peruvian fascism makes political 
sense.  With the failure of the Andahuaylas revolt and the 
GOP,s subsequent crackdown on the Ethno-Cacerista movement 
(Ref C), Ollanta was left without a political organization 
and he lacks a registered party to sponsor a presidential 
bid.  At the same time, the far-left, whose factionalism and 
whose identification with Sendero Luminoso and the Tupac 
Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA) terrorist organizations 
have discredited it with the mass of voters, needs a 
charismatic leader with a message that can project beyond its 
narrow base within the intelligentsia, public universities, 
and labor movements.  Given their respective needs, a little 
political push by Castro and financial incentives from Chavez 
should be more than enough to bring the far-left and 
fascist-right together on the basis of their shared extremism 
and thirst for political influence. 
 
13.  (C)  An August nationwide poll by the respected Apoyo 
consultancy showed Ollanta Humala placing fourth in a 
presidential race, with seven percent of the vote and over 10 
percent in the southern coast and highlands.  Given adequate 
funding and strong organizational support from the far-left 
parties, unions and NGOs, we would not be surprised if an 
Ollanta candidacy could achieve 15-20 percent of the vote and 
a comparable percentage of congressional seats in the April 
2006 elections.  END COMMENT. 
POWERS 

=======================CABLE ENDS============================