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Viewing cable 05BRASILIA2452, BRAZILIANS AGREE TO PARAMETERS FOR SECURITY

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
05BRASILIA2452 2005-09-15 16:16 2011-07-11 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Brasilia
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 BRASILIA 002452 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
STATE FOR WHA/BSC 
STATE FOR EB/TRA/OTP - BMATTINGLEY 
HOMELAND SECURITY PASS TO TSA VICKI REEDER 
BUENOS AIRES FOR TSA 
USCG FOR MARIO MERCADO 
FAA FOR AGC-330 
USDOC FOR 4332/ITA/MAC/WH/OLAC/JANDERSEN/ADRISCOLL/MWAR D 
USDOC FOR 3134/ITA/USCS/OIO/WH/RD/DDEVITO/DANDERSON/EOL SON 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EWWT EAIR KREC
SUBJECT: BRAZILIANS AGREE TO PARAMETERS FOR SECURITY 
ASSESSMENTS BY TSA AND COAST GUARD 
 
1. (SBU) Summary.  Recently Post and the Brazilian Foreign 
Ministry have agreed upon parameters for reciprocal visits to 
maritime ports and airports to assess security procedures. 
This accord allows the Transportation Security Administration 
and the U.S. Coast Guard to continue with their scheduled 
assessment visits, which the Foreign Ministry had placed on 
hold pending review.  The Foreign Ministry's principal reason 
for seeking this review was its concern that the appropriate 
talking points be ready in case either the Brazilian press or 
Congress began to ask questions about whether such visits were 
violating "Brazilian sovereignty."  Although the issue of TSA 
and USCG access has now been resolved, and the Foreign Ministry 
was impressively engaged, we still see some turbulence ahead on 
questions such as Advanced Passenger Information System (APIS) 
data.  End Summary. 
 
2. (SBU) Both the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) 
and the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) have been seeking for a number 
of months to conduct visits to certain Brazilian airports and 
maritime ports, respectively, in order to conduct security 
assessments.  Although the visits are referred to in official 
communications as "technical visits" and "exchanges of 
information," they are essentially U.S. mandated inspections. 
Both TSA and the USCG have historically had good working 
relationship with their GOB counterparts.  However, as security 
requirements have been much greater since 9/11, this has placed 
greater demands on the GOB agencies; both TSA and USCG had 
their visits canceled or postponed by the Brazilians several 
times during the past year.  Although Coast Guard had scheduled 
with their counterparts to visit a list of maritime ports from 
September 12 to 23, and TSA had scheduled with its counterparts 
to visit the Guarulhos airport in Sao Paulo from September 27 
to October 10, in late August the Foreign Ministry refused to 
allow these trips to move forward until after a bilateral 
meeting to discuss the parameters and purposes of these visits. 
 
3. (U) On September 2, the Foreign Ministry and the Embassy 
met to initiate such a bilateral review.  DCM Phil Chicola 
led the U.S. side of the meeting, which included EmbOffs, 
TSA Americas Director Vicki Reeder, TSA Regional 
 
SIPDIS 
Representative Joe Ochoa (based on Buenos Aires), and USCG 
Regional Representative Mario Mercado.  The Brazilian side 
was led by Under Secretary for Latin America, Ambassador 
Jose Eduardo Felicio, joined by diplomats from Office for 
Combat Against Illicit Transnational Activities (COCIT), the 
U.S. desk, and the maritime office. 
 
4. (SBU) During the meeting, the DCM discussed the 
importance of continued cooperation on these security 
visits.  Ambassador Felicio stated that under the current 
political circumstances, until the Foreign Ministry 
understood the programs better, neither TSA nor the USCG 
should come to Brazil under what may be easily interpreted 
as a unilateral inspection by the USG.  When the DCM 
clarified that the visits programs are entirely reciprocal 
in nature and that the Brazilians were welcome to visit both 
U.S. airports and maritime ports, the Foreign Ministry 
officials became much more responsive. 
 
5. (SBU) On September 6, the DCM, EmbOff, and TSA and USCG 
reps met again with Ambassador Felicio to discuss TSA and 
USCG visits.  During this follow-up meeting, the officials 
responsible for security issues at the Brazilian Department 
of Civil Aviation (DAC) and Infraero were present, as well 
as a number of members from the Brazilian National 
Commission for Safety in Ports, Terminals and Navigation 
Channels (CONPORTOS).  None of the GOB interlocutors 
expressed substantive disagreements on the technical aspects 
of the visits, and the Foreign Ministry did not appear 
interested in the details.  Instead, the two sides walked 
through some proposed guidelines for the visits that would 
be applicable to both TSA and USCG.  The guidelines were 
outlined not as a legally binding document that either party 
would sign, but rather as an assurance that both governments 
were on the same page -- and as "talking points" for the 
Brazilians in case either the press or Congress made 
inquiries about whether such visits were violating 
"Brazilian sovereignty."  Ambassador Felicio clearly saw the 
value in the visits and was quite frank in admitting that 
they just needed to make sure that they had the "story" 
right.  (A translation of the guidelines is included at the 
end of the cable.) 
 
6. (SBU) Comment.  The GOB appears to have taken the 
reciprocity offer seriously: CONPORTOS is scheduling with 
the DHS office in Brasilia for a visit to U.S ports during 
the first two weeks of December.  We are mindful that not 
all of our transportation security issues covered by COCIT 
will be as easily resolved.  For example, another TSA 
mandated data sharing requirement (APIS+) enters into effect 
on October 04.  We anticipate that APIS+ will encounter at 
least the same resistance (both technical and political) we 
faced during discussions earlier this year regarding 
Personal Name Record (PNR) data-sharing.  We anticipate that 
Brazil will request an extension of the deadline.  Although 
we foresee some choppy waters ahead, we hope our future 
discussions with the GOB will be similarly pragmatic and 
results-oriented.  End Comment. 
 
7. (U) An unofficial translation of the guidelines follows. 
 
Begin text. 
 
GUIDELINES FOR RECIPROCAL VISITS OF GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES 
FROM BRAZIL AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO PORTS AND 
AIRPORTS TO ASSESS SECURITY PROCEDURES, AGREED TO IN A 
COORDINATION MEETING BETWEEN THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN 
RELATIONS (SGAS, COCIT, DEUC, DMAE, DSF), CONPORTOS, 
DEPARTMENT OF CIVIL AVIATION, INFRAERO AND REPRESENTATIVES 
FROM THE U.S. GOVERNMENT (U.S. EMBASSY, TSA AND COAST GUARD) 
- SEPTEMBER 6, 2005 
 
I. CONDITIONS OF RECIPROCITY 
Visits by Brazilian and U.S. authorities to ports and/or 
airports of the United States of America and Brazil will 
occur with strict observance of the principle of 
reciprocity.  Authorities from both countries will have 
access to the same information and areas of ports and/or 
airports, in the two countries, during the visits. 
 
II. REQUESTING VISITS 
Requests for visits should be sent to the host country, by 
the visiting country, at least three months in advance.  The 
request must include: name of the ports and/or airports to 
be visited, length of the visit and other pertinent 
technical details. 
 
III. CONTACTS WITH EMPLOYEES OF PORT AND/OR AIRPORT 
FACILITIES 
All visits to ports and/or airport facilities must be 
coordinated with federal representatives of the host 
government.  Federal representatives of the host government 
will accompany representatives of the visiting country and 
participate in the dialogue with employees at the ports 
and/or airports visited.  Prior to and following the visit, 
representatives of the visiting country should address any 
questions and/or comments to federal representatives of the 
host government. 
 
IV. CONTACTS WITH THE PRESS 
Representatives of the visiting country should not directly 
address the press of the country being visited, rather they 
should transmit their observations and/or comments to an 
employee designated by host country authorities. 
 
V. NON-DISCLOSURE COMMITMENT 
Any information obtained as a result of visits to ports 
and/or airports, or reports generated by the visiting 
country should be carefully protected, and not divulged or 
supplied to any other country or agency without previous 
consent by the competent authorities of the country visited. 
 
VI. TECHNICAL COOPERATION 
Using observations gleaned as a result of the reciprocal 
visits, both countries can establish programs for 
cooperation, training and other related activities for the 
purpose of improving security at their ports and/or 
airports. 
 
VII. PARAMETERS OF THE VISITS 
In terms of the realization of reciprocal visits, both 
countries will observe existing bilateral understandings and 
multilateral commitments assumed before competent international 
organizations: International Maritime Organization (IMO) and 
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO).  Visits will 
likewise be conducted respecting the ascribed authority of the 
designated governmental agencies of the two countries. 
 
End text. 
 
CHICOLA