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Viewing cable 05BRASILIA2387, BRAZIL CORRUPTION SCANDAL: A GUIDE TO IMPEACHMENT

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
05BRASILIA2387 2005-09-09 19:09 2011-07-11 00:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Brasilia
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BRASILIA 002387 
 
SIPDIS 
 
TREASURY FOR PARODI; STATE PASS TO USTR AND USAID/LAC 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/09/2015 
TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON BR
SUBJECT: BRAZIL CORRUPTION SCANDAL: A GUIDE TO IMPEACHMENT 
MECHANICS 
 
REF: A. BRASILIA 2219 
     B. BRASILIA 2150 
     C. BRASILIA 2082 
     D. BRASILIA 2025 
     E. BRASILIA 1979 
     F. BRASILIA 1874 
     G. BRASILIA 1973 
     H. BRASILIA 1631 
     I. BRASILIA 2242 
     J. BRASILIA 2237 
     K. BRASILIA 2305 
     L. BRASILIA 2348 
 
Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR DENNIS HEARNE. REASONS: 
1.4(B)(D). 
 
 1. (SBU) INTRODUCTION: Per refs, over the past three months 
the political crisis in Brazil caused by interlocking 
corruption scandals has led to public discussion of the 
question of presidential impeachment.  In a 4 September 
interview in &O Estado do Sao Paulo,8 Brazilian Supreme 
Court President Nelson Jobim opined that the lack of public 
support for impeaching President Lula da Silva mitigates 
against consideration of the action, in contrast to the 
robust public mobilization in favor of impeachment of former 
President Fernando Collor de Mello. There clearly remains a 
powerful desire in Brazilian society, including within the 
political opposition, to avoid this drastic measure against 
Lula, absent new revelations that would tie the president 
incontrovertibly to wrongdoing or gross negligence. 
Nonetheless, for Washington's background, we are providing 
herewith a guide to Brazil's presidential impeachment 
procedures under the 1988 constitution. 
 
THE IMPEACHMENT PROCESS 
----------------------- 
 
2. (U) The implementation of impeachment procedures in Brazil 
is a complex political process that involves both Houses of 
Congress -- the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate.  Article 
51 of the 1988 Brazilian Constitution states that any citizen 
may denounce the President for a "crime of responsibility" by 
submitting a formal impeachment request to the President of 
the Chamber of Deputies (equivalent to the U.S. Speaker of 
the House), a position held currently by the controversial 
Severino Cavalcanti.  The Chamber President analyzes the 
request and, if he deems the request appropriate for action, 
sends it to a commission conceived specifically to 
investigate the allegations against the President. 
 
3. (U) The Chamber President has the authority to decide 
whether to move the process to the commission, based on the 
merits of the request and subject to recommendations from 
legal advisors.  Two private attorneys (with unclear motives 
and affiliations) filed impeachment requests against Lula 
with the Chamber in recent weeks, but Severino Cavalcanti 
effectively shelved those requests, and has suffered no 
criticism for that decision.  Four other impeachment requests 
against Lula dating back to his election but preceding the 
current spate of scandals have also been shelved.  Hence 
public and political pressures, in addition to legal issues, 
play a major role in the Chamber President's decision making. 
 
4. (U) The commission's findings are then voted on by Chamber 
deputies and require a vote of a two-thirds majority to move 
the process to the Senate. When the impeachment motion 
arrives in the Senate, the accused President must resign from 
his duties for 180 days.  The Senate is then constituted as a 
special tribunal for hearing the impeachment case, with the 
President of the Brazilian Supreme Court (Supremo Tribunal 
Federal) presiding over the trial and senators acting as 
jurors.  If found guilty by two-thirds of the Senators, the 
President is removed from office and loses his political 
rights (e.g., ability to run for election and vote) for eight 
years.  The succession chain is similar to that of the United 
States: the President is succeeded by the Vice-President, 
followed by the President of the Chamber of Deputies, the 
President of the Senate, and the President of the Supreme 
Court. 
 
THE CURRENT SCENARIO 
-------------------- 
 
5. SBU) Per refs, the political crisis rocking President 
Lula's Worker's Party (PT) and his government was prompted by 
allegations that the PT -- which has a minority in Congress 
and struggles to maintain a working majority there through a 
fragile coalition with other parties -- was securing support 
in Congress and consolidating its own power base through 
illegal financial activities.  Per refs, elements of the PT 
stand accused of bribing lawmakers from other parties in 
order to secure their votes in Congress.  Eighteen 
congressmen are subjects of formal expulsion proceedings in 
the Chamber.  Elements of the PT also allegedly manipulated 
the system of appointments to state-run enterprises by 
handing out top jobs to allied parties' nominees (refs).  In 
addition, the PT is accused of irregular campaign funding 
activities -- including off-shore transfers that evaded tax 
obligations -- for itself and allied parties (refs). 
Although the corruption and illicit financing charges relate 
primarily to the PT party rather than the government, the 
continuing revelations have led the Congress and judicial 
authorities to investigations that could eventually implicate 
high-level administration officials, including possibly 
President Lula da Silva himself. 
 
6. (SBU) Legal pursuit of these allegations could follow two 
paths.  First, if it becomes clear that illegal activities 
were underway -- the vote bribery scheme, illegal campaign 
funding, influence peddling -- and that President Lula, 
although aware at some level of these activities, failed to 
act to curb them, he could be accused of a "crime of 
responsibility" -- a first step towards the impeachment 
process within the congress.  Second, if the President is 
implicated in more direct fashion in a corruption scheme -- 
e.g., conspiring in or profiting from it -- he could be 
impeached and also subjected to a criminal trial before the 
Brazilian Supreme Court. 
 
THE IMPEACHMENT OF COLLOR DE MELO 
--------------------------------- 
 
7. (U) In 1992, the first Brazilian President elected after 
the military dictatorship, Fernando Collor de Melo, faced an 
impeachment process due to corruption allegations.  In May 
1992, President Collor's younger brother, Pedro Collor, made 
public accusations of a corruption scheme operated by 
Collor's campaign treasurer, Paulo Cesar Farias, with 
Collor's blessing and participation.  According to Pedro 
Collor, the Collor-Farias administration centralized all 
corruption, demanding 40 percent kickbacks for government 
contracts and special policy decisions, and committing other 
crimes ranging from money laundering to influence peddling. 
The widely publicized revelations brought Brazilians, 
especially young people, into the streets in the tens of 
thousands to demand impeachment. The public pressure and 
intense media scrutiny pushed the process ahead with 
alacrity. On 1 June 1992, the Chamber of Deputies installed 
an impeachment commission.  On 29 September 1992, the Chamber 
voted to start the impeachment process by a 441-36 vote, and 
on 30 December, at the opening of his impeachment trial by 
the Brazilian Senate, Collor resigned as President of Brazil. 
 Even though he resigned, the Senate convicted Collor of the 
corruption charges, barring him from holding public office 
for a period of eight years. Collor also faced criminal 
prosecution on the corruption charges, but in December 1994 
he was acquitted by the Supreme Court on the grounds of 
insufficient evidence. 
 
8. (C) Comment.   The three necessary factors for impeachment 
of a sitting president in Brazil are: (1) sufficient evidence 
of either a &crime of responsibility8 (per above), or 
outright criminal complicity; (2) congressional competence 
and credibility to carry out the proceeding; and (3) a strong 
public outcry demanding impeachment.   On the first point, it 
could be reasonably argued that the last three months of 
scandal have produced sufficient grounds for at least opening 
lines of investigation toward a possible impeachment.  The 
president of Brazil's professional order of attorneys and 
other legal experts have said as much publicly, and Supreme 
Court President Jobim in his &Estado8 interview was 
tellingly silent on this issue.  On the second point, despite 
the proceedings for expulsion against several congressmen, 
Brazil's congressional inquiry committees (CPIs) have done a 
sufficiently credible job thus far in the crisis to establish 
the institution's ability to carry out an impeachment trial. 
 
9. (C) Comment continued.  Hence it is the final element of 
public will, as Jobim and major figures across Brazilian 
society have argued consistently over the past three months, 
that remains decisive in keeping the threat of impeachment 
away from Lula.  Although Lula's popularity has plummeted and 
his re-election prospects appear dismal at present, the 
majority of Brazilians of all political stripes, for various 
reasons ranging from admiration for Lula's personal history 
to fears of negative impacts on Brazil's economy, remain 
uninterested in the trauma of impeachment.  We believe this 
will likely remain the case, absent a stunning revelation 
that more clearly and directly links Lula or those closest to 
him to impropriety.  That would a touchstone event, and we 
think then the tide of public opinion might well turn, with 
Brazilians looking beyond the figure of Lula and temporary 
setbacks for the economy and toward the necessity of honoring 
constitutional processes and safeguarding the credibility of 
national institutions that have generally functioned well 
through this long crisis. 
 
CHICOLA