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Viewing cable 05ATHENS2403, DAS BRYZA AND GREEK DEFMIN ON DEEPENING BILATERAL

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
05ATHENS2403 2005-09-14 11:59 2011-06-11 08:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Athens
Appears in these articles:
http://www.tanea.gr
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ATHENS 002403 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EUR, PM/RSAT, EUR/SE; DOD FOR OSD/ISP 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/06/2015 
TAGS: PREL MARR GR TU CY AMB
SUBJECT: DAS BRYZA AND GREEK DEFMIN ON DEEPENING BILATERAL 
MILITARY COOPERATION 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Charles P. Ries for reasons 1.4(b) and (d) 
 
1.  (C)  Summary.  DAS Bryza with Greek DefMin Spiliotopoulos 
discussed how to deepen bilateral military ties during a 
September 7 meeting.  Bryza praised the increased focus on 
strategic concerns, such as promoting stability in Iraq, 
Afghanistan, and the Balkans, and away from relatively minor, 
day-to-day concerns.  In this context, he emphasized the 
importance of removing U.S.-origin weapons from Cyprus. 
Spiliotopoulos said Greece was working to come into 
compliance with U.S. law.  Spiliotopoulos reviewed Greek 
concerns about Turkish military activity over the Aegean. 
End Summary. 
 
Thinking Strategically 
---------------------- 
 
2.  (C)  DAS Matthew Bryza met with Greek Minister of Defense 
Spilios Spiliotopoulos September 7 to review bilateral 
military ties and promote a more strategic perspective to the 
relationship.  The U.S. and Greek governments were 
increasingly focussed on broader issues of mutual concern, 
Bryza said.  He expressed appreciation for Greek assistance 
in Afghanistan, where Greece recently assumed control of 
ISAF's Role 2 medical facility in Kabul, and in Iraq, where 
Greece was transporting Hungarian tanks and had donated BMPs 
from its own stocks to help the Iraqi armed forces.  He 
encouraged Spiliotopoulos to continue this trend, including 
by removing caveats on NATO missions in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
 
3.  (C)  Greece 'wants to live in a safe area' Spiliotopoulos 
said, and so supported efforts to stabilize the Balkans and 
Middle East.  To that end, the Greek military was expanding 
its contribution to Operation Active Endeavor and was doing 
what it could do politically to help stabilize Iraq.  He 
updated Bryza on Greek efforts to be of assistance in 
training Iraqi personnel, noting that Athens was still 
waiting for a response from Baghdad to an offer to train 
Iraqi medical personnel in Greek military hospitals. 
Spiliotopoulos observed that the Greek offer to train Iraqi 
security personnel in a third country had run into problems, 
as Athens had been unable to find a suitable country willing 
to act as host.  Ambassador encouraged Spiliotopoulos to 
consider the logical alternative of providing training at the 
Greek PfP peacekeeping training facility in Kilkis (in 
northern Greece), noting that the situation in Iraq had 
changed signficantly since Greek PM had made his 'no training 
in Iraq or Greece' pledge at the Istanbul NATO summit. 
Responding to Bryza's query, Spiliotopoulos said Greece had 
no present plans to take the lead on one of ISAF's PRTs in 
Afghanistan.  Greece's commitments to the medical unit, 
engineering unit, and airport security in Kabul, along with a 
650-person deployment to Kosovo, were already straining MOD 
resources. 
 
Procurement and Transformation 
------------------------------ 
 
4.  (C)  Spiliotopoulos briefed Bryza on his efforts to 
overhaul the Greek defense procurement system, as part of a 
more general transformation of the Greek military.  The 
recent decision to buy 40 F-16s reflected a new way of 
operating for the Greek military.  Procurement decisions 
would be based on requirements put forward by the various 
Services, rather than on political factors, as it had been in 
the past.  This would streamline the system, and ensure -- as 
was the case with the F-16s -- that Greece got better, more 
standardized equipment at more attractive prices.  On a 
separate procurement issue, Spiliotopoulos said Greece 
remained interested in two U.S. EDA minesweepers, noting that 
the request had stalled in Congress. 
 
Cyprus Arms Transfers 
--------------------- 
 
5.  (C)  Bryza turned to the related subject of Greek 
transfers of U.S.-origin equipment to Cyprus, about which the 
United States remained concerned and, if not resolved, could 
affect bilateral military ties.  The recent removal of two 
UH-1 helicopters had been a good first step, he said, but now 
it was time to act on the artillery and other hardware still 
in place.  Greece was 'in the process of dealing with the 
issue,' said Spiliotopoulos.  Pointing out that Turkey had 
large amounts of U.S.-origin equipment on Cyprus (legally, 
because it was under the direct control of Turkish forces), 
he suggested that Greek equipment would remain on the island 
under the Greek plan.  Bryza replied that, ideally, all 
U.S.-origin equipment would leave the island.  At a minimum, 
however, its presence needed to accord with U.S. legal 
requirements.  In a follow-up conversation with MOD 
Diplomatic Advisor Ioannis Bourloyiannis, Ambassador made 
clear that an outstanding Greek request to import U.S.-origin 
M109 howitzers from Germany would not be approved until U.S. 
concerns Cyprus arms were resolved. 
 
Tensions in the Aegean 
---------------------- 
 
6.  (C)  Spiliotopoulos offered the Greek perspective on 
Turkish air activity over the Aegean, while demonstrating a 
live feed of Aegean air traffic at the computer on his desk. 
He estimated that 25 percent of Turkish flights in the region 
passed within 6 nautical miles of Greek territory. 
Nevertheless, he said, Greek pilots were under strict 
instructions to avoid incidents.  To emphasize this point, 
Spiliotopoulos pointed out the special telephone on his desk 
which he used to contact Greek pilots to urge them to avoid 
confrontations with their Turkish counterparts.  At the same 
time, he added, caution and international law obligated 
Greece to protect civil aviation in its FIR by inspecting 
unidentified aircraft.  Observing that Turkish actions were 
motivated by a sense of weakness as well as bravado, Bryza 
counseled continued calm in Athens' response. 
RIES