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Viewing cable 05HOCHIMINHCITY818, SBU) AMBASSADOR MEETS DEMOCRACY ACTIVIST NGUYEN

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
05HOCHIMINHCITY818 2005-08-05 11:54 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

051154Z Aug 05
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 HO CHI MINH CITY 000818 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EAP/BCLTV, DRL 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PHUM SOCI PREL PGOV VM
SUBJECT: (SBU) AMBASSADOR MEETS DEMOCRACY ACTIVIST NGUYEN 
DAN QUE 
 
REF:  A) Hanoi 1971 B) HCMC 169 and previous C) Hanoi 1861 
 
1. (SBU) Summary: In a private meeting in Ho Chi Minh City, 
democracy activist Nguyen Dan Que told the Ambassador that 
there has been a gradual expansion of personal freedoms in 
Vietnam.  The visit of Prime Minister Phan Van Khai to the 
United States has strengthened the hand of "liberals" within 
the Communist Party in the run-up to the 10th Party 
Congress.  Que strongly favors Vietnam's WTO accession; he 
believes that Vietnam's participation in a rules-based 
system will hasten the demise of the Communist Party.  While 
the Ambassador made clear that he could not guarantee a 
favorable result, he promised to intercede with the GVN in 
support of Que's efforts to visit the United States as well 
as urge the GVN to permit Que to return after a visit.  The 
Ambassador cautioned that finding a way to calibrate Que's 
message, acknowledging some of the good as well as the bad, 
would go a long way towards maximizing the impact of his 
visit while minimizing the risk of a GVN backlash.  In a 
subsequent meeting with Hanoi Poloff, Ministry of Public 
Security (MPS) officers said that Que's "actions" in Vietnam 
are becoming more and more difficult to tolerate.  They also 
said that MPS would be able to support Que's trip to the 
United States if it is permanent, but the concern that he 
would use a temporary visit to publicly criticize Vietnam's 
human rights record makes supporting a temporary visit 
"sensitive and difficult."  End Summary. 
 
2. (SBU) The Ambassador and leading democracy activist 
Nguyen Dan Que met for an hour at a private room at Ho Chi 
Minh City's Caravelle Hotel on August 3.  (Que had expressed 
unease at meeting the Ambassador at the Consulate.)  Seven 
months after his amnesty and release from prison (ref B), 
Que told the Ambassador that he is mentally and physically 
fit.  Arriving by taxi, Que said that he had no problem 
coming to the meeting, although police routinely monitor his 
activities and those of his wife and two sons.  Police have 
cut telephone service to his house and blocked the use of 
his wife's cell phone.  Police had cut off at least two 
phone interviews he was giving to U.S. journalists and 
academics using cell phones since his amnesty.  (Que now has 
a new cell phone, but he is unsure how long it will be 
operational.)  Police question the infrequent visitors to 
his home after their visits and seek to intimidate their 
guests not to return, Que added.  On a more positive note, 
Que said the authorities have never attempted to block the 
monthly financial assistance from his brother his family has 
been receiving since his first arrest in 1978. 
 
3. (SBU) The Ambassador noted that he had read Que's March 
2005 interview with Voice of America.  He had found it hard 
hitting, perhaps even somewhat aggressive in tone.  The 
Ambassador asked whether the police, while in prison, at the 
time of his release, or afterwards, tried to persuade or 
intimidate Que to stop.  Que replied that he was not 
interrogated or pressured by police, even when in their 
custody, because they "know better than to try."  However, 
police have asked his wife to urge him to stop giving 
interviews. 
 
Vietnam Slowly is Changing for the Better 
----------------------------------------- 
 
4. (SBU) In Que's view, although Vietnam's transition to a 
market-based economy is well underway, Communist Party 
domination and mismanagement left the country well behind 
where it should be at this point in time.  However, the U.S.- 
Vietnam Bilateral Trade Agreement, Vietnam's effort to 
accede to the World Trade Organization (WTO), and an 
internal impetus to reform is fostering irreversible and 
positive change.  This process has been bolstered further by 
the successful visit of Prime Minister Phan Van Khai to the 
United States.  The Khai visit has opened new possibilities 
for enhanced cultural and information exchange, which is 
particularly significant for Vietnam's youth.  It also has 
bolstered the "liberal/reformist" wing of the Communist 
Party, at a time when internal tensions are increasing in 
the run-up to the Party's 10th Party Congress in 2006. 
 
5. (SBU) Que believes that the pace of change and Vietnam's 
international integration are putting one-party Communist 
rule under increasing strain.  The Communist Party is 
incapable of keeping up with the requirements of a rules- 
based environment in which Vietnam increasingly must 
participate.  As it responds to demands for reform -- 
tackling corruption, for example -- the Party is inexorably 
weakened and power gradually is shifting to the people.  Que 
pointed to the strengthening of institutions such as the 
National Assembly and the increasing availability of the 
Internet as developments that, over time, could limit the 
monopoly of the Party on power and information. 
 
6. (SBU) Because of these factors, Que said that he strongly 
supports Vietnam's accession to the WTO as well as greater 
cultural and educational exchanges between Vietnam and the 
United States.  Greater economic freedom and prosperity will 
give people the courage to demand other rights. 
 
7. (SBU) However, as the USG works with Vietnam on WTO 
access, it should emphasize that respect for human rights 
and democracy are preconditions for Vietnam's full and 
successful participation in the world economy.  In this 
regard, the United States should find ways to reduce the 
Communist Party's power and "tip the balance" in favor of 
democracy in Vietnam.  In this regard, Que suggested that 
the USG consider establishing a website to promote democracy 
in Vietnam and have President Bush meet with leading 
dissidents when he visits Vietnam in 2006.  The USG also 
should push the GVN to take concrete steps to reconcile with 
the overseas Vietnamese community, promote greater autonomy 
for ethnic minority Vietnamese and end GVN limitations on 
the spiritual life of the Vietnamese people, including 
recognition of the United Buddhist Church of Vietnam, Que 
said. 
 
8. (SBU) Que envisioned a nine-point "road map to democracy" 
for Vietnam.  (Note: these are the same points Que outlined 
in his April 2005 VOA interview.)  This would require the 
USG and others to press the Party to: 
 
-- ease the flow of information into and out of Vietnam; 
-- expand freedom of speech; 
-- release all political prisoners; 
-- end government intervention in religious affairs and 
"oppression" of ethnic minorities; 
-- secure a declaration from the Politburo that the National 
Assembly is the supreme legal body in Vietnam; 
-- secure a GVN declaration that Vietnam will fully adhere 
to all international norms on human rights and religious 
freedom; 
-- pass a law divorcing the Party from Government at all 
levels of administration; 
-- pass a new electoral law; and 
-- call for free and fair general elections and draft a new 
constitution. 
 
How Hard and How Fast to Push? 
------------------------------ 
 
9. (SBU) The Ambassador agreed that Que's roadmap was 
laudable and said we share his desire and vision for a 
Vietnam that fully respects human rights and democratic 
ideals.  However, the Communist Party will not "commit 
suicide," so these kinds of changes would require 
considerable evolution in how the Party sees its role. 
Moreover, the changes that Que is describing usually occur 
because of internal developments in a society, not because 
of outside pressure.  We need to appreciate that this 
transition is likely to be a lengthy one, particularly in a 
one-party state, the Ambassador noted.  For example, China 
has changed significantly since 1978, although the Communist 
Party remains firmly in control.  Nonetheless, China is 
moving in the right direction, and that is what is 
important.  The same process will happen in Vietnam.  The 
Ambassador told Que that recently he participated in a live 
"webcast" in which human rights and other sensitive issues 
were discussed openly (ref C).  For Vietnam, this is a real 
step forward. 
 
10. (SBU) The Ambassador also stressed that a key question 
is how far to push and how to deliver the message of change 
to the Vietnamese authorities.  For example, the Ambassador 
had publicly called for Que's release, but did not attack 
the GVN in the process.  He has critiqued how Vietnam is 
handling aspects of its economic reform policy but with 
enough positives so as not to alienate the GVN.  Similarly, 
the Ambassador said that while he rejected GVN entreaties 
not to meet with Que (ref A), he would not publicize his 
meeting, a step that would only antagonize the authorities. 
Que said he would also refrain from publicizing the meeting. 
 
Que to the United States? 
------------------------- 
 
11. (SBU) Que told the Ambassador that he wishes to visit 
the United States, both to share his political views with 
the Vietnamese-American community, politicians and others, 
and to visit his relatives.  He sought USG support with the 
GVN to obtain a passport, facilitate his travel to the 
United States, and ensure that the GVN will allow him to 
return to Vietnam.  The Ambassador committed to assisting 
Que, and noted that, as a respected individual, his message 
will have an impact both inside and outside Vietnam. 
However, the USG could not guarantee what the GVN response 
will be.  The Ambassador observed that the tone of Que's 
message in the United States will have great bearing on a 
GVN decision on permitting his return.  Que said he 
understood. 
 
Ministry of Public Security (MPS) Reaction 
------------------------------------------ 
 
12. (SBU) On August 4, MPS representatives sought an off-the- 
record meeting with Hanoi Poloff to discuss the Ambassador's 
meeting with Que.  A senior MPS department director met 
Hanoi Poloff at a local cafe.  The officer asked about Que's 
attitude and the content of the conversation, then asked 
specifically about Que's travel plans and whether the USG 
would allow him to immigrate.  Hanoi Poloff advised the MPS 
officer that Que had said he does not intend to immigrate to 
the United States, but instead wishes to take a three-to six- 
month trip.  The MPS officer responded that the GVN would 
have "no problem" permitting Que to depart permanently for 
the United States, but permitting a short-term visit "would 
be sensitive and difficult."  The problem, the officer 
stated, is that the GVN fears that "anti-Vietnam forces" in 
the United States will use Que as a "mouthpiece against 
Vietnam" in the United States, which will "deeply offend the 
Vietnamese people."  This would make it difficult for Que to 
return to Vietnam.  Hanoi Poloff confirmed the MPS officer's 
assumption that there is no legal way the USG could compel 
Que to avoid public speaking appearances in the United 
States. 
 
13. (SBU) Hanoi Poloff asked about the current status of 
dissident novelist Duong Thu Huong, who was granted a 
temporary visa to visit Italy and France and who was then 
featured in a highly critical article on the front page of 
the New York Times.  The MPS officer said that she has not 
returned to Vietnam, and that the handling of her return has 
become "another sensitive and difficult question." 
 
14. (SBU) The MPS officer explained that MPS and the GVN are 
very much aware of the danger of creating "symbols" out of 
imprisoned activists and the damage that legal action 
against them does to Vietnam's international reputation. 
However, these dissidents are breaking Vietnamese laws, and 
as long as those laws exist, it is MPS' job to enforce them. 
"We try to deal with these sensitive issues in an 
appropriate manner," the official said.  "But it becomes 
difficult.  Que's actions, for example, are coming closer 
and closer to being unacceptable." 
 
15. (SBU) After the meeting with the Ambassador, Que told 
HCMC Poloff that he would begin the application process for 
a Vietnamese passport "the following week."  He added that 
he is not aware of any administrative detention or other 
legal ruling against him that would prevent him applying for 
a passport or traveling.  After the meeting, ConGen 
confirmed that Que returned home without incident. 
 
16. (SBU) Comment: In previous meetings with Que after his 
release from prison, Que categorically refused to consider 
resettlement in the United States for himself and family, 
telling HCMC Poloff that "his place is in Vietnam." 
 
17. (SBU) Comment, continued:  In the meeting with the 
Ambassador, Que demonstrated the same tenacity and 
conviction that helped him survive years in prison and house 
arrest.  Also notable was Que's optimism that Vietnam, 
through a process of international integration, is 
inexorably headed towards a more democratic future.  It is 
that optimism and eagerness for change that also poses the 
biggest risk for Que.  In past public statements, he has 
dispensed with nuance and taken a very tough line against 
the GVN.  It remains to be seen whether Que can and will act 
on the Ambassador's advice to carefully calibrate his 
message.  As we support Que's plans to visit the United 
States, we will continue to stress the importance of finding 
a way to maximize the impact of a U.S. visit while 
minimizing the risk that the GVN will subsequently deny him 
reentry.  The GVN seems to have decided that having Que as a 
dissident cause celebre in Vietnam is worse than adding him 
to the corps of anti-Vietnam activists in the United States. 
The temporary visit scenario, however, presents the 
possibility that Que will return to Vietnam after saying or 
doing something in the United States that blatantly violates 
one of Vietnam's laws on "threatening national unity" or 
"abusing democratic freedoms" or some other authoritarian 
catchall, thus "forcing" the authorities to throw him back 
in jail.  The GVN clearly wants to avoid this outcome.  End 
Comment. 
 
CHERN