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Viewing cable 05HELSINKI920, AMBASSADOR'S MEETING WITH CONSERVATIVE PARTY

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
05HELSINKI920 2005-08-23 13:17 2011-04-24 00:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Helsinki
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 HELSINKI 000920 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/23/2012 
TAGS: PGOV PREL EU FI TU
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S MEETING WITH CONSERVATIVE PARTY 
PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE NIINISTO 
 
 
Classified By: PolChief Greg Thome, Reasons 1.5 (b) and (d). 
 
1. (C) Summary:  Conservative Party presidential candidate 
Sauli Niinisto provided us a candid summary of his views on 
the upcoming campaign and on key issues of interest to the 
United States.  Domestically, he criticized President 
Halonen for benefiting from Finland's decade of economic 
and foreign policy success, while failing to address 
difficult issues of the future.  On international issues, 
Niinisto plans to make security and defense a central 
component of his campaign.  Niinisto emphasized that 
Finland's security will always depend on a strong European 
commitment to the trans-Atlantic Alliance, although Finnish 
public opinion still favors ESDI participation ahead of 
NATO membership.  While he agreed that Russian perceptions 
of insecurity have intensified as a result of EU 
enlargement and China's emergence, he was noncommittal in 
response to the Ambassador's warnings regarding the China 
arms embargo, saying only that Finland will not take a 
leadership role on the issue.  Niinisto supported Turkey's 
EU membership, but suggested it may have to be phased in 
through a well-defined "partnership period."  If elected, 
Niinisto would be a strong supporter of U.S. policy in 
general terms and a reliable partner within the EU on 
security and other issues.  However, both he and we must 
remain realistic about his slim chances of victory against 
a very popular incumbent.  End Summary. 
 
2. (SBU) The Ambassador hosted National Conservative 
Coalition Party (Cons) presidential Sauli Niinisto and 
Member of Parliament Jari Vilen for lunch on August 22. 
DCM and PolChief also attended.  With incumbent President 
Tarja Halonen (Social Democrats) and Prime Minister Matti 
Vanhanen (Center Party) as his principal rivals, Niinisto's 
Conservatives face an uphill battle in the January 2006 
contest.  (A Finland Gallup poll published August 22 
showed that if elections were held today, Halonen would 
take 58 percent, Niinisto 19, and Vanhanen 17 -- with 
 Niinisto pulling ahead of Vanhanen for the first time.) 
Nevertheless, Niinisto -- a former finance 
minister, deputy prime minister and currently Vice 
President of the European Investment Bank -- is a 
charismatic and thoughtful candidate and a well regarded 
choice to represent the third-largest of Finland's "big 
three" political parties. 
 
Halonen: Resting on Past Successes 
---------------------------------- 
3. (SBU) As he has done in public, Niinisto criticized his 
chief rivals for enjoying their terms in office and basking 
in the glow of Finland's recent period of economic and 
diplomatic success, while failing to address looming 
threats to the country's economic stability.  Finland 
suffers from an aging population and a dwindling tax base, 
Niinisto noted, and neither President Halonen nor the 
Vanhanen government has had the courage to convince Finns 
that small changes to Finland's welfare state model as well 
as an influx of skilled immigrants are crucial to 
maintaining social and economic success.  Regarding Halonen 
-- who, at this early stage maintains a significant lead in 
the polls -- Niinisto noted that, "she has made no mistakes 
because she had done nothing."  Nevertheless, he 
acknowledged that she in enormously popular -- particularly 
among women voters who remain enthusiastic about Finland's 
first female president -- and that he will have to reach 
out to voters across the gender gap if he is to be 
successful.  Niinisto also expressed frustration in getting 
the president and prime minister to engage in a campaign, 
noting that, in their incumbent positions, the calendar 
worked to their advantage. 
 
Finnish Security: The Top Concern 
--------------------------------- 
4. (C) Niinisto stated frankly that Finnish (and, to a 
lesser extent, European) security will be a key component 
in his campaign.  He supported the concept of greater 
Finnish participation in the European Security and Defense 
Initiative (ESDI), noting that Europeans in general feel 
that Europe must take greater responsibility for its own 
security.  However, he noted his support for Finland's 
significant role in NATO activities and emphasized that his 
vision for Finnish involvement in an evolving ESDI would in 
no way diminish its support for and participation in NATO 
activities both inside and outside the NATO area.  When 
pushed, Niinisto espoused a cautious line on actual NATO 
membership, noting that currently ESDI is palatable to 
Finnish voters and that, as a candidate, he would have to 
stress the importance of putting a European defense 
mechanism first.  However, he agreed with the Ambassador 
that public opinion could be changed if the right leader 
were to lead the way, and he emphasized that Europe's 
security remains heavily based on a strong trans-Atlantic 
alliance.  Niinisto further noted that his own unequivocal 
stance on European security would set him apart from both 
Halonen and Vanhanen, neither of whom has staked out a 
clear position on ESDI or NATO. 
 
5. (C) Niinisto also expressed some lingering concerns 
about broader security issues.  He noted that despite an 
upswing in its economy, Russia continues to suffer a sense 
of insecurity.  To the extent possible, European efforts to 
reassure Russia are in Europe's own security interest, he 
said, and Finland remains well-placed to help foster better 
relations.  Niinisto marveled at the growth of China as a 
economic power, but added that this also exacerbates 
Russian insecurity.  The Ambassador took the opportunity to 
make crystal clear to Niinisto the importance the U.S. 
places on maintaining the arms embargo against China. 
In response, Niinisto was largely non-committal.  He took 
our views on board and agreed that China's human rights 
record left much to be desired, but noted that "Finland will 
not be a playmaker" on the issue. 
 
Turkey and the EU 
----------------- 
6. (C) Regarding further EU enlargement, Niinisto remained 
enthusiastic.  Breaking somewhat from his party's usual 
line, Niinisto offered his own opinion that Turkey's 
membership in the EU is of tremendous importance to 
European security.  However, he cautioned, Turkey's road is 
certain to be difficult.  Following the eventual accession 
of Romania, Bulgaria and perhaps Croatia, some have 
suggested that all future candidates be subject to 
referendum -- a proposal he said is gaining currency 
throughout Europe following the "non" votes in France and 
Holland.  Niinisto feared that this concept would likely be 
popular in Finland, where opposition to Turkish membership 
is high.  Despite his own views in favor of Turkish 
membership, Niinisto also stated that Europe is not yet 
ready -- politically or structurally -- to "absorb that 
large mass that is Turkey."  In response, he advocated an 
eventual "phasing in" process that would involve a well- 
defined set of conditions and perhaps a lengthy time 
period.  Regardless of the mechanism, he added, Europe 
needs to find a way to allay public opinion fears about 
Turkey while still sending a message to the Turks that "you 
are part of Europe." 
 
Comment 
------- 
7. (C) Were he to be elected president in January, Niinisto 
would prove a strong supporter of both enhanced European 
security capability and a trans-Atlantic security 
partnership.  He would also likely be more supportive of 
U.S. policy than President Halonen.  Occasional differences 
over nuance (some reported here) would certainly arise, and 
there is little reason to expect that Niinisto could effect 
(or would wish to effect) dramatic departures from 
Finland's typically pragmatic and forthcoming approach to 
shared security and trans-Atlantic cooperation.  That said, 
both Niinisto and we are realistic about his chances for 
victory, at least at this early stage of the campaign. 
President Tarja Halonen has a significant lead in current 
opinion polls, and barring any major missteps will likely 
win.  Nevertheless, we look to Niinisto to run the type of 
campaign that will permit his party to continue working 
with Halonen and with the current Center Party government, 
while at the same time raising legitimate, positive debate 
on issues of concern to the United States. 
MACK