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Viewing cable 05ABUJA1497, SUPREME COURT VERDICT UPHOLDING 2003 ELECTION

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
05ABUJA1497 2005-08-12 15:53 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Abuja
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 001497 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PHUM PGOV PREL KDEM KCOR NI ELECTIONS
SUBJECT:  SUPREME COURT VERDICT UPHOLDING 2003 ELECTION 
- IDENTIFYING THE CASUALTIES 
 
REF: ABUJA 1181 
 
------- 
Summary 
------- 
 
1.  (SBU) A month after the Supreme Court judgment 
upheld President Obasanjo's 2003 election, Nigeria is 
calm, with no reports of violence related to the 
verdict.  The media provided only modest coverage of 
the judgment.  Ordinary Nigerians have been more 
interested in discussing other issues such as the 
recent debt cancellation, the rising cost of 
living...or even better, the possible elimination of 
the Nigerian soccer team from next year's World Cup 
finals.  After the verdict, few expressed surprise at 
the court's ruling.  ANPP presidential candidate 
Muhammadu Buhari, who filed the court challenges, made 
several foreign and local trips, granted media 
interviews and told his supporters that he accepted the 
verdict, although he pointedly disagreed with it.  The 
protracted court case, along with perceived 
presidential intimidation of the justices, heightened 
cynicism concerning the impartiality of the apex court. 
End Summary. 
 
-------------------------------------- 
The Court Rules, and the Public Shrugs 
-------------------------------------- 
 
2.  (U) Contrary to many predictions, there were no 
reports of violence after the July 1 Supreme Court 
verdict upholding the 2003 presidential election 
(reftel).  There was neither a celebration rally by the 
winners (the ruling PDP) nor protest demonstrations by 
the losers (the opposition ANPP). 
 
3.  (SBU) Most Embassy sources said they were not 
surprised with the court's decision.  Cynical about the 
extent of judicial independence in general, many felt 
President Obasanjo would interfere in the process, a 
prediction they believe was upheld. 
----------------------------------- 
Did Obasanjo Interfere in Decision? 
----------------------------------- 
 
4.  (SBU) Reports abound that President Obasanjo met 
with the justices prior to the judgment.  A source 
close to Buhari's camp told us, "Obasanjo initially 
favored cancellation of the elections with the view of 
re-contesting again for another four years. But when he 
was told the initial judgment would indict him, he 
forced Chief Justice of Nigeria Mohammed Uwais and his 
colleagues to rule in his favor." 
 
5.  (SBU) Contacts at the Supreme Court confirmed that 
a meeting was held between Obasanjo and the Supreme 
Court justices before the judgment.  These same sources 
asserted that throughout the court proceedings, 
Associate Justice Alfa Belgore provided Obasanjo with 
"inside information."  When asked about possible 
financial inducement, one Supreme Court insider 
replied:  "I don't think the Chief Justice of Nigeria 
was bribed.  I believe blackmail was used and when he 
realized that he was swimming against the tide, he 
joined the flow." 
 
6.  (SBU) Many contacts recalled that the President 
summoned justices of the Federal Court of Appeal, the 
first Presidential Election Tribunal last year, shortly 
before they delivered the initial judgment on Buhari's 
petition.  When asked about that meeting, President 
Obasanjo told newsmen the meeting was about allocating 
a piece of land to serve as a permanent site for the 
court. 
 
--------------------------------------- 
Protracted Legal Battle Erodes Interest 
--------------------------------------- 
 
7.  (SBU) One possible reason for the lack of public 
reaction to the judgment is that the case was over two 
years old, and interest in the 2003 election had waned 
considerably.  There likely would have been a much 
greater public response if the judgment had been 
delivered within a few months of the election. 
Moreover, justices may have leaned against "upsetting 
the applecart."  "It is difficult to cancel the 
election of the President who has already spent two 
years in office," quipped one legal scholar. 
 
------------------------------------------ 
Buhari Talks Tough But Accepts the Verdict 
------------------------------------------ 
 
8.  (SBU) Following the verdict, Buhari traveled inside 
and outside the country assuring his supporters he 
plans to remain in politics.  Whenever he has spoken in 
public, Buhari has repeated his message that, although 
he accepts the verdict, he does not agree with it. 
Buhari has also said the judgment portended poorly for 
the nation's judiciary and nascent democracy:  "As we 
accept this denial of justice, it is pertinent to note 
the direct impact that it is bound to have on the 
country.  Regrettably, our judiciary has failed to 
sanction those who admitted unleashing armed soldiers, 
police, and thugs on the civil society during the 
election." 
 
---------------------------------- 
ANPP Plagued by Myriad of Problems 
---------------------------------- 
 
9.  (SBU) During the final days of the court 
proceedings, speculations were rife that six out of the 
seven ANPP governors, all of them from the North, 
planned to dump Buhari.  Sources believed the five 
governors who are in their second terms were eyeing the 
presidency themselves (Ahmed Sani of Zamfara has 
already declared his intention to run), or planning to 
support another candidate in 2007.  Curiously, the 
absence of all the ANPP governors--with the exception 
of Ibrahim Shekarau of Kano--at the Supreme Court when 
the verdict was read lent credence to speculations that 
ANPP governors and Buhari were going in opposite 
directions. 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
10. (SBU) It is difficult to predict the impact of the 
court's ruling on Buhari's 2007 political ambitions. 
Although he remains very popular at the grassroots 
level in the North, Buhari obviously does not control 
the ANPP party machinery.  Following the court 
decision, Buhari offered his supporters little in the 
way of motivation, making no calls for protests and 
failing to articulate a vision or strategy for 2007. 
It is possible that in this vacuum, the party may begin 
to cast about for other standard bearers.  However, 
this could be risky as the party might collapse absent 
a strong personality such as Buhari. 
 
11. (SBU) The ongoing bitter rivalry among presidential 
contestants within the PDP may benefit the ANPP, but 
not necessarily Buhari.  If either VP Atiku Abubakar or 
former military president Ibrahim Babangida (IBB) 
emerges as the PDP candidate in 2007, the other may 
look to the ANPP for a new home. 
 
12. (SBU) The larger question to consider is the impact 
of this Supreme Court decision on Nigerians' faith, or 
lack thereof, in the judiciary.  Though the judiciary 
consistently receives higher marks from the public than 
do the executive or legislative branches, it is very 
far from being perceived as transparent and impartial. 
While the decision upholding the president's election 
was tolerable to most, many were taken aback by the 
breadth of the victory handed to the president.  That 
the Supreme Court offered no words of sanction in 
response to obvious electoral irregularities and abuses 
has left a bad taste for many.  Buhari may be right in 
his prediction that the ruling will contribute to 
increased apathy among voters, and increased impunity 
among political thugs. 
CAMPBELL