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Viewing cable 05TAIPEI3041, MEDIA REACTION: FORMER DEPUTY ASSISTANT

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
05TAIPEI3041 2005-07-15 07:00 2011-08-23 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 TAIPEI 003041 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR INR/R/MR, EAP/RSP/TC, EAP/PA, EAP/PD - 
ROBERT PALLADINO 
DEPARTMENT PASS AIT/WASHINGTON 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OPRC KMDR KPAO TW
SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION: FORMER DEPUTY ASSISTANT 
SECRETARY OF STATE RANDY SCHRIVER'S TAIWAN TRIP, U.S.- 
 
SIPDIS 
CHINA-TAIWAN RELATIONS 
 
1. Summary:  Local politics and the arrest of one of 
Taiwan's most wanted fugitives remained the focus of 
attention for the major Taipei daily newspapers July 
14.  The pro-independence "Taiwan Daily" was the only 
Chinese-language newspaper that reported on a Central 
News Agency (CNA) interview with visiting former Deputy 
Assistant Secretary of State Randy Schriver prior to 
his departure Wednesday.  The "Taiwan Daily" ran the 
news story on an inside page with the headline: "Randy 
Schriver: Taiwan will likely have to pay a price if it 
fails to enhance its defense capability."  The 
newspaper also carried short reports on the reactions 
of the DPP and the Pan-Blue Camp to Schriver's remarks 
on U.S. arms sales to Taiwan.  The first "Taiwan Daily" 
article ran with the headline: "DPP agrees with 
Schriver's remarks on [U.S.] arms sales." The second 
short article ran with the two-part headline: "Blue 
Camp: [the special arms procurement budget] will be 
listed in [the government's] fiscal budgets; PFP: 
Taiwan will not buy anti-missile equipment."  In the 
meantime, while the pro-independence "Liberty Times," 
Taiwan's biggest daily newspaper, did not run the CNA 
interview with Schriver, it did run an article on its 
page four with a headline that read: "A U.S. decision- 
making official complemented Taiwan as the most stable 
[U.S.] ally."  The sub-headline added: "A Presidential 
Office official emphasized that Washington-Taipei ties 
are developing stably.  It will benefit the bilateral 
relations all the more if both the ruling and 
opposition parties could quickly pass the [U.S.] arms 
procurement bill to prove Taiwan's determination to 
defend itself." 
 
2. In addition, the "Taiwan Daily" editorialized on 
Schriver's remarks regarding the U.S. arms sales to 
Taiwan.  The editorial noted that perhaps the United 
States could exercise its influence and persuade the 
Pan-Blue legislators not to boycott the arms 
procurement bill again.  A "Liberty Times" commentary 
also discussed U.S.-China-Taiwan relations, noting that 
if Taiwan wants to maintain its independent 
sovereignty, the only way to pursue peace in the Taiwan 
Strait would be for Taiwan to play well its role of a 
major ally to the United States in the region.  End 
summary. 
 
1. Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Randy 
Schriver's Taiwan Trip 
 
"Randy Schriver, `Friend of Taiwan,' Visits the Island; 
[His Remarks] Provide [an Opportunity] for the Taiwan 
People to Ponder Taiwan's Strategic Position and They 
Are Worthy of Contemplation by Both the Ruling and 
Opposition Parties" 
 
The pro-independence "Taiwan Daily" [circulation: 
150,000] editorialized (7/14): 
 
". [Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State] Randy 
Schriver, however, directly pointed out that Taiwan's 
delayed decision to pass a special budget for 
purchasing the U.S. weapons will, without a doubt, 
cause it to `miss a chance' and Taiwan `will have to 
pay for it' in the future. 
 
"Schriver did not specify what kind of a price Taiwan 
will have to pay, but he did provide the information 
for Taiwan to ponder, namely, if the passage of the 
arms procurement bill keeps being delayed, it would 
certainly impact the U.S. Pacific Command's ability to 
intervene in a Taiwan Strait crisis and could also 
impact the political climate on Capitol Hill. 
Moreover, in addition to the repeated requests by some 
U.S. officials recently urging Taiwan to `demonstrate 
its determination to defend itself,' the U.S. Congress, 
which used to support Taiwan greatly, has also started 
to echo calls by the U.S. executive branch.  Thus, we 
believe that Schriver's remarks reveal that the U.S. 
executive and legislative branches are getting 
impatient with Taiwan's stalled decision to pass the 
arms procurement bill. 
 
"Just as Schriver said, no one should `cover up the 
fact of China's rising.'  . We must point out again 
that both Washington and Tokyo can tell the importance 
of Taiwan's strategic position, and so can the Chinese 
government in Beijing.  The real intent behind China's 
grave desire to take over Taiwan's sovereignty is not 
entirely because it wants to `complete the grand task 
of Chinese unification' but because it wants to 
successfully control this strategic port in the Pacific 
Ocean by taking Taiwan's territory.  All Beijing 
aspires to is to become a Pacific Rim country that 
possesses sea dominance, and Taiwan is the perfect 
gateway for China to enter the Pacific Rim area.  This 
is where Beijing's real intent to obtain Taiwan lies. 
 
"It was based on such a strategic understanding that 
the United States demanded that Taiwan strengthen its 
national defense capabilities and not rely solely on 
the military support provided under the U.S.-Japan 
security pact.  Nonetheless, we want to tell our 
foreign friends who support Taiwan, such as Schriver, 
that the DPP government has never neglected its duty to 
push for the arms procurement bill that can help 
safeguard our national security.  The problem, on the 
contrary, lies with the pro-China Pan-Blue legislators 
who insist on boycotting the bill.  The Taiwan 
authorities, of course, have the responsibility to 
negotiate and openly explain [the situation] to the Pan- 
Blue legislators, in order to seek their support for 
the bill. Perhaps the United States can also exercise 
its influence via certain channels to persuade those 
Pan-Blue political parties not to boycott the bill any 
more. ." 
 
2. U.S.-China-Taiwan Relations 
 
Journalist Su Yung-yao noted in the "Focus Review" 
column of the pro-independence "Liberty Times" 
[circulation: 800,000] (7/14): 
 
". For Beijing, an unstable status quo [in the Taiwan 
Strait] can better provide it with an excuse to 
intervene [in Taiwan affairs.]  In terms of 
geopolitics, if China wants to become a hegemonic power 
in the Asia-Pacific region, the key is to break through 
the First Island Chain, of which Taiwan is a part. 
 
"In terms of practical interests, unless Taiwan is 
under China's sphere of influence, it will never be 
able to see China's goodwill no matter what it does or 
compromises on. . 
 
"All these indicate that if Taiwan wants to maintain 
its independent sovereignty and not be forced to unify 
[with China], the only way to pursue peace across the 
Taiwan Strait is to play well its role as a major ally 
of the United States in the Asia-Pacific region. 
 
"During its two terms in office, the Bush 
administration, even in the face of intense threats 
posed by international terrorism, has made the American 
people realize that conciliation and a perfunctory 
attitude will not make their lives any safer. 
 
"By the same token, in the face of the Beijing regime 
that will not abandon using non-peaceful means to 
invade Taiwan, Taiwan's only way to protect itself is 
to strengthen its relationship with the United States. 
." 
 
PAAL