Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 97115 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
ETRD EAGR ETTC EAID ECON EFIN ECIN EINV ELAB EAIR ENRG EPET EWWT ECPS EIND EMIN ELTN EC ETMIN EUC EZ ET ELECTIONS ENVR EU EUN EG EINT ER ECONOMICS ES EMS ENIV EEB EN ECE ECOSOC EK ENVIRONMENT EFIS EI EWT ENGRD ECPSN EXIM EIAD ERIN ECPC EDEV ENGY ECTRD EPA ESTH ECCT EINVECON ENGR ERTD EUR EAP EWWC ELTD EL EXIMOPIC EXTERNAL ETRDEC ESCAP ECO EGAD ELNT ECONOMIC ENV ETRN EIAR EUMEM ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID EREL ECOM ECONETRDEAGRJA ETCC ETRG ECONOMY EMED ETR ENERG EITC EFINOECD EURM EENG ERA EXPORT ENRD ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EGEN EBRD EVIN ETRAD ECOWAS EFTA ECONETRDBESPAR EGOVSY EPIN EID ECONENRG EDRC ESENV ETT EB ENER ELTNSNAR ECHEVARRIA ETRC EPIT EDUC ESA EFI ENRGY ESCI EE EAIDXMXAXBXFFR EETC ECIP EIAID EIVN EBEXP ESTN EING EGOV ETRA EPETEIND ELAN ETRDGK EAIDRW ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ENVI ELN EAG EPCS EPRT EPTED ETRB EUM EAIDS EFIC EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM EAIDAR ESF EIDN ELAM EDU EV EAIDAF ECN EDA EXBS EINTECPS ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EPREL EAC EINVEFIN ETA EAGER EINDIR ECA ECLAC ELAP EITI EUCOM ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID EARG ELDIN EINVKSCA ENNP EFINECONCS EFINTS ECCP ETC EAIRASECCASCID EINN ETRP EAIDNI EFQ ECOQKPKO EGPHUM EBUD ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ENERGY ELB EINDETRD EMI ECONEFIN EIB EURN ETRDEINVTINTCS EIN EFIM ETIO ELAINE EMN EATO EWTR EIPR EINVETC ETTD ETDR EIQ ECONCS EPPD ENRGIZ EISL ESPINOSA ELEC EAIG ESLCO EUREM ENTG ERD EINVECONSENVCSJA EEPET EUNCH ECINECONCS ETRO ETRDECONWTOCS ECUN EFND EPECO EAIRECONRP ERGR ETRDPGOV ECPN ENRGMO EPWR EET EAIS EAGRE EDUARDO EAGRRP EAIDPHUMPRELUG EICN ECONQH EVN EGHG ELBR EINF EAIDHO EENV ETEX ERNG ED
KMDR KPAO KPKO KJUS KCRM KGHG KFRD KWMN KDEM KTFN KHIV KGIC KIDE KSCA KNNP KHUM KIPR KSUM KISL KIRF KCOR KRCM KPAL KWBG KN KS KOMC KSEP KFLU KPWR KTIA KSEO KMPI KHLS KICC KSTH KMCA KVPR KPRM KE KU KZ KFLO KSAF KTIP KTEX KBCT KOCI KOLY KOR KAWC KACT KUNR KTDB KSTC KLIG KSKN KNN KCFE KCIP KGHA KHDP KPOW KUNC KDRL KV KPREL KCRS KPOL KRVC KRIM KGIT KWIR KT KIRC KOMO KRFD KUWAIT KG KFIN KSCI KTFIN KFTN KGOV KPRV KSAC KGIV KCRIM KPIR KSOC KBIO KW KGLB KMWN KPO KFSC KSEAO KSTCPL KSI KPRP KREC KFPC KUNH KCSA KMRS KNDP KR KICCPUR KPPAO KCSY KTBT KCIS KNEP KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNNB KGCC KINR KPOP KMFO KENV KNAR KVIR KDRG KDMR KFCE KNAO KDEN KGCN KICA KIMMITT KMCC KLFU KMSG KSEC KUM KCUL KMNP KSMT KCOM KOMCSG KSPR KPMI KRAD KIND KCRP KAUST KWAWC KTER KCHG KRDP KPAS KITA KTSC KPAOPREL KWGB KIRP KJUST KMIG KLAB KTFR KSEI KSTT KAPO KSTS KLSO KWNN KPOA KHSA KNPP KPAONZ KBTS KWWW KY KJRE KPAOKMDRKE KCRCM KSCS KWMNCI KESO KWUN KPLS KIIP KEDEM KPAOY KRIF KGICKS KREF KTRD KFRDSOCIRO KTAO KJU KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KEN KO KNEI KEMR KKIV KEAI KWAC KRCIM KWCI KFIU KWIC KCORR KOMS KNNO KPAI KBWG KTTB KTBD KTIALG KILS KFEM KTDM KESS KNUC KPA KOMCCO KCEM KRCS KWBGSY KNPPIS KNNPMNUC KWN KERG KLTN KALM KCCP KSUMPHUM KREL KGH KLIP KTLA KAWK KWMM KVRP KVRC KAID KSLG KDEMK KX KIF KNPR KCFC KFTFN KTFM KPDD KCERS KMOC KDEMAF KMEPI KEMS KDRM KEPREL KBTR KEDU KNP KIRL KNNR KMPT KISLPINR KTPN KA KJUSTH KPIN KDEV KTDD KAKA KFRP KWNM KTSD KINL KJUSKUNR KWWMN KECF KWBC KPRO KVBL KOM KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KEDM KFLD KLPM KRGY KNNF KICR KIFR KM KWMNCS KAWS KLAP KPAK KDDG KCGC KID KNSD KMPF KPFO KDP KCMR KRMS KNPT KNNNP KTIAPARM KDTB KNUP KPGOV KNAP KNNC KUK KSRE KREISLER KIVP KQ KTIAEUN KPALAOIS KRM KISLAO KWM KFLOA
PHUM PINR PTER PGOV PREL PREF PL PM PHSA PE PARM PINS PK PUNE PO PALESTINIAN PU PBTS PROP PTBS POL POLI PA PGOVZI POLMIL POLITICAL PARTIES POLM PD POLITICS POLICY PAS PMIL PINT PNAT PV PKO PPOL PERSONS PING PBIO PH PETR PARMS PRES PCON PETERS PRELBR PT PLAB PP PAK PDEM PKPA PSOCI PF PLO PTERM PJUS PSOE PELOSI PROPERTY PGOVPREL PARP PRL PNIR PHUMKPAL PG PREZ PGIC PBOV PAO PKK PROV PHSAK PHUMPREL PROTECTION PGOVBL PSI PRELPK PGOVENRG PUM PRELKPKO PATTY PSOC PRIVATIZATION PRELSP PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PMIG PREC PAIGH PROG PSHA PARK PETER POG PHUS PPREL PS PTERPREL PRELPGOV POV PKPO PGOVECON POUS PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PWBG PMAR PREM PAR PNR PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PARMIR PGOVGM PHUH PARTM PN PRE PTE PY POLUN PPEL PDOV PGOVSOCI PIRF PGOVPM PBST PRELEVU PGOR PBTSRU PRM PRELKPAOIZ PGVO PERL PGOC PAGR PMIN PHUMR PVIP PPD PGV PRAM PINL PKPAL PTERE PGOF PINO PHAS PODC PRHUM PHUMA PREO PPA PEPFAR PGO PRGOV PAC PRESL PORG PKFK PEPR PRELP PREFA PNG PGOVPHUMKPAO PRELECON PINOCHET PFOR PGOVLO PHUMBA PRELC PREK PHUME PHJM POLINT PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PGOVE PHALANAGE PARTY PECON PEACE PROCESS PLN PRELSW PAHO PEDRO PRELA PASS PPAO PGPV PNUM PCUL PGGV PSA PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PGIV PRFE POGOV PEL PBT PAMQ PINF PSEPC POSTS PHUMPGOV PVOV PHSAPREL PROLIFERATION PENA PRELTBIOBA PIN PRELL PGOVPTER PHAM PHYTRP PTEL PTERPGOV PHARM PROTESTS PRELAF PKBL PRELKPAO PKNP PARMP PHUML PFOV PERM PUOS PRELGOV PHUMPTER PARAGRAPH PERURENA PBTSEWWT PCI PETROL PINSO PINSCE PQL PEREZ PBS

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 05MANILA3370, CALMER WEEK ON POLITICAL FRONT PROVIDES RESPITE

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #05MANILA3370.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
05MANILA3370 2005-07-22 09:36 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Manila
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 MANILA 003370 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
STATE FOR EAP/PMBS, EAP/EP, EB/IFD, EB/TPP/BTA/ANA 
STATE PASS USTR FOR BWEISEL AND DKATZ 
STATE PASS USAID AND OPIC 
TREASURY FOR OASIA FOR AJEWELL 
USDOJ FOR MCRAWFORD 
USDOC FOR 4430/ITA/MAC/DBISBEE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ECON EFIN EINV PGOV RP
SUBJECT:  CALMER WEEK ON POLITICAL FRONT PROVIDES RESPITE 
FOR FINANCIAL MARKETS 
 
REFS: A) Manila 3279, B) Manila 3326, C) Manila 2878, 
 
D) Manila 2879, E) Manila 2881 
 
1.  (SBU)  Summary:  A relatively calmer week on the 
political front and positive fiscal news gave currency, 
stock, and bond markets some breathing space to partially 
recoup lost gains.  The peso traded above the 56 pesos/$1 
level throughout the July 18-22 trading week, but ended 
the week down slightly from the previous week's close. 
In the equities market, the stock price index rose to a 
four-week high and foreign buying more than offset net 
foreign sales during the first half of July.  After 
rising over the past several weeks, the loan-benchmark 91- 
day Treasury bill dipped to a 22-month low.  However, 
considering the Philippines' fractious political climate, 
few discount the possibility of more surprises ahead. 
Market players will closely watch President Arroyo's July 
25 State of the Nation Address and Supreme Court action 
on the suspended Expanded Value Added Tax law.  End 
Summary. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
91-Day Treasury Bill Rates Slide to 22-Month Low 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
2.  (U) Rates for 91- and 182-day papers declined during 
the GRP's weekly Treasury bill auction on July 18.  The 
benchmark 91-day bills slid to an average rate of 5.452%, 
down by 72.1 basis points week-on-week.  The drop more 
than made up for successive increases since mid-June 2005 
and pulled down the average rate for the 91-day 
instrument to its lowest level since late-September 2003. 
Rates for 182-day bills also declined for the first time 
since mid-June 2005, though by a more modest 10.9 basis 
points to 7.431%.  As of July 18, the average 182-day 
Treasury bill rate was at a three-week low.  The rate had 
increased by 46.5 basis points from the end of May 2005 
(before the audio tapes linking President Arroyo to 
alleged election fraud surfaced), but was still down by 
39.5 basis points from the end of December 2004. 
Financial system liquidity, lessened political tension, 
and encouraging first-semester fiscal results that showed 
the National Government deficit (67.5 billion pesos) well 
below its programmed 98.5-billion pesos ceiling and about 
10% ahead of its financing program also helped ease rates 
down. 
 
3.  (U) Risk premiums continued to rise, however, for the 
longer-term 364-day bills because of hovering political 
uncertainties.  After rejecting all bids for the 364-day 
paper in each of its weekly auctions since mid-June as 
being "unreasonably high," the Government fully awarded 
its scheduled 2 billion peso offering on July 18.  The 
364-day paper fetched an average rate of 8.482%, 63.1 
basis points higher from when the Government last awarded 
these papers on June 6.  The July 18 average rate for the 
364-day bills represented an 11-week high.  It was 49.7 
basis points higher than at the end of May 2005, but was 
140.2 basis points lower than the 364-day rate during 
2004's last Treasury bill auction.  The average 
differential between the 91-day and 364-day papers 
widened to 303 basis points during the Government's July 
18 auction, from the 206.5 and 209.4 basis point 
differentials at the end of May 2005 and December 2004, 
respectively. 
 
--------------------------------------------- 
Peso Trades Above 56 pesos/$1 Throughout the Week 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
4.  (U) Since July 14, the local currency has traded at 
stronger than 56.00 pesos/$1 in the inter-bank market. 
Inter-bank trades ranged from 55.25-55.98 pesos/$1 during 
the July 18-22 trading week.  The peso opened July 22, 
the last day of the trading week, at 55.25 pesos/$1 -- 
the strongest intra-day rate posted since June 15 -- in 
reaction to the slight appreciation of the Chinese yuan. 
However, resurgent political jitters ahead of President 
Arroyo's July 25 State of the Nation Address capped the 
peso's recovery and the local currency ended the week at 
55.89 pesos/$1, slightly weaker than the previous 
Friday's 55.85 pesos/$1 close.  At July 22's closing 
rate, the peso was down 2.5% (1.37 peso) from the end of 
May 2005; and was 0.7% (0.39 peso) stronger than at the 
end of 2004. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
Investors Hunting Bargains; Foreigners Net Buyers 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
5.  (U) The Phisix inched up to its highest closing level 
in nearly four weeks on July 21 (1,960.76) before 
declining somewhat on profit taking before closing the 
week at 1,954.40 on July 22.  At that level, the Phisix 
was up 1.3% from the end of May 2005 and up 7.2% from 
yearend 2004.  Foreign investors were net buyers of 
Philippine stocks during four of the five trading days 
this week.  Net foreign purchases during the week 
exceeded 1.7 billion pesos, more than offsetting net 
foreign sales of 1.2 billion pesos during the first half 
of July. 
 
---------------------- 
Sovereign Bond Spreads 
---------------------- 
 
6.  (U) As of July 21, sovereign bond spreads had 
narrowed for medium-term Philippine bonds maturing in 
2008 and 2010 but had widened somewhat for longer-term 
foreign debt instruments.  Spreads for Philippine bonds 
maturing in 2008 and 2010 closed 156 and 320 basis 
points, respectively, above comparable U.S. treasuries, 
tightening from the previous week's close of 157 and 324 
basis points.  Spreads for the 2019 and 2025 papers 
widened to 462 and 507 basis points, respectively, from 
454 and 500 basis points the week before.  As of July 21, 
the respective spreads for the 2008, 2010, and 2019 bonds 
were 47, 19, and 6 basis points narrower than at the end 
of May 2005, and, for the 2025 bonds, 3 basis points 
wider.  Compared with end-December 2004, spreads for 
these four bond maturities had tightened by 123, 80, 45, 
and 13 basis points, respectively. 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
7.  (SBU) A sense of calm appears to have settled over 
financial markets this week, but few local observers 
discount the possibility of more political surprises in 
the weeks ahead as the opposition works to impeach the 
President and the Palace tries to establish an 
independent "Truth Commission" (Ref B).  Investors, 
credit rating agencies, and other observers will also 
closely watch President Arroyo's State of the Nation 
Address on July 25 and the Supreme Court's decision on 
the currently suspended implementation of the amended 
Expanded Value Added Tax (EVAT) law.  The EVAT 
implementation will be an important test of the Arroyo 
Administration's political will and its ability to 
carryout economic reform and stabilize the deficit.  As 
Central Bank Governor Amando Tetangco underscored in 
recent remarks to the business community, non- 
implementation of this centerpiece tax measure would 
deepen fiscal problems and significantly limit the 
efficacy of monetary policy. 
 
8.  (SBU) Despite the media frenzy and oppositionists' 
claims, and although the country continues to face many 
important challenges (Refs C, D and E), the Philippines 
does not appear to be on the brink of economic 
dysfunction or financial insolvency.  The main financial 
and economic indicators have so far avoided immediate 
danger.  Managers at the Central Bank and the Finance 
Department deserve at least some credit for maintaining 
relative economic stability.  For now, international 
reserves appear adequate, the balance of payments is in 
surplus (nearly $2 billion as of June), and bankers tell 
us they see no sign of capital flight.  The situation 
nevertheless remains potentially volatile.  Until the 
EVAT and possible impeachment proceedings are settled, 
many foreign and domestic investors will be in a wait-and- 
see mode. 
 
Mussomeli