Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 97115 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
ETRD EAGR ETTC EAID ECON EFIN ECIN EINV ELAB EAIR ENRG EPET EWWT ECPS EIND EMIN ELTN EC ETMIN EUC EZ ET ELECTIONS ENVR EU EUN EG EINT ER ECONOMICS ES EMS ENIV EEB EN ECE ECOSOC EK ENVIRONMENT EFIS EI EWT ENGRD ECPSN EXIM EIAD ERIN ECPC EDEV ENGY ECTRD EPA ESTH ECCT EINVECON ENGR ERTD EUR EAP EWWC ELTD EL EXIMOPIC EXTERNAL ETRDEC ESCAP ECO EGAD ELNT ECONOMIC ENV ETRN EIAR EUMEM ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID EREL ECOM ECONETRDEAGRJA ETCC ETRG ECONOMY EMED ETR ENERG EITC EFINOECD EURM EENG ERA EXPORT ENRD ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EGEN EBRD EVIN ETRAD ECOWAS EFTA ECONETRDBESPAR EGOVSY EPIN EID ECONENRG EDRC ESENV ETT EB ENER ELTNSNAR ECHEVARRIA ETRC EPIT EDUC ESA EFI ENRGY ESCI EE EAIDXMXAXBXFFR EETC ECIP EIAID EIVN EBEXP ESTN EING EGOV ETRA EPETEIND ELAN ETRDGK EAIDRW ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ENVI ELN EAG EPCS EPRT EPTED ETRB EUM EAIDS EFIC EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM EAIDAR ESF EIDN ELAM EDU EV EAIDAF ECN EDA EXBS EINTECPS ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EPREL EAC EINVEFIN ETA EAGER EINDIR ECA ECLAC ELAP EITI EUCOM ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID EARG ELDIN EINVKSCA ENNP EFINECONCS EFINTS ECCP ETC EAIRASECCASCID EINN ETRP EAIDNI EFQ ECOQKPKO EGPHUM EBUD ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ENERGY ELB EINDETRD EMI ECONEFIN EIB EURN ETRDEINVTINTCS EIN EFIM ETIO ELAINE EMN EATO EWTR EIPR EINVETC ETTD ETDR EIQ ECONCS EPPD ENRGIZ EISL ESPINOSA ELEC EAIG ESLCO EUREM ENTG ERD EINVECONSENVCSJA EEPET EUNCH ECINECONCS ETRO ETRDECONWTOCS ECUN EFND EPECO EAIRECONRP ERGR ETRDPGOV ECPN ENRGMO EPWR EET EAIS EAGRE EDUARDO EAGRRP EAIDPHUMPRELUG EICN ECONQH EVN EGHG ELBR EINF EAIDHO EENV ETEX ERNG ED
KMDR KPAO KPKO KJUS KCRM KGHG KFRD KWMN KDEM KTFN KHIV KGIC KIDE KSCA KNNP KHUM KIPR KSUM KISL KIRF KCOR KRCM KPAL KWBG KN KS KOMC KSEP KFLU KPWR KTIA KSEO KMPI KHLS KICC KSTH KMCA KVPR KPRM KE KU KZ KFLO KSAF KTIP KTEX KBCT KOCI KOLY KOR KAWC KACT KUNR KTDB KSTC KLIG KSKN KNN KCFE KCIP KGHA KHDP KPOW KUNC KDRL KV KPREL KCRS KPOL KRVC KRIM KGIT KWIR KT KIRC KOMO KRFD KUWAIT KG KFIN KSCI KTFIN KFTN KGOV KPRV KSAC KGIV KCRIM KPIR KSOC KBIO KW KGLB KMWN KPO KFSC KSEAO KSTCPL KSI KPRP KREC KFPC KUNH KCSA KMRS KNDP KR KICCPUR KPPAO KCSY KTBT KCIS KNEP KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNNB KGCC KINR KPOP KMFO KENV KNAR KVIR KDRG KDMR KFCE KNAO KDEN KGCN KICA KIMMITT KMCC KLFU KMSG KSEC KUM KCUL KMNP KSMT KCOM KOMCSG KSPR KPMI KRAD KIND KCRP KAUST KWAWC KTER KCHG KRDP KPAS KITA KTSC KPAOPREL KWGB KIRP KJUST KMIG KLAB KTFR KSEI KSTT KAPO KSTS KLSO KWNN KPOA KHSA KNPP KPAONZ KBTS KWWW KY KJRE KPAOKMDRKE KCRCM KSCS KWMNCI KESO KWUN KPLS KIIP KEDEM KPAOY KRIF KGICKS KREF KTRD KFRDSOCIRO KTAO KJU KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KEN KO KNEI KEMR KKIV KEAI KWAC KRCIM KWCI KFIU KWIC KCORR KOMS KNNO KPAI KBWG KTTB KTBD KTIALG KILS KFEM KTDM KESS KNUC KPA KOMCCO KCEM KRCS KWBGSY KNPPIS KNNPMNUC KWN KERG KLTN KALM KCCP KSUMPHUM KREL KGH KLIP KTLA KAWK KWMM KVRP KVRC KAID KSLG KDEMK KX KIF KNPR KCFC KFTFN KTFM KPDD KCERS KMOC KDEMAF KMEPI KEMS KDRM KEPREL KBTR KEDU KNP KIRL KNNR KMPT KISLPINR KTPN KA KJUSTH KPIN KDEV KTDD KAKA KFRP KWNM KTSD KINL KJUSKUNR KWWMN KECF KWBC KPRO KVBL KOM KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KEDM KFLD KLPM KRGY KNNF KICR KIFR KM KWMNCS KAWS KLAP KPAK KDDG KCGC KID KNSD KMPF KPFO KDP KCMR KRMS KNPT KNNNP KTIAPARM KDTB KNUP KPGOV KNAP KNNC KUK KSRE KREISLER KIVP KQ KTIAEUN KPALAOIS KRM KISLAO KWM KFLOA
PHUM PINR PTER PGOV PREL PREF PL PM PHSA PE PARM PINS PK PUNE PO PALESTINIAN PU PBTS PROP PTBS POL POLI PA PGOVZI POLMIL POLITICAL PARTIES POLM PD POLITICS POLICY PAS PMIL PINT PNAT PV PKO PPOL PERSONS PING PBIO PH PETR PARMS PRES PCON PETERS PRELBR PT PLAB PP PAK PDEM PKPA PSOCI PF PLO PTERM PJUS PSOE PELOSI PROPERTY PGOVPREL PARP PRL PNIR PHUMKPAL PG PREZ PGIC PBOV PAO PKK PROV PHSAK PHUMPREL PROTECTION PGOVBL PSI PRELPK PGOVENRG PUM PRELKPKO PATTY PSOC PRIVATIZATION PRELSP PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PMIG PREC PAIGH PROG PSHA PARK PETER POG PHUS PPREL PS PTERPREL PRELPGOV POV PKPO PGOVECON POUS PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PWBG PMAR PREM PAR PNR PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PARMIR PGOVGM PHUH PARTM PN PRE PTE PY POLUN PPEL PDOV PGOVSOCI PIRF PGOVPM PBST PRELEVU PGOR PBTSRU PRM PRELKPAOIZ PGVO PERL PGOC PAGR PMIN PHUMR PVIP PPD PGV PRAM PINL PKPAL PTERE PGOF PINO PHAS PODC PRHUM PHUMA PREO PPA PEPFAR PGO PRGOV PAC PRESL PORG PKFK PEPR PRELP PREFA PNG PGOVPHUMKPAO PRELECON PINOCHET PFOR PGOVLO PHUMBA PRELC PREK PHUME PHJM POLINT PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PGOVE PHALANAGE PARTY PECON PEACE PROCESS PLN PRELSW PAHO PEDRO PRELA PASS PPAO PGPV PNUM PCUL PGGV PSA PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PGIV PRFE POGOV PEL PBT PAMQ PINF PSEPC POSTS PHUMPGOV PVOV PHSAPREL PROLIFERATION PENA PRELTBIOBA PIN PRELL PGOVPTER PHAM PHYTRP PTEL PTERPGOV PHARM PROTESTS PRELAF PKBL PRELKPAO PKNP PARMP PHUML PFOV PERM PUOS PRELGOV PHUMPTER PARAGRAPH PERURENA PBTSEWWT PCI PETROL PINSO PINSCE PQL PEREZ PBS

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 05BAGHDAD2809, MEDIA REACTION: IRAQ, CONSTITUTION, SHIITES,

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #05BAGHDAD2809.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
05BAGHDAD2809 2005-07-03 10:42 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Baghdad
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 002809 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR INR/R/MR, NEA/PPD, NEA/PPA, NEA/AGS, INR/IZ, 
INR/P 
E.0. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OPRC KMDR KPAO IZ
SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION: IRAQ, CONSTITUTION, SHIITES, 
SUNNIS, NEGOTIATIONS, INSURGENCY; BAGHDAD 
 
1. SUMMARY: The major themes in the daily newspapers on 
July. 3 were the preparations for drafting the 
constitution and the latest developments of the security 
situation. END SUMMARY. 
 
----------------- 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
----------------- 
 
A. "Yesterday's prey and today's hunter" (Al-Ittihad, 7/3) 
B. "Negotiations with resistance solve an American and not 
Iraqi problem" (Al-Mada, 7/3) 
 
---------------------- 
SELECTED COMMENTARIES 
---------------------- 
 
A. "Yesterday's prey and today's hunter" (Al-Ittihad, 7/3) 
 
Al-Ittihad (affiliated with PUK led by Jalal Talabani) 
published a fifth-paged editorial by Faryad Rawanduzi about 
the constitution: 
 
"Some individuals are asking why the Americans are 
insisting on Sunni participation in the constitutional 
committee and the political process in Iraq?  Those with 
inside knowledge may be asking why the U.S. is choosing to 
intervene directly on this issue while discussing other 
issues indirectly. In order to answer these two questions, 
we must ask if the Bush administration is afraid of failure 
in Iraq. Is it afraid of the current Iraqi politicians who 
have begun to implement this new project in Iraq? 
 
Without a doubt, the U.S. began reconsidering some of its 
policies regarding Iraq because the new situation has led 
the Shiites and Kurds - the winners of the political 
process - to dominate the political process. On the other 
hand, the Sunnis boycotted the elections because they 
thought that the Iraqi-American project opposed their own 
n 
aspirations. However, the U.S. objectives in Iraq also 
oppose some official and unofficial Shiite viewpoints. For 
this reason, the U.S. has had to resort to the "lost son" 
in order to restore balance to the unfair political 
process. The "lost son" that we are referring to is the 
Arab Sunni community. Indeed, the recent American 
discussions with the Arab Sunnis clearly indicates that the 
U.S. administration is confident with the Shiite 
understanding of the American role in Iraq. 
 
We realize that the U.S. has depended largely on the 
Shiites after it guaranteed the Kurds a major political 
role in an attempt to establish a country without anti- 
American sentiment. It is true that the participation of 
the Arab Sunnis is important to the Americans but it is 
also important for Iraq. In fact, the recent American 
insistence on supporting the Arab Sunnis represents a 
strong message to the Arab Shiites. This message informs 
the Shiites that the American strategy is to ensure the 
redistribution of the political balance in Iraq. The U.S. 
is conveying this message and providing concessions to the 
Arab Sunnis in an attempt to gain their participation and 
to end the Sunni insurgency. As a result, the Sunnis will 
participate in the U.S.-engineered political project. 
 
It appears that the Arab Sunnis have finally realized that 
they must knock at the American door if they want to 
participate in the political process. However, it is 
useless to knock on this door unless there have been real 
changes in the Arab Sunni's political strategy toward the 
American presence. Once that occurs, there will be American 
guarantees for Sunni participation in the political 
process. From their perspective, the Arab Shiites have 
begun to understand the significance of the new American 
orientation toward the Arab Sunnis. The Shiite political 
parties have been put on a state of alert because they 
understand that any American gesture to the Sunnis will be 
made at their expense. This implies that the Shiites will 
lose some positions and privileges. Therefore, if the 
Shiites do not make a gesture to support the new American 
position, the Iraqi equation will become more complicated. 
 
It is possible that the constitution will not be completed 
on time or new factors in the Iraqi political scene may 
come to the fore. The hawks in the White House will not 
hesitate to fly over the Sunni Triangle. Nor will they 
hesitate to build nests in the middle of the insurgency. 
The hawks will not hesitate to give yesterday's prey to the 
hunters in order to experience political profits in Iraq." 
 
B. "Negotiations with the 'resistance' solves the American 
problem, not the Iraqi problem" (Al-Mada, 7/3) 
 
Al-Mada (independent) published a front-page editorial by 
Jamal Abdul Rahim about the American negotiations with the 
Iraqi insurgency: 
 
"Over the past few days, the American government has 
announced that it has held negotiations with the Iraqi 
resistance. The Iraqi and foreign media outlets paid great 
attention to this frank confession. We all have the right 
to hypothesize that these negotiations will prove 
successful. But what would success mean to the Iraqi 
people?  Which party to the conflict will be able to free 
itself from its problems by experiencing success? Is it 
Iraq? The U.S.? Perhaps both? 
 
The answer to this question is very important for all 
Iraqis who are determined to stop the bloodshed in Iraq. 
The Iraqi people can urge the government to actively 
participate in these negotiations. However, our problem is 
that the real Iraqi picture is different from what the 
media outlets are portraying. The truth is that these 
negotiations will never improve the stability of the 
security situation in Iraq. Perhaps such negotiations can 
reduce pressure on the American government by leading to a 
reduction in the number of American loses in Iraq. I say 
that hypothetically because the Americans are negotiating 
with leaders of the Iraqi 'resistance' who supposedly only 
target foreign troops, not Iraqis. Is there any proof that 
verifies this statement? 
 
I think it is reasonable to discuss recent Iraqi and 
American reports that were published just days ago about 
the losses of Iraqi and American life in Iraq. The Pentagon 
published statistics stating that the number of American 
soldiers killed since last January has reached 307. 
Meanwhile, the Iraqi Ministry of Interior announced that 
the Iraqi loses reached 8,175 killed and 12,000 wounded 
during this same period. These two results indicate that 
the American loses represent no more than 4 percent while 
the Iraqi losses make up 96%. 
 
It seems that the success of the negotiations with the 
resistance is aimed at reducing American loses. On the 
other hand, we do not know whether or not these 
negotiations will decrease the amount of Iraqi casualties. 
However, achieving success on this issue may uncover some 
armed groups that have insisted on provoking a civil war. 
These groups are undertaking operations under the slogan of 
jihad against the occupier. The supposed goal of these 
operations is to divide the Iraqi people into those that 
support the foreign forces and those that oppose them, 
thereby threatening Iraqi unity. 
 
I discuss these issues while remembering the anniversary of 
transferring sovereignty to the Iraqis. Thank God that we 
have obtained our full sovereignty, at least in general. 
However, we still face minor issues that must be addressed. 
For example, we do not control the presidential palace, we 
were not advised that the Americans wanted to build the 
largest embassy in the world here in Baghdad, and nobody 
asked for our opinion in choosing and replacing American 
ambassadors. Additionally, we do not have any input 
regarding Saddam's trial. If the reports on American 
negotiations with the resistance are true, then we can also 
add this issue to the list. In our completely sovereign 
state, neither the government nor the National Assembly 
know anything about these negotiations." 
 
SATTERFIELD