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Viewing cable 05ABUJA1217, DARFUR PEACE TALKS: DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
05ABUJA1217 2005-07-06 14:54 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Abuja
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

061454Z Jul 05
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 ABUJA 001217 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12598: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PHUM PREF NI SU CD DARFUR
SUBJECT: DARFUR PEACE TALKS: DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES 
SIGNED 
 
REF: ABUJA 1178 
 
1.  (SBU)  Summary: The Government of Sudan, the Sudan 
Liberation Movement, and Justice and Equality Movement 
signed a Declaration of Principles for the Resolution of the 
Sudanese Conflict in Darfur (DOP) on July 5.  This evolved 
after more than three weeks of African Union (AU) mediation 
assisted by a final push through a focused negotiating 
effort by a team consisting of the United Nations, United 
States, Arab League, and AU.  UN Special Representative to 
Sudan, Jan Pronk, flew in on the next to last day to help 
spearhead that initiative.  In the final days of the talks, 
the rebel movements were under significant pressure from 
external parties, including Libya, Eritrea, and, reportedly 
one of John Garang's political advisers.  The SLM, though 
deeply divided, was eventually persuaded by the 
international community and its own self-interest to accept 
the document.  The AU plans to start the next round of 
negotiations on August 24.  End Summary. 
 
- - - - - - 
DOP SIGNED 
- - - - - - 
 
2.  (SBU)  The Government of Sudan, Sudan Liberation 
Movement (SLM), and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) 
signed the DOP on July 5 after a weekend of negative Libyan 
and Eritrean interventions.  In an elaborate signing 
ceremony, Sudanese State Minister for Humanitarian Affairs, 
Mohammed Youssif, SLM's Vice Chairman Khamis Abdullah 
Abakar, and JEM's Ahmed Tugod Lissan signed the DOP with AU 
Special Envoy Salim Ahmed Salim as witness.  The final text 
includes guidelines for future deliberations and basis "for 
a just, comprehensive, and durable settlement on the 
conflict in Darfur."  These include power and wealth sharing 
and social, economic reconstruction, and security 
arrangements, including disarmament, demobilization, and 
rehabilitation (DDR).  The AU announced that the next round 
of negotiations is set to begin on August 24. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
NEGATIVE EXTERANL INFLUENCES THREATEN PROCESS 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
3.  (SBU) Libyan Envoy Dr. Ali Abdul Salam Treiki arrived in 
town to push a deal though prior to the AU Summit in 
Tripoli.  He and the Eritreans obtained Dr. Salim Salim's 
blessing to "work with the parties" on the remaining areas 
of disagreement over the text of the DOP.  Beginning July 2, 
it became evident that Treiki and the Eritreans were 
shuttling between the parties to negotiate the DOP's text. 
Norway's Special Envoy Ambassador Tom Vraalsen joined 
Treiki, whom he knew from their UN days together, as the 
Libyan moved between the parties.  Other international 
partners were not included.  During the day, various members 
of both the SLM and JEM began complaining about the Libyan 
and Eritrean pressure, which allegedly included bribery and 
threats of physical harm.  In the late evening, the 
movements realized that the U.S. and UN were not involved. 
Around midnight, the Libyans publicly announced via an 
interview on Al Jazeera that a deal had been struck.  The 
SLM immediately denied the reports.  This added to the SLM's 
suspicions and concerns about the AU's ability to manage the 
process.  JEM's position was less transparent and at one 
point, team leader Ahmed Tugod Lissan told us an agreement 
would be signed imminently. 
 
4.  (SBU) The pressure on the SLM eventually backfired as it 
created common cause, however temporary, between the 
disparate factions on resisting the outside influences. 
Internally, however, the pressure, threats, and intimidation 
also deepened distrust among SLM members and consensus was 
not easily achieved.  The SLM rented a room at another hotel 
to escape the Libyan team.  They eventually succeeded in 
getting some privacy even though the Libyans followed them. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
CREATION OF UN, U.S., AU, ARAB LEAGUE TEAM 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
5.  (SBU) On Sunday, July 3 the AU called a partners meeting 
to explain Saturday's diplomatic efforts.  Dr. Salim 
reported that there was movement on some issues, including 
"voluntary" unity which the GOS resisted and separation of 
religion from the state upon which SLM adamantly insisted, 
with some language proposed by the Chadians, among others. 
The UN's Jan Pronk arrived and Salim asked him and the US 
(because of presumed influence with all three parties) to 
work with the parties on the finalization of the Declaration 
of Principles.  The AU and Arab League were added for 
balance.  The team was given the day of July 4 for a final 
effort to get agreement regarding the land use language of 
operative paragraph 12. 
 
6.  (SBU) Beginning at 8:00 a.m. and ending at 3:30 a.m. on 
July 5, the team under UN SSRG Pronk's leadership conducted 
three rounds of discussions with the parties.  In the first 
round, the team elicited from them their minimum and maximum 
positions, focusing on the SLM, whose three factions were 
equally represented.  As expected, the SLM adopted a hard- 
line against language which had been forced in by Treiki's 
earlier effort and which the GOS and JEM had accepted.  In 
round two, the team was able to get further agreement from 
the GOS and JEM on specific language fixes to the land use 
paragraph.  The SLM still reserved but appeared to be 
listening.  In round three, all three parties met for a face- 
to-face discussion.  Pronk started with the JEM, who 
accepted the text, noting their reservations.  The GOS then 
accepted the text.  The SLM's chief negotiator, Abdulgabar 
Dosa rejected the text without further explanation. 
 
7.  (SBU) At approximately 1:00 a.m. on July 5, Salim called 
the international partners together to explain the outcome 
of the negotiating team's efforts.  All of the partners 
vented their frustrations with the SLM.  Ambassador Yates 
discouraged the AU from holding a 10:00 a.m. meeting between 
the partners and SLM at which the partners would vent again 
and made it clear that we cannot have a DOP signing with 
only two parties, which is where most of the rest of the IC 
was headed. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
A NEW DAY, LAST DITCH EFFORTS 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
8.  (SBU) Later in the morning on July 5, Ambassador Yates 
and P/E officer met with each of the SLM factions, including 
Chairman Abdelwahid Nur, Secretary General Mini Minawi's 
supporters, and the camp of other non-Zaghawas and non- 
supporters of Abdelwahid.  (Note: Minawi was in Libya.  End 
Note.) We outlined to each group the facts as the world will 
see them: in effect, that the SLM will be seen as not 
wanting an agreement while Darfurian suffering continued. 
In addition, we emphasized that while the compromise 
language was not perfect, it does give more than adequate 
protection for the SLM in negotiating their key demands 
during the political and wealth-sharing discussions.  The 
SLM met throughout the day, trying to obtain internal 
consensus to sign the draft DOP.  The task was made harder, 
according to some sources, because of pressure from SPLM/A 
political advisor Hafiz not to sign a document until after 
John Garang is installed.  Various SLM members told us that 
they agreed to accept the document because it was important 
for them not to lose the confidence and support of the 
international community. 
 
9.  (SBU) The SLM overcame its differences and ultimately 
came to agreement to accept the text, making a small change 
which amounted to reordering the paragraph as well as some 
other changes to other sections, two of which were accepted. 
The AU's Sam Ibok met with the GOS and the JEM and obtained 
their acceptance, paving the way for the DOP's signing at a 
plenary ceremony with live national and international media 
coverage.  After a secession of speeches, Special Envoy 
Salim announced that the implementation talks would 
reconvene in Abuja on August 24. 
 
- - - - 
COMMENT 
- - - - 
 
10.  (SBU)  The SLM's internal divisions, aggravated by 
outside players, will continue to plague the process as the 
much more difficult implementation issues are addressed.  We 
are urging the various SLM factions to take advantage of the 
momentum of process to get their house in order prior to the 
next round.  It will behoove us to help facilitate this 
reconciliation process, too.  For now, all parties are 
relieved that this round is finally concluded. 
 
11.  (SBU)  However frustrating it may have been to require 
three weeks of teeth-gnashing negotiation, the DOP does in 
fact provide important, essential commitments toward the 
resolution of the Darfur tragedy.  These include, inter 
alia, to: a multi-ethnic, multi-religious Sudan (operative 
paragraph 1); democracy, political pluralism, independent 
judiciary, and free media (operative paragraph 2); 
formulation for separation of religion from the political 
process (operative paragraph 3) and other important 
commitments done through other paragraphs. 
 
CAMPBELL