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Viewing cable 05TELAVIV4107, MOSSAD CHIEF ON WEAKNESS OF SYRIA, PREDICTS NO

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
05TELAVIV4107 2005-06-29 13:24 2011-04-08 05:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Tel Aviv
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
"C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TEL AVIV 004107 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NEA FOR WELCH, CHENEY/DIBBLE, E. 
NSC FOR ABRAMS/DANIN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/20/2010 
TAGS: PREL PARM PGOV PTER MNUC IR SY IS GOI EXTERNAL
SUBJECT: MOSSAD CHIEF ON WEAKNESS OF SYRIA, PREDICTS NO 
CHANGE IN IRAN 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Daniel C. Kurtzer for reasons 1.4(b) and (d). 
 
1.  (C) Summary: Mossad Chief Meir Dagan told NEA A/S David 
Welch, Deputy National Security Advisor Elliott Abrams, and 
the Ambassador June 17 that, despite the weakness of Syrian 
president Bashar al-Assad, he is unlikely to be replaced any 
time soon.  Syria,s neighbors prefer to keep Assad in power 
but weak, as Syria is then less likely to meddle in the 
affairs of its neighbors.  On Iran, Dagan predicted that 
former president Rafsanjani will win the elections, but that 
little will change in Iran regardless: Iran will continue to 
seek even incremental escape from its suspension agreement 
with the EU-3.  Dagan said he thought a UN Security Council 
resolution codifying the EU-3 agreement would provide a 
better mechanism for taking action against constant low-level 
Iranian violations.  End Summary. 
 
----------------------- 
Syria -- Bashar Is Weak 
----------------------- 
 
2.  (C) In a meeting with visiting NEA A/S David Welch, 
Deputy National Security Advisor Elliott Abrams, and the 
Ambassador June 17, Mossad Chief Meir Dagan said that Syrian 
President Bashar al-Assad is very weak.  Despite having built 
up an atmosphere of what Dagan called ""dramatic political 
change,"" after the recent Ba'ath Party Congress, it became 
clear that ""nothing in Syria is changing.""  That being said, 
Dagan continued, there are now liberal elements willing to 
risk demonstrations against the government.  Discussion of 
the return of Rifat al-Assad, and graffiti in Syria 
proclaiming his return, are both signs that Bashar is 
becoming weaker.  The process of removing the old guard in 
Syria continues, Dagan said, but reiterated his initial point 
that even that does not signify any genuine change. 
 
3.  (C) Despite Bashar's weakness, Dagan did not predict that 
he would be driven from power any time soon.  If a leadership 
change were to occur at some future point, Dagan and his team 
predicted that any successor would come from within the 
elites: ""there are no dark horse candidates out there."" 
Neighboring countries have a genuine fear that radicals could 
replace Bashar in Syria; there is a widespread and strong 
preference for a weak -- but present -- Bashar al-Assad.  If 
an acceptable alternative were to present himself, that 
equation, however, might change.  The most important thing to 
the Syrian elites remains the continued control of the 
Allawites on power. 
 
4.  (C) Asked how Syria views the United States, Dagan said 
that the Syrians ""take your politeness as compromise."" 
Syria, in Dagan's view, will be less inclined to meddle in 
the affairs of its neighbors if a weakened Bashar al-Assad 
remains in place.  On the other hand, weakness in Syria means 
that Syria will be unable to control the Syria-Iraq border. 
Change in Syria will also have negative consequences in 
Lebanon, Dagan predicted. 
 
----------------- 
Iran -- No Change 
----------------- 
 
5.  (C) Dagan and his team said they were assuming that 
former president Rafsanjani would be re-elected in Iran, even 
if the voting necessitated going to a second round.  As 
president, Dagan predicted that Rafsanjani would espouse the 
same tough ideas as his predecessors, but with ""better 
packaging.""  Ayatollah Khamenei still remains very much on 
the scene, Dagan pointed out, further evidence that the 
presidential elections will not signify substantive policy 
change. 
 
6.  (C) Dagan asserted that Iran will continue the same 
policy regarding Iraq, hoping to see the Shi'a gain real 
power there through elections.  Dagan predicted that Iran's 
nuclear policy would also remain the same, as would their 
policies towards Hizballah.  Mossad had at last discovered 
how Iran Hizballah is moving money to Palestinian Islamic 
Jihad (PIJ), Dagan said, having actually seen Iranian agents 
hand over the cash to PIJ operatives.  Iran has in the past 
proven that it can rein in Hizballah when it suits them. 
 
7.  (C) Dagan said that Iran is very susceptible to, and 
should ""always remain under, constant pressure.""  As an 
example, Dagan said that European pressure had actually 
delayed work in the Kashan nuclear site, with a number of 
workers having been transferred elsewhere.  DNSA Abrams said 
that the U.S. opposes any compromises on Iran's nuclear 
program that might lead to Iran's development of the nuclear 
fuel cycle, and will press the Europeans to maintain a tough 
line.  Dagan said that Iran wants ""more than anything"" to 
break out of the suspension, and that even the ""tiniest 
compromise"" that leaves the door open for later discussion is 
sufficient.  DNSA Abrams agreed, adding that even a 100% 
suspension with the understanding that the suspension is 
voluntary would do, given Iran's incremental negotiating 
style. 
 
8.  (C) Dagan said that Israel would like more IAEA 
safeguards imposed on Iran, using the safety checks as a 
vehicle for more inspections and tighter IAEA control.  A UN 
Security Council resolution that requires cessation of all 
prohibited activity would also be useful, as it would 
translate the EU-3 demands into binding form.  Dagan's staff 
asserted that there had already been sufficient violations of 
the EU-3 suspension agreement of IAEA requirements in the 
last five months to pave the way for a UNSC resolution. 
9.  (U) A/S Welch and DNSA Abrams cleared this message. 
 
********************************************* ******************** 
Visit Embassy Tel Aviv's Classified Website: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/telaviv 
 
You can also access this site through the State Department's 
Classified SIPRNET website. 
********************************************* ******************** 
KURTZER 
"