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Viewing cable 05BUCHAREST1347, BLACK SEA BORDER SECURITY INITIATIVE EXPERTS GROUP

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
05BUCHAREST1347 2005-06-13 08:59 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Bucharest
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 BUCHAREST 001347 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
STATE DEPT FOR EUR/NCE - WILLIAM SILKWORTH AND ALSO FOR NP 
SECDEF FOR ISP - EURASIA, ISP-NPP 
DOE/NNSA FOR NA-211, NA 
HOMELAND SECURITY FOR NAP 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL ETTC KNNP RO MD GG UP BU
SUBJECT: BLACK SEA BORDER SECURITY INITIATIVE EXPERTS GROUP 
"STYX 2005" BUCHAREST PLANNING  CONFERENCE READ-OUT 
 
REF: A. A) STATE 90931 
     B. B) STATE 90564 C) 04 STATE 253728 
 
1. Summary.  Under the auspices of the Black Sea Border 
Security Initiative (BSBSI), USG representatives attended a 
first planning conference to consider Romania,s proposal to 
hold a tabletop simulation of a WMD incident.  The other 
states represented at the conference were Georgia, Moldova, 
Bulgaria, and Ukraine.  The delegations agreed in principle 
to send representatives to the forthcoming &STYX 20058 
tabletop exercise, scheduled for June 23 in Bucharest. 
Further coordination between the BSBSI participant states and 
the Romanian organizers will take place with Romanian MFA 
nonproliferation chief Dan Neculaescu via fax and e-mail. 
End Summary. 
 
INTRODUCING THE BLACK SEA BORDER SECURITY INITIATIVE 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
2. Romanian MFA Nonproliferation and Arms Control Division 
Director Dan Neculaescu opened the May 27-28 planning 
conference for the Black Sea Border Security Initiative 
(BSBSI) held at the Southeast European Cooperative Initiative 
(SECI) Regional Center Headquarters in Bucharest.  Neculaescu 
stated that BSBSI's goals consist of: 
 
- enhancing regional cooperation in the field of 
counterproliferation of WMD, and identifying mechanisms for 
increasing that cooperation;  and, 
 
- establishing confidence between the Black Sea littoral 
states and generally increasing the Black Sea,s security 
posture. 
 
Neculaescu stated that while the BSBSI states agreed in 
principle to projects in accordance with these goals during a 
high-level policy discussion in May 2004, the Romanians, 
&STYX 20058 proposal represented the first concrete 
proposal under the BSBSI rubric.  (Note: During the May 2004 
meeting, BSBSI was referred to by its prior name, the 
&Border Defense Initiative (BDI)8.  For further background 
on BSBSI, see Reftels.  End Note.) 
 
PRESENTATION OF &STYX 20058 
--------------------------- 
3. Following Neculaescu's introduction, Romanian National 
Commission for Nuclear Activities Control (&CNCAN8) officer 
Florian Baciu presented the proposed &STYX 20058 tabletop 
exercise.  STYX 2005 is a fictional scenario in which the 
five BSBSI states cooperate to prevent the central European 
front-companies  STYX, and  the Precision Tool Company, 
from trafficking a truck-borne radiological dispersal device 
(i.e. a dirty bomb) and a quantity of WMD chemical precursors 
to the EMANON terrorist organization.  In the Romanian draft, 
the countries were listed solely by colors (i.e.  the RED 
LAND,).  Romania proposed to hold the tabletop simulation in 
Bucharest on June 23.  Baciu advised the national delegations 
that they are looking into the possibility of off-setting 
travel expenditures for three participants from each BSBSI 
government ) one to serve in a five-member  control group, 
that will run the exercise, and two to serve in a ten-member 
 working group,, which will simulate the responses of the 
BSBSI national governments to events that unfold in the STYX 
2005 scenario.  During the simulation, the control group will 
provide the working group with (fictional) real-time 
developments within the scenario, and the working group will 
attempt to effectively respond on behalf of their governments. 
 
4. All national delegations agreed to participate in the June 
23 tabletop simulation.  They also agreed to the Romanians 
proposal regarding which colors (i.e. roles) their respective 
countries would play in the scenario (GREEN LAND - Bulgaria; 
BLACK LAND ) Georgia; YELLOW LAND ) Ukraine; BLUE LAND ) 
Romania; GRAY LAND ) Moldova).  During the discussion of the 
ideal composition of the control and working groups, 
Bulgarian MOD official Lecev Lecezar opined that the control 
groups would ideally be comprised of MFA officials, as the 
MFA is best placed to know how to effectively conduct 
international dialogues.  For their working group delegation, 
Lecezar said that he would recommend to his government one 
Ministry of Internal Affairs (MOIA) officer and one 
intelligence officer.  Most delegations agreed with the 
Bulgarian-proposed structure, although Romanian CNCAN 
official Baciu cautioned that the MFA may not have sufficient 
technical expertise in dealing with radiological materials to 
serve as effective control group officers.  Lecezar responded 
that no delegation is perfect, but the MFA nevertheless has 
the best available expertise. 
 
5. Baciu also advised all delegations that in order to 
maximize the possibility of success for the tabletop 
exercise, national delegations should be thoroughly versed in 
STYX 2005 during the June 23 simulation, keeping in mind that 
the control group will be privy to simulation information 
that will be withheld from the working group until the day of 
the exercise.  Questions that the control group should be 
prepared to answer include: 
-Who are your national decision-makers in the event of a WMD 
incident? 
-What information does your intelligence community require in 
the event of a trafficking incident? 
-To what extent do your national institutions coordinate? 
What points are critical for effective inter-institutional 
coordination? 
-Do you coordinate at the international level in the event of 
a WMD incident?  Through what channels?  Police channels? 
Diplomatic channels?  How are such channels established? 
-What capabilities exist to assist other countries in either 
interdicting WMD or in disaster response should they request 
it? 
-What about jurisdiction in international waters? 
-How do you work with the media?  At what point are 
announcements made in the event of a WMD incident?  How much 
information is publicly disseminated?  How much international 
cooperation is appropriate regarding public liaison? 
 
FOLLOW-UP ACTIVITIES 
-------------------- 
6. Neculaescu requested national delegations that they inform 
him of their representatives to the June 23 simulation by 
June 10.  Neculaescu also stated that he would disseminate 
the minutes of the STYX 2005 first planning conference to the 
local Embassies of the BSBSI participant states, and the 
Romanian Embassies in the other BSBSI capitals would do the 
same directly to their host government contacts.  He also 
collected the contact information of the conference 
participants, and advised the conference that he would 
further coordinate with BSBSI states via fax and e-mail. 
Following the conclusion of the tabletop simulation, 
Neculaescu proposed that experts from the BSBSI participant 
states again meet to evaluate the relative success of &STYX 
20058.  At such a meeting, the BSBSI experts would evaluate 
the strengths and weaknesses of their respective 
nonproliferation infrastructures, as well as evaluate their 
current legal and institutional capacity to cooperate 
internationally in responding to a WMD incident.  Neculaescu 
further suggested that &STYX 20058 be run as a field 
operation in Fall 2005. 
 
PARTICIPANTS 
------------ 
7. Delegation lists for the STYX 2005 first planning 
conference follows: 
 
BULGARIA: 
Mr. Tonev Dimov, Ministry of Internal Affairs 
Mr. Nikolay Kolev, Bulgarian Embassy to Romania 
Mr. Lecev Lecezar, Ministry of Defense 
 
GEORGIA: 
Mr. Guram Rogava, Ministry of Internal Affairs 
Mr. Mindia Janelidze, Foreign Intelligence Service 
 
MOLDOVA: 
Mr. Igor Goredetki, Service of Intelligence and Security 
Mr. Victor Nichifor, Ministry of Internal Affairs 
 
ROMANIA: 
Mr. Augustin Aculai, Nuclear Agency 
Mr. Florian Baciu, National Commission for Nuclear Activities 
Control 
Mr. Nicolae Comanescu, Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
Ms. Codruta Dima, Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
Lt. Cmdr. Cristian Gadei, Ministry of Defense 
Mr. Horatiu Grigorescu, Romanian Intelligence Service 
Ms. Daniela Marca, Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
Mr. Dan Neculaescu, Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
Mr. Nicolae Neferoiu, Foreign Intelligence Service 
Mr. Alin Tanase, Ministry of the Interior 
Mr. Dragos Tocae, National Agency for Export Controls 
 
UKRAINE: 
Mr. Ivan Zaitev, Interior Ministry Attache, Ukrainian Embassy 
to Romania 
 
UNITED STATES (observer): 
Mr. John Conlon, EUR/PRA, State Department 
Mr. Christopher Palmer, Political-Military Affairs Officer, 
U.S. Embassy to Romania 
Mr. Milan Sturgis, Department of State SECI Coordinator 
 
8.  Amembassy Bucharest's reporting telegrams are available 
on the Bucharest SIPRNet website: 
www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/bucharest  . 
DELARE