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Viewing cable 05BRASILIA1549, BRAZIL: LULA ENVOY AND AMBASSADOR DISCUSS BOLIVIA

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
05BRASILIA1549 2005-06-08 21:15 2011-07-11 00:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Brasilia
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRASILIA 001549 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/08/2015 
TAGS: PREL BR BL
SUBJECT: BRAZIL: LULA ENVOY AND AMBASSADOR DISCUSS BOLIVIA 
CRISIS 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR JOHN DANILOVICH. REASONS: 1.4 (B)(D) 
 
1. (C) Introduction: Ambassador and PolCounselor met on 8 
June at the residence for a private lunch with President Lula 
da Silva's Foreign Affairs Advisor, Marco Aurelio Garcia and 
his deputy, Marcel Biato.  Garcia has traveled repeatedly as 
Lula's  "fireman" to Venezuela (he speaks by phone and meets 
frequently with Hugo Chavez), Haiti (where he spent a week in 
October 2004 assessing security, political and assistance 
issues) and Bolivia (where he was dispatched by Lula last 
week for meetings with President Mesa, MAS leader Evo 
Morales, church and social sector representatives and U.S. 
Embassy Charge.)  Septel will focus on the discussion 
regarding Haiti; details of the Bolivia discussion follow 
below. 
 
2.(C) Garcia returned from Bolivia at the end of last week 
and has been monitoring the situation closely since then.  He 
expects major developments in the next 24-48 hours.  Garcia 
said that both he and FM Amorim (who returned early from the 
OAS GA because of Bolivia) are on stand-by for travel to 
Bolivia on short notice, but Garcia opined that he thought it 
would be best if he goes instead of Amorim (Comment: Garcia's 
reasoning was not explained, but we assumed he thought 
Amorim's presence would raise the signature of Brazilian 
involvement higher than the GOB believes to be opportune. 
Amorim called Garcia on his cell phone during the meeting 
with Ambassador and the two conferred on Bolivia 
developments.  End comment.)  Garcia made these observations 
on the current situation: 
 
-- The GOB believes the best succession scenario in the 
current conditions would be by-passing Senate President Vaca 
Diez and Chamber of Deputies President Mario Cossio, who are 
deeply unpopular with protesting sectors, and passing 
executive authority after their resignations to the chief 
Supreme Court justice until new elections are held. This is 
constitutional and provides "breathing room" in which Morales 
and others may be persuaded to demobilize protests in the 
immediate term. 
 
-- A worst case scenario, in Garcia's view and based on his 
meetings last week, would be assumption of authority by Vaca 
Diez.  Garcia said the GOB fears a large-scale, violent 
revolt in such a case, with protestors occupying areas around 
government buildings in an effort to bar Diez's installation 
as acting president. The potential for a blood bath is such 
circumstances deeply concerns the Brazilians, Garcia said. 
 
-- Another scenario for defusing tensions would be a decision 
to nationalize the gas sector immediately by whomever is 
acting as president, Garcia said.  He noted that such a 
decision would involve complex arbitration in its aftermath 
and would be "reversable at most any time," hence there could 
be some merit in using this tactic to provide immediate 
stabilization in the country.  (Comment: Garcia must 
understand this would be an extreme option, but he appeared 
to believe the circumstances are sufficiently grave that 
unorthodox tactics are required.  End comment.) 
 
-- Asked about the possibility of a victory by Morales if 
elections are called, Garcia replied that the GOB doubts 
Morales could win, and Morales must be aware of this reality. 
 Garcia opined that Morales has "radicalized" in some 
positions, but that he also must be aware that such extreme 
positions do not constitute "an agenda for governance." 
Garcia also seemed to downplay the influence of Chavez on 
Morales, but would not be drawn into a detailed discussion, 
joking only that "Venezuela and the United States are equally 
distrusted," depending on who one talks to in Bolivia. 
 
-- Garcia praised the role of the church and senior clergy 
who are politically astute, saying the church now is 
virtually the only institution in Bolivia with sufficient 
credibility and good will across the social spectrum to act 
as a mediator. 
 
-- In terms of mediation, Garcia said that the GOB has not 
offered itself in any specific role to the Bolivians, but has 
made clear it would be willing to engage if requested, 
possibly working with the Argentines.  Garcia said that OAS 
mediation is not likely to be accepted in Bolivia owing to 
the Chilean nationality of the Secretary General. 
 
-- Garcia said the GOB and Brazilian military are quietly 
completing contingency planning for evacuation of Brazilian 
citizens (mainly from La Paz) in the event of a major 
collapse. 
 
3. (C) Comment:  It is possible Garcia will be on a plane to 
Bolivia on/around the time this message reaches Washington. 
The GOB clearly is seized with the unfolding crisis, and 
Garcia candidly stated to Ambassador that what is happening 
in Bolivia is a potentially devastating repudiation of 
Brazil's efforts to present regional economic integration as 
a basis for enhancing political stability in South America. 
The efficacy of Brazilian efforts to assist in the crisis in 
the immediate term remain to be seen, but we believe we 
should remain engaged with the GOB on its willingness to work 
with Argentina in some capacity as mediators/guarantors if 
the different sectors in Bolivia reach a consensus on seeking 
outside support for a solution to the crisis.