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Viewing cable 05ZAGREB792, LOCAL ELECTIONS: BELLWETHER FOR HDZ GOVERNMENT

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
05ZAGREB792 2005-05-13 05:48 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Zagreb
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS  ZAGREB 000792 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
DEPT FOR EUR/SCE - KABUMOTO, BENEDICT 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL HR
SUBJECT: LOCAL ELECTIONS: BELLWETHER FOR HDZ GOVERNMENT 
 
REF: ZAGREB 625 
 
1. (SBU) SUMMARY AND COMMENT: Local elections on May 15 will 
be dominated by county and city issues but are bringing to 
light regional fractures within the ruling Croatian 
Democratic Union (HDZ), as the party suffers the 
repercussions of reforms made after the 2003 parliamentary 
elections.  This campaign is giving renewed national 
confidence to the left-wing opposition Social Democratic 
Party (SDP) and marks a rise in popularity of the far 
right-wing Croatian Party of Rights (HSP), which contrary to 
its international outreach (reftel) has campaigned in true 
nationalist style.  Despite frequent mentions by the HSP and 
others of early parliamentary elections if the HDZ performs 
poorly at the upcoming local polls, the governing coalition 
remains stable and it will likely hold on to its current 
one-seat majority no matter the results on May 15.  END 
SUMMARY AND COMMENT. 
 
COALITIONS ARE KEY, STRANGE BEDFELLOWS LIKELY 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
2. (SBU) The HDZ continues to pay the price of its move 
toward the center following its victory in November 2003 
parliamentary elections, losing some votes to the HSP of 
disgruntled right-wingers opposed to such policies as 
cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and programs to support the return 
of ethnic-Serb refugees.  While these local elections will be 
decided on city and county issues such as roads and jobs, the 
HDZ will lose some votes to the left over undelivered 
promises from the 2003 national campaign.  Nevertheless, the 
party's faithful core voters will likely give the HDZ about 
25 percent of the total vote on May 15 (compared to a 34 
percent finish in 2003 parliamentary elections). 
 
3. (SBU) With this dip in HDZ popularity and gains for both 
the left and the far-right, very few counties or cities will 
be governed by any single party, resulting in a widespread 
post-electoral coalition-building frenzy in late May and June 
involving almost all possible party combinations.  The 
notable exception is the HSP, running alone in all 
jurisdictions, which has publicly declared it will not join 
in coalition with the Independent Democratic Serbian Party 
(SDSS) due to ties of some party leaders to the wartime 
government of Serb-occupied Croatia.  (COMMENT: In contrast, 
within mainstream parties, Serb names are appearing with 
unprecedented frequency on traditionally Croat lists, 
illustrating a growing political maturity.  END COMMENT.) 
 
4. (SBU) The two largest parties, the center-right HDZ and 
center-left SDP, may hesitate to enter any coalitions as they 
define the opposing ends of the Croatian political spectrum, 
though this combination is possible if absolutely necessary. 
Independent party lists are popping up like weeds, including 
the Zagreb list of former presidential candidate and 
Croatian-American Boris Miksic, but few are likely to be of 
lasting significance.  City and county governments not formed 
within two months of elections face dissolution by the 
central government and appointment of a state commissioner as 
caretaker until a new election can be held. 
 
OSIJEK AND ZAGREB ) SAMPLE BATTLEGROUNDS 
---------------------------------------- 
 
5. (SBU) The eastern Croatian city of Osijek represents the 
most dramatic split of the HDZ, after the party in April 
expelled local strongman and MP Branimir Glavas, one of the 
few remaining high-profile, extreme hardliners.  Glavas, 
taking his loyalists with him, split the electorate into four 
parts: Glavas, the HDZ, and two parties running separately 
from an incumbent left-wing coalition that has held power for 
more than ten years.  Osijek election results and the 
subsequent inevitable struggle to form a coalition will 
determine the political future of this city, which has led 
the Eastern Slavonia region in stability-ensuring reforms to 
date. 
 
6. (SBU) The campaign in Zagreb, which represents about 25 
percent of the Croatian electorate, has been relatively low 
key, with the HDZ running more of a tourist campaign than a 
political one, avoiding conflict with the widely popular SDP 
candidate former mayor Milan Bandic.  Bandic, currently the 
very visible deputy mayor, is likely to succeed in his 
attempt to come back from the drunk driving incident and 
various abuse of power accusations that drove him from the 
city's top job in 2002.  The SDP, however, will need a 
coalition partner, and the natural choice, the Croatian 
People's Party (HNS), has not forgiven Bandic his misdeeds 
and has said it will not be part of a coalition with him at 
the helm.  This may leave the SDP to face that implausible 
 
coalition with the HDZ or cobble together smaller partners 
from the likes of the HSP, the pensioners' party, or any 
independent lists that cross the five percent threshold. 
 
NATIONALIST HSP SHOWS TRUE COLORS 
--------------------------------- 
 
7. (SBU) Despite its concerted campaign to convince the 
international community of its new centrist outlook, the HSP 
has not demonstrated any departure from its nationalist roots 
during the campaign.  Party President Anto Djapic has spoken 
openly against the government's hunt for fugitive Ante 
Gotovina and its cooperation with the Hague Tribunal.  He 
also attended at least one campaign rally including the 
screening of a war documentary with various scenes of Serbs 
standing near burning houses and churches.  Their guilt or 
innocence is unclear, but the presentation included photos 
drawn from the film and the message, "These are your 
neighbors ) Recognize them."  Unfortunately, Djapic's 
rhetoric still holds appeal for a small portion of the 
electorate, and the HSP will likely average around 10 percent 
at local polls. 
 
8. (SBU) Prior to the campaign, HSP officials indicated they 
were expecting to be offered a role in the national 
government, counting on exploiting ripples among the HDZ's 
current coalition partners and planning to step in and save 
the government during a vote of no confidence that might 
follow a poor local elections performance.  Throughout the 
campaign, however, Djapic has refocused on pushing for early 
national elections, likely hoping to increase the HSP's share 
of parliamentary seats (currently 8) to leverage a greater 
role in national government. 
 
9. (SBU) However, the HDZ's key coalition members, the SDSS 
and the pensioners' party, are unlikely to jump ship soon, no 
matter the local electoral outcome.  As the leading Serb 
party, the SDSS will not want to bring down the government, 
fearing ethnic backlash, while the pensioners will get more 
for party members by staying in the coalition.  The 
opposition SDP, without which a vote of no confidence could 
not succeed, has not joined Djapic's call for early 
elections, preferring instead to wait for certain difficult 
issues to pass.  The SDP is reportedly forming a shadow 
cabinet, perhaps planning a move after members pass the 
two-years-in-office threshold in December to qualify for 
parliamentary pensions. 
FRANK 
 
 
NNNN