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Viewing cable 05TELAVIV2855, MOSSAD DIRECTOR MEIR DAGAN TELLS CODEL LIEBERMAN

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
05TELAVIV2855 2005-05-06 14:23 2011-05-19 23:30 SECRET Embassy Tel Aviv
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
"S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 TEL AVIV 002855 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/03/2015 
TAGS: OREP PREL KWBG IS GOI EXTERNAL ISRAEL RELATIONS
SUBJECT: MOSSAD DIRECTOR MEIR DAGAN TELLS CODEL LIEBERMAN 
THAT U.S. MUST ACT NOW TO STOP IRAN 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Daniel C. Kurtzer for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
. 
 
1. (C) Summary: In his meeting with CODEL Lieberman on May 2, 
Meir Dagan, Director of Mossad, laid out steps that he said 
the United States should take to block Iran's efforts at 
acquiring and producing nuclear weapons.  Dagan also 
presented his assessments of Iran's support for Hizballah and 
Palestinian terrorist organizations and the political 
position of Palestinian President Abbas, as well as the 
current situation in, and future of, Iraq.  The delegation, 
consisting of Senator Joseph Lieberman and staff aide Fred 
Downey, was accompanied by the Ambassador and emboffs. End 
Summary. 
 
-------------------------------------- 
How to Thwart Iran's Nuclear Ambitions 
-------------------------------------- 
 
2. (C) Dagan stated that Iran has three reasons for pursuing 
nuclear weaponry.  The first is to secure the position of the 
current Iranian regime.  He said that Iran has drawn a bad 
lesson from the experiences of North Korea, and it now 
believes that if it can create nuclear weapons, the rest of 
the world will have no choice but to leave Iran alone. 
Second, the Iranian regime also hopes that a nuclear 
capability would change the country's position in the Middle 
East, leaving it able to force its will upon neighboring 
countries.  The third reason Dagan elaborated is what he 
termed the ""Israel equation.""  Iran believes that Israel has 
nuclear weapons, and thus Iran must go nuclear as a balancing 
force in the region. 
 
3. (S) In Dagan's estimation, the world has reached a 
critical point in relations with Iran.  Iran is now close to 
solving the technological problems regarding aspects of the 
nuclear fuel cycle.  From the point that those problems are 
solved, it is just a matter of time before Iran will acquire 
a nuclear bomb.  At the same time that the regime is working 
to create enriched uranium, it is also attempting to create 
the delivery mechanism for such fissile material, and may 
already have such weapon systems.  The one weakness Dagan saw 
in Iran's nuclear ambitions is that its projects to create 
centrifuges are centralized. 
 
4. (C) At this point, Dagan said, the world must stop Iran 
from creating enriched uranium.  He laid out several steps 
that the United States can take to this end.  Dagan said that 
the first and most important step is bringing the Iranian 
nuclear issue to the United Nations Security Council as soon 
as possible, and preventing what he characterized as a flood 
of technology into Iran.  Iranian nuclear scientists must not 
be allowed to participate in conferences with European or 
American scientists.  Second, a system of sanctions must be 
created to put economic pressure on Iran.  Dagan said that 
Iran's dependence on oil imports due to its lack of refinery 
capacity is one factor that can be taken into account when 
considering sanctions. 
 
5. (C) Sanctions against Iran would also, Dagan said, create 
pressure on Iranian opposition groups to act against the 
regime.  The United States must encourage different groups to 
become more serious in their efforts to undermine the regime, 
Dagan said, citing the Solidarity movement in Poland of the 
1980s as an example of such opposition pressure helping to 
bring down a regime.  Dagan said that a large portion of 
Iranians is pro-American, especially in the cities, which 
account for 40 percent of the country's population. 
 
------------------------- 
Iran and the Palestinians 
------------------------- 
 
6. (S) Even without a nuclear capability, Iran currently 
poses a threat to the stability of the Middle East through 
its support of terrorist organizations, Dagan asserted. 
According to Dagan, Iran has supported terrorist action 
against Israel through Hizballah and encouraged recruitment, 
both directly and indirectly, through organizations such as 
Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigade.  Two specific branches of Hizballah, 
Dagan said, gather intelligence and launch terror activities. 
 Iranians, themselves, are directly attempting to recruit 
Arab-Israelis, while at the same time encouraging Hizballah 
to recruit members of Fatah and other groups.  Dagan said 
that Palestinian Islamic Jihad has been receiving money from 
Iran based on the number of terror attacks that it carries 
out.  Dagan warned that Iran has also grown closer to Hamas. 
He said that Iran supports Hamas partly out of ideological, 
anti-Israel views, and partly in an attempt to curb Israel,s 
influence and to expand its own influence in the Middle East. 
 
--------------------------------------- 
Hamas and the Future of President Abbas 
--------------------------------------- 
 
7. (C)  Dagan emphasized that, while some kind of ceasefire 
is now in effect and terrorist attacks against Israel have 
indeed declined drastically, the number of terrorist warnings 
and ""events"" are still very high.  He blamed Palestinian 
President Abbas for being ineffective against Hamas, thus 
allowing Hamas to use the current lull to reorganize.  Dagan 
said that Hamas agreed to the ceasefire for ""tactical"" 
reasons only, mainly because it wanted to concentrate in the 
coming months on enhancing its political power through the 
upcoming Palestinian elections.  In addition, Dagan claimed 
that the IDF's success in damaging Hamas's capability and 
leadership has also caused the group to retrench.  He 
contended that it is only a matter of time until the 
Palestinian groups abandon the ceasefire. 
 
8. (C) President Abbas's support among the Palestinian 
people, Dagan said, comes from popular frustration with the 
continuing struggle with Israel, Israel's rejection of talks 
with the old Palestinian leadership, and corruption within 
the Palestinian Authority (PA).  Dagan predicted, however, 
that Abbas would lose this support because Abbas, despite 
some actions, is incapable of effecting real reform.  One 
barrier to reform that Dagan cited was what he claimed is the 
fact that Abbas has only two true allies in the PA, Finance 
Minister Salam Fayyad and Civil Affairs Minister Muhammad 
Dahlan.  He described these men, however, as neither honest 
enough to gain popular support nor strong enough to exert 
authority.  He said he could identify no Palestinian leaders 
who meet both these requirements. 
 
------------------ 
The Future of Iraq 
------------------ 
 
9. (S) The subject of Iran again came up in Dagan's 
assessment of the situation in Iraq.  Iran has played a 
negative role in Iraq because it hopes to see the state 
dominated by Shia, he said, who would in turn be dominated by 
Iran.  Dagan said that Iran is encouraging Iraqi groups close 
to the regime's ideology, such as radical Shia groups that 
are participating in the new political structure of Iraq. 
Iran feels besieged by the American presence in neighboring 
Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan and has, he charged, allowed 
Al Qaeda members to take harbor in or transit through Iran. 
 
10. (C) Dagan characterized his view of Iraq as optimistic 
based on the economic growth, and improved services and 
living conditions, in the country.  He conditioned his 
optimism on the new government's ability to recruit the 
support of different factions, such as the Kurds and Sunni, 
and to fight effectively against terrorist elements such as 
Zarqawi.  Through terrorist actions against Iraqis, he said, 
Zarqawi's forces have tried to discourage people from 
participating in the system and have attempted to create a 
rift between Shia and Sunni groups. 
 
11. (U) CODEL Lieberman did not clear this cable. 
 
********************************************* ******************** 
Visit Embassy Tel Aviv's Classified Website: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/telaviv 
 
You can also access this site through the State Department's 
Classified SIPRNET website. 
********************************************* ******************** 
KURTZER 
"