Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 97115 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
ETRD EAGR ETTC EAID ECON EFIN ECIN EINV ELAB EAIR ENRG EPET EWWT ECPS EIND EMIN ELTN EC ETMIN EUC EZ ET ELECTIONS ENVR EU EUN EG EINT ER ECONOMICS ES EMS ENIV EEB EN ECE ECOSOC EK ENVIRONMENT EFIS EI EWT ENGRD ECPSN EXIM EIAD ERIN ECPC EDEV ENGY ECTRD EPA ESTH ECCT EINVECON ENGR ERTD EUR EAP EWWC ELTD EL EXIMOPIC EXTERNAL ETRDEC ESCAP ECO EGAD ELNT ECONOMIC ENV ETRN EIAR EUMEM ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID EREL ECOM ECONETRDEAGRJA ETCC ETRG ECONOMY EMED ETR ENERG EITC EFINOECD EURM EENG ERA EXPORT ENRD ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EGEN EBRD EVIN ETRAD ECOWAS EFTA ECONETRDBESPAR EGOVSY EPIN EID ECONENRG EDRC ESENV ETT EB ENER ELTNSNAR ECHEVARRIA ETRC EPIT EDUC ESA EFI ENRGY ESCI EE EAIDXMXAXBXFFR EETC ECIP EIAID EIVN EBEXP ESTN EING EGOV ETRA EPETEIND ELAN ETRDGK EAIDRW ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ENVI ELN EAG EPCS EPRT EPTED ETRB EUM EAIDS EFIC EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM EAIDAR ESF EIDN ELAM EDU EV EAIDAF ECN EDA EXBS EINTECPS ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EPREL EAC EINVEFIN ETA EAGER EINDIR ECA ECLAC ELAP EITI EUCOM ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID EARG ELDIN EINVKSCA ENNP EFINECONCS EFINTS ECCP ETC EAIRASECCASCID EINN ETRP EAIDNI EFQ ECOQKPKO EGPHUM EBUD ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ENERGY ELB EINDETRD EMI ECONEFIN EIB EURN ETRDEINVTINTCS EIN EFIM ETIO ELAINE EMN EATO EWTR EIPR EINVETC ETTD ETDR EIQ ECONCS EPPD ENRGIZ EISL ESPINOSA ELEC EAIG ESLCO EUREM ENTG ERD EINVECONSENVCSJA EEPET EUNCH ECINECONCS ETRO ETRDECONWTOCS ECUN EFND EPECO EAIRECONRP ERGR ETRDPGOV ECPN ENRGMO EPWR EET EAIS EAGRE EDUARDO EAGRRP EAIDPHUMPRELUG EICN ECONQH EVN EGHG ELBR EINF EAIDHO EENV ETEX ERNG ED
KMDR KPAO KPKO KJUS KCRM KGHG KFRD KWMN KDEM KTFN KHIV KGIC KIDE KSCA KNNP KHUM KIPR KSUM KISL KIRF KCOR KRCM KPAL KWBG KN KS KOMC KSEP KFLU KPWR KTIA KSEO KMPI KHLS KICC KSTH KMCA KVPR KPRM KE KU KZ KFLO KSAF KTIP KTEX KBCT KOCI KOLY KOR KAWC KACT KUNR KTDB KSTC KLIG KSKN KNN KCFE KCIP KGHA KHDP KPOW KUNC KDRL KV KPREL KCRS KPOL KRVC KRIM KGIT KWIR KT KIRC KOMO KRFD KUWAIT KG KFIN KSCI KTFIN KFTN KGOV KPRV KSAC KGIV KCRIM KPIR KSOC KBIO KW KGLB KMWN KPO KFSC KSEAO KSTCPL KSI KPRP KREC KFPC KUNH KCSA KMRS KNDP KR KICCPUR KPPAO KCSY KTBT KCIS KNEP KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNNB KGCC KINR KPOP KMFO KENV KNAR KVIR KDRG KDMR KFCE KNAO KDEN KGCN KICA KIMMITT KMCC KLFU KMSG KSEC KUM KCUL KMNP KSMT KCOM KOMCSG KSPR KPMI KRAD KIND KCRP KAUST KWAWC KTER KCHG KRDP KPAS KITA KTSC KPAOPREL KWGB KIRP KJUST KMIG KLAB KTFR KSEI KSTT KAPO KSTS KLSO KWNN KPOA KHSA KNPP KPAONZ KBTS KWWW KY KJRE KPAOKMDRKE KCRCM KSCS KWMNCI KESO KWUN KPLS KIIP KEDEM KPAOY KRIF KGICKS KREF KTRD KFRDSOCIRO KTAO KJU KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KEN KO KNEI KEMR KKIV KEAI KWAC KRCIM KWCI KFIU KWIC KCORR KOMS KNNO KPAI KBWG KTTB KTBD KTIALG KILS KFEM KTDM KESS KNUC KPA KOMCCO KCEM KRCS KWBGSY KNPPIS KNNPMNUC KWN KERG KLTN KALM KCCP KSUMPHUM KREL KGH KLIP KTLA KAWK KWMM KVRP KVRC KAID KSLG KDEMK KX KIF KNPR KCFC KFTFN KTFM KPDD KCERS KMOC KDEMAF KMEPI KEMS KDRM KEPREL KBTR KEDU KNP KIRL KNNR KMPT KISLPINR KTPN KA KJUSTH KPIN KDEV KTDD KAKA KFRP KWNM KTSD KINL KJUSKUNR KWWMN KECF KWBC KPRO KVBL KOM KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KEDM KFLD KLPM KRGY KNNF KICR KIFR KM KWMNCS KAWS KLAP KPAK KDDG KCGC KID KNSD KMPF KPFO KDP KCMR KRMS KNPT KNNNP KTIAPARM KDTB KNUP KPGOV KNAP KNNC KUK KSRE KREISLER KIVP KQ KTIAEUN KPALAOIS KRM KISLAO KWM KFLOA
PHUM PINR PTER PGOV PREL PREF PL PM PHSA PE PARM PINS PK PUNE PO PALESTINIAN PU PBTS PROP PTBS POL POLI PA PGOVZI POLMIL POLITICAL PARTIES POLM PD POLITICS POLICY PAS PMIL PINT PNAT PV PKO PPOL PERSONS PING PBIO PH PETR PARMS PRES PCON PETERS PRELBR PT PLAB PP PAK PDEM PKPA PSOCI PF PLO PTERM PJUS PSOE PELOSI PROPERTY PGOVPREL PARP PRL PNIR PHUMKPAL PG PREZ PGIC PBOV PAO PKK PROV PHSAK PHUMPREL PROTECTION PGOVBL PSI PRELPK PGOVENRG PUM PRELKPKO PATTY PSOC PRIVATIZATION PRELSP PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PMIG PREC PAIGH PROG PSHA PARK PETER POG PHUS PPREL PS PTERPREL PRELPGOV POV PKPO PGOVECON POUS PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PWBG PMAR PREM PAR PNR PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PARMIR PGOVGM PHUH PARTM PN PRE PTE PY POLUN PPEL PDOV PGOVSOCI PIRF PGOVPM PBST PRELEVU PGOR PBTSRU PRM PRELKPAOIZ PGVO PERL PGOC PAGR PMIN PHUMR PVIP PPD PGV PRAM PINL PKPAL PTERE PGOF PINO PHAS PODC PRHUM PHUMA PREO PPA PEPFAR PGO PRGOV PAC PRESL PORG PKFK PEPR PRELP PREFA PNG PGOVPHUMKPAO PRELECON PINOCHET PFOR PGOVLO PHUMBA PRELC PREK PHUME PHJM POLINT PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PGOVE PHALANAGE PARTY PECON PEACE PROCESS PLN PRELSW PAHO PEDRO PRELA PASS PPAO PGPV PNUM PCUL PGGV PSA PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PGIV PRFE POGOV PEL PBT PAMQ PINF PSEPC POSTS PHUMPGOV PVOV PHSAPREL PROLIFERATION PENA PRELTBIOBA PIN PRELL PGOVPTER PHAM PHYTRP PTEL PTERPGOV PHARM PROTESTS PRELAF PKBL PRELKPAO PKNP PARMP PHUML PFOV PERM PUOS PRELGOV PHUMPTER PARAGRAPH PERURENA PBTSEWWT PCI PETROL PINSO PINSCE PQL PEREZ PBS

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 05ANKARA2803, TURKISH MFA ON EU, IRAQ, BTC, AND BYPASSES

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #05ANKARA2803.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
05ANKARA2803 2005-05-17 12:45 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Ankara
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 002803 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
USEU FOR MIKE MOZUR 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ENRG EPET ETRD IZ TU
SUBJECT: TURKISH MFA ON EU, IRAQ, BTC, AND BYPASSES 
 
REF: A. ANKARA 1003 
     B. ANKARA 1991 
     C. ANKARA 2380 
 
 1.  (SBU)  Summary: A Turkish MFA official expressed 
concerns about continued lack of oil flow in the Iraq-Turkey 
pipeline, but optimism about potential for providing 
additional Turkish electricity to Iraq.  He explained that 
the GOT was unable to initial the draft of the EU's Energy 
Community Treaty that was presented to it on a 
take-it-or-leave-it basis by the European Commission, but 
that it had agreed to an offer by Commissioner Piebalgs to 
continue talking.  The GOT is eagerly looking forward to 
participating in the May 25 BTC "First Oil" ceremony in Baku 
and is still targeting first oil at the Ceyhan terminus in 
October-November 2005.  He also commented on nuclear energy, 
regional links, and Bosphorus bypass projects.  End Summary. 
 
2.  (SBU)  In a May 16 meeting with EconCounselor and Energy 
Officer, Turkish MFA DDG for Energy Mithat Rende covered a 
range of regional and domestic energy issues.  Rende asked 
for USG views on diversifying electricity links to Iraq to 
include from Syria and Iran.  He asked for USG support in 
ensuring that Iraq (Baghdad and KRG) were providing adequate 
protection to the Iraq-Turkey oil pipeline to restart oil 
flow to Ceyhan.  Please note requests for guidance in paras 
3, 4, and 8. 
 
Iraq - Where's the Oil? 
----------------------- 
 
3.  (SBU)  Rende lamented the continued lack of oil flow in 
the Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline, citing (at least) 16 serious 
sabotage incidents in 2004.  He said that he and MFA 
colleagues were coming to a conclusion that inability to stem 
the sabotage stemmed not from a lack of capacity on the part 
of the Iraqi authorities, but rather on a "lack of political 
will" on the part of Kurdish regional authorities.  We told 
Rende this sounded like a conspiracy theory, but said we 
would report those views.  Post would appreciate any 
information to rebut this assertion.  We note that much of 
the pipeline and presumably most, if not all, of the sabotage 
incidents are outside of the KRG controlled areas. 
 
Iraq - Electricity Linkages 
--------------------------- 
 
4.  (SBU)  Anticipating Prime Minister Jaafari's May 19 visit 
to Turkey, Rende said the GOT was looking at ways to provide 
additional Turkish electricity to Iraq.  He said there has 
not, however, been a decision on how to do this.  One option 
would be to expand the existing Kartet-Karadeniz agreement to 
provide 150 MW to northern Iraq, but Rende noted that there 
were domestic Turkish regulatory issues that needed to be 
addressed by the Turkish energy regulatory authority (EMRA - 
see ref A).  Rende asked if the United States would have any 
objection to sending Turkish electricity to Iraq via Syria. 
He also noted that Iran would be another potential source of 
electricity linkages to Iraq. 
 
South East Europe Energy Community Treaty - We are Serious 
--------------------------------------------- ------------- 
 
5.  (SBU)  Rende defended the GOT's recent decision not to 
initial the EU's Energy Community Treaty (newest version of 
South East Europe process).  He noted that the treaty was 
ambitious in targeting common markets in natural gas and 
electricity.  Rende said that Turkey was not prepared to 
accept the requirement of immediate implementation of 
environment and energy "acquis communitaires" as foreseen by 
the Treaty.  Rather, Turkey needed the longer time and 
gradual implementation contemplated in the EU accession 
process to implement the costly measures.  Furthermore, he 
objected to the negotiating approach of the European 
Commission, which had negotiated the draft with the existing 
member states and then it to Turkey on a take it or leave it 
basis,  He said that Commissioner Piebalgs had recently 
acknowledged that this was not an appropriate approach 
(Piebalgs claimed the EC negotiators had exceeded their 
instructions) and had offered to resume talks, which the 
Turks had accepted.  Rende noted that the Treaty made little 
sense without Turkey.  He said Turkey would not be able to 
support an Italian proposal to extend the purview of the 
treaty to the oil market. 
 
Nuclear Dreams 
-------------- 
 
6.  (SBU)  Rende reaffirmed the GOT's commitment to pursue 
building three nuclear power plants in order to diversify 
Turkey's energy mix, noting that Energy Minister Hilmi 
Guler's roll out of Turkey's intentions earlier this year had 
been well received.  He said that Turkey was discussing this 
project with German and French firms, but noted that U.S. 
firm Westinghouse had not approached the GOT to initiate 
discussions.  Rende noted that financing would be a major 
obstacle, but said that the European firms had suggested that 
financing could be available.  (Rende had not seen the 
details and was skeptical.) 
 
BTC First Oil in Baku - Concerns About Georgia 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
7.  (SBU) Rende said that he was planning to accompany 
President Sezer and Energy Minister Guler to the BTC "First 
Oil" ceremony in Baku May 25, but that he had a potentially 
conflicting obligation in Brussels following his recent 
appointment as chair of an Energy Charter working group.  He 
was aware that the Embassy had submitted a diplomatic note 
requesting a meeting for Energy Secretary Bodman with the 
President and Minister.  In response to a question from 
Energy Officer, Rende lamented that Georgia had still not 
been responsive on approving the intergovernmental security 
protocol and designating a representative to the BTC IG 
Committee on Security.  He said the GOT would be willing to 
provide, but not fund, training or other security assistance 
to its partner countries.  He noted that Georgia was still 
making unreasonable demands with respect to security and 
environment in the Borjomi region and suspected it might have 
"other motives" for not moving on the security protocol. 
Rende said that the GOT still expected first oil tanker 
loading at the Ceyhan terminus October-November 2005 (Ref C), 
but hinted at the possibility of additional slippage. 
 
East West Energy Corridor - More Links 
-------------------------------------- 
 
8.  (SBU) The MFA official noted the importance of the June 
28 CERA Three Seas Conference in Istanbul and hoped for high 
level U.S. participation.  (Post would appreciate information 
on Ambassador Mann's plans.)  Rende cited the important link 
for the Turkey-Greece gas interconnector, which will be 
celebrated by a ceremony with the Prime Minister in June.  He 
also cited the emphasis of rail (Kars-Tbilisi-Baku) and road 
links.  Rende encouraged the USG to reinforce demarches to 
promote reconsideration of the Trans-Caspian Pipeline for 
natural gas from Turkmenistan.  He also noted that BOTAS was 
a little behind on initiating the Georgia-Erzurum spur to 
off-load the natural gas from the South Caucasus - Shah Deniz 
pipeline, but he noted that the GOT would satisfy its 
end-of-2006 2 bcm take-or-pay obligation (increasing to 6.5 
bcm in 2009). 
 
Bosphorus Bypass - Same Old 
--------------------------- 
 
9.  (SBU) Sounding like the old refrain, Rende said he was 
encouraged by interest in the (GOT preferred) Bosphorus oil 
bypass route of Samsun-Ceyhan, and said he expected a 
decision soon from the Council of Ministers expressing 
"support" (Ref B).  He noted that companies expected a more 
tangible expression of support from the GOT on behalf of 
Samsun-Ceyhan to allow them to do a comparative analysis with 
Burgos-Alexandropolos (factoring in Greek and Bulgarian 
promises of financial and other support).  Rende said an 
additional argument for Samsun-Ceyhan was that a Ceyhan 
terminus would be a veritable "oil supermarket," from which 
ULCC's could pick up and transport compartmentalized cargos 
of Kirkuk, Caspian, and Russian crudes without having to call 
at different ports.  He also lamented that there were 
competing sponsors for Samsun-Ceyhan (Calik Enerji, BOTAS, 
Zorlu, and Ekinceler), as well as for the Trans-Thrace 
project (Thrace Development Company- with U.S. Howard Lowe, 
Turkish Cukurova, and Kazakh interests; Anadolu group was 
still pursuing its "copy-cat" project, but now apparently 
without Transneft).  In separate meetings, a ChevronTexaco 
official confirmed to energy officer that it was redoing its 
numbers and it was looking closely at Burgos-Alexandropolos 
and what the Russian Companies were doing.  He repeated 
concerns about too much market reliance on Turkey (Ceyhan or 
Turkish Straits) for oil passage and the need for a 
comprehensive commercial approach to Bosphorus bypass(es). 
 
10.  (U) Baghdad Minimize Considered. 
EDELMAN