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Viewing cable 05WELLINGTON274, THE TWO WORLDS OF MIDDLE EARTH: NEW ZEALAND'S

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
05WELLINGTON274 2005-04-01 04:09 2011-04-28 00:00 SECRET//NOFORN Embassy Wellington
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 WELLINGTON 000274 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/23/2015 
TAGS: PREL PGOV NZ
SUBJECT: THE TWO WORLDS OF MIDDLE EARTH: NEW ZEALAND'S 
STRATEGIC POLICIES 
 
REF: A) WELLINGTON 0234 B) WELLINGTON 0233 C) 
 
     WELLINGTON 0157 D) 04 WELLINGTON 0470 E) 04 
     WELLINGTON 0173 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Charles J. Swindells; reasons 1.5 (B and D) 
 
1.  (S/NF ) Summary:  Foreign and defense policies in New 
Zealand are the product of an internal debate between two 
worlds.  The first world -- most military, intelligence, 
foreign affairs and business professionals, and a handful of 
politicians -- values its relationship with the United States 
and still sees New Zealand as a U.S. ally.  The other world 
-- most politicians, media, academics and much of the public 
-- views the United States with suspicion or hostility and 
sees New Zealand as non-aligned.  These worlds meet in the 
person of Prime Minister Clark, who alone controls the 
defense and intelligence portfolios within cabinet, and who 
can always call on the "other-worlders" in the Labour caucus 
to rein in her long-time rival, Foreign Minister Goff.  This 
matters to the United States, because the Prime Minister uses 
military and intelligence cooperation with the U.S. -- and 
high-level visits in particular -- to give the illusion in 
some circles in Washington that New Zealand is still an ally, 
while maintaining as much as possible New Zealand,s 
non-aligned policies and the PM,s anti-American image at 
home.  Post's ability to bridge the gap between these two 
worlds and effect needed policy changes requires a clear, 
consistent message both here and in Washington of USG 
interests and priorities.  End Summary. 
 
2. (SBU/NF)  Since New Zealand left ANZUS in 1987, its 
foreign and defense policies have been formed by an internal 
debate between two worlds.  The first includes most military, 
intelligence and foreign affairs professionals, and a few 
politicians.  This world understands that New Zealand can be 
greatly affected by events outside the South Pacific and 
therefore must help shape events despite its small size and 
geographic isolation.  This world recognizes that as a small 
country New Zealand cannot by itself impact world events, and 
sees the United States as the greatest source of global 
stability and positive change.  By extension, even though 
this world may disagree with the United States on specific 
policies, it still sees New Zealand as a U.S. ally, and is 
eager to play a role, however small, supporting us around the 
globe.  Washington policy makers deal almost exclusively with 
first-world New Zealand. 
 
3.  (C/NF)  The other world -- made up of most politicians, 
the media, academics, non-governmental organizations and a 
slight majority of the public -- also believes that New 
Zealand's small size means its own actions cannot by 
themselves effect international change.  But this world sees 
the United States as a source of global corruption and 
instability: a bully, inimical toward small nations (and 
toward New Zealand in particular, because of its "heroic" 
defiance over the nuclear issue).  It views any cooperation 
with the United States with suspicion or outright hostility. 
The other-worlders believe that New Zealand,s small size, 
geographic isolation and "internationalist" foreign policy 
protect it from harm.  U.S. officials are seldom exposed to 
the other New Zealand except through Embassy reporting, 
though occasionally meetings lift the veil, as when  Minister 
for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Marian Hobbs indicated 
to U.S. Ambassador to the Conference on Disarmament Jackie 
Sanders that elimination of all U.S. nuclear arms was as 
important to world security as was blocking Iran's nuclear 
program (Ref B). 
 
4. (S/NF)   These two worlds meet in the person of Prime 
Minister Helen Clark.  The Prime Minister holds the 
intelligence portfolio, and provides extremely limited 
briefings to her cabinet colleagues on the extent to which 
New Zealand cooperates with the United States in this area. 
Senior Foreign Affairs and Defence colleagues (strictly 
protect) tell us only Foreign Minister Goff, Finance Minister 
Cullen and (possibly) Economic Development Minister Anderton 
have any inkling of U.S.-New Zealand joint intelligence 
activities.  The Prime Minister also runs defense policy. 
She appointed a loyal, self-professed "peacenik," Mark 
Burton, as Defence Minister.  Burton, who devotes most of his 
time to his other ministerial portfolio, Tourism, defers all 
decisions on defense matters to the Prime Minister.  The PM 
Clark's control over foreign policy is less absolute, but she 
occasionally outflanks Foreign Minister Goff on the left by 
stirring up her largely other-world Labour Party Caucus. 
5. (C/NF)  New Zealand,s absence from the Coalition in Iraq 
is a good example.  We are told that Foreign Minister Goff, 
while not a strong supporter of the Coalition, worried that 
New Zealand,s absence would have significant economic and 
political ramifications.  (Comment:  Goff also has an Amcit 
nephew serving in Iraq and another soon to graduate from West 
Point.  End Comment.)  PM Clark stoked anti-American 
sentiment in the Caucus, leaving Goff isolated in Cabinet 
discussion of New Zealand,s participation.  Senior MOD 
officials (strictly protect) tell us it was not until Finance 
Minister Michael Cullen pointed out in a subsequent Cabinet 
meeting that New Zealand's absence from Iraq might cost NZ 
dairy conglomerate Fonterra the lucrative dairy supply 
contract it enjoyed under the UN Oil for Food program, that 
the PM found a face-saving compromise and sent combat 
engineers in a non-combat role to Basra, where they were 
embedded with British forces.  By then, however, the PM had 
so stirred up anti-war sentiment that she had to expend a lot 
of political capital to get Caucus and Cabinet support for 
this time-limited deployment.  The PM deftly managed the 
dust-up, while GoNZ officials quickly cashed in on New 
Zealand's presence in Iraq, receiving repeated expressions of 
thanks from senior USG officials (possibly because they had 
so little else to discuss with visiting NZ dignitaries). 
 
6. (S/NF)  Prime Minister Clark's tight control of the 
bilateral security relationship allows her to play up New 
Zealand's support for USG objectives to Washington while 
avoiding significant, potentially controversial policy 
changes at home, changes that would strengthen the 
relationship in the long term. This tactic has been an 
important element of New Zealand's charm offensive in pursuit 
of a U.S.-NZ Free Trade Agreement (FTA). NZ officials admit 
in private that they have not come up with compelling 
economic arguments that would interest the USG in an FTA 
negotiation, so they are working hard to make the case that 
New Zealand's "strategic" importance to the U.S. -- the PRT 
and SAS deployments in Afghanistan, growth in intelligence 
cooperation, and sending combat engineers to Basra -- merits 
an FTA.  The Prime Minister's meetings with senior USG 
officials, including flag-rank officers and members of 
Congress, are carefully scripted to that end, and she has 
made it very clear that she resents the Ambassador's use of 
country team pre-briefings to reveal her government's "other 
world" policies to U.S. visitors (Ref A). 
 
7. (C/NF)  But whether New Zealand should or should not have 
an FTA with the United States is only one issue in a diverse, 
complex bilateral relationship.  The FTA discussion has been 
useful mainly because it has focused public attention on New 
Zealand's relationship with the United States and has raised 
public questions about the country's lack of strategic policy 
direction.  PM Clark's balancing act between New Zealand's 
two worlds shows how little has been done here since New 
Zealand left ANZUS to shape an agreed vision of the country's 
foreign and defense policies.  We have been told by senior 
MOD and NZDF officials (strictly protect) that their efforts 
to update the badly outdated 1999 Defence White Paper, which 
underlies military spending priorities through 2009, was 
rebuffed because the Prime Minister did not want to re-open 
contentious debate in the Labour Party Caucus on the 
direction of New Zealand's security policies. The general 
consensus among the otherworlders that New Zealand's 
influence is greater working through the United Nations, 
because of the UN's "moral authority," is too vague to 
constitute a clear vision for most Kiwis. Further, recent 
events highlighting UN ineffectiveness and corruption have 
shaken the faith of New Zealanders in their strict 
internationalist approach to global issues. 
 
8. (C/NF) Even some otherworld Kiwis, particularly 
journalists and academics, are beginning to wonder publicly 
if New Zealand has not cut itself adrift in increasingly 
dangerous seas.  But while the first-world solution to this 
policy incoherence would be to get rid of New Zealand's 
anti-nuclear legislation and return to ANZUS, this would be a 
bitter pill for the otherworlders to swallow. And, of course, 
a full-court press from the U.S. Embassy on the subject would 
allow the Clark Government to dismiss our concerns as "U.S. 
bullying."  Still, our first-world contacts continue to 
encourage us to, in the words of a senior MOD official 
(strictly protect), "help us get out of the hole we have dug 
for ourselves."  Therefore, we have worked hard to reach 
beyond our customary first-world contacts with explanations 
to other-world New Zealand of how the nuclear propulsion ban 
keeps New Zealand's relationship with the United States (and 
to a large extent, with Australia) stuck in the Cold War era. 
 We have used media backgrounders and classroom discussions 
to ask what kind of relationship New Zealand wants with the 
United States in the future, and what its government might do 
to convince us that it is serious about a forward-looking 
security relationship.  We have worked with the Australian 
High Commission and the Japanese Embassy to reiterate our 
message that New Zealand cannot continue its current policy 
drift without consigning itself to irrelevance in the South 
Pacific, let alone the rest of the world. 
 
9. (S/NF)  These and other outreach efforts will have little 
impact if our message differs from what the Kiwis hear in 
Washington.  Ambassador Swindells requested a reality check 
of the bilateral relationship (Ref C) to ensure that what we 
say here is what Washington has agreed we should say.  We 
strongly support the desire of many in Washington to do all 
we can to help our first-world Kiwi friends, and to benefit 
from any assistance they can offer us.  We also understand 
that in the short-run, policy success may be judged by how 
many players we get to the table, though in the long haul, 
success depends on what they bring to the game.  We just want 
to make sure all of our Washington clients understand that we 
are being asked by many of our first-world friends to help 
them help themselves in moving from ideologically motivated, 
self-congratulatory policies to a clear vision of New 
Zealand's role in the world and of how our bilateral 
relationship might move forward, consistent with that vision. 
Burnett