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Viewing cable 05PARIS2663, EU REFERENDUM AS PLEBICITE ON JACQUES CHIRAC AND

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
05PARIS2663 2005-04-19 18:06 2011-08-24 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Paris
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 002663 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT ALSO FOR EUR/WE, EUR/ERA, EUR/PPD, DRL/IL AND INR/EUR 
AND EB 
DEPT OF LABOR FOR ILAB 
DEPT OF COMMERCE FOR ITA 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV ELAB EU FR PINR SOCI
SUBJECT: EU REFERENDUM AS PLEBICITE ON JACQUES CHIRAC AND 
HIS LEADERSHIP 
 
REF: A. (A) PARIS 2604 
     B. (B) PARIS 2516 
     C. (C)PARIS 2205 
     D. (D) PARIS 1649 
     E. (E) PARIS 1230 
 
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED -- NOT FOR INTERNET DISTRIBUTION 
 
SUMMARY 
------ 
1.  (SBU) France's referendum on a proposed Constitution for 
the EU could be shaping up into a nationwide vote of no 
confidence in Chirac and his leadership.  Chirac has been 
President of France since 1995, and may well be aiming to run 
for a third term.  For many voters across the electoral 
spectrum, Chirac and those around him have come to epitomize 
the failures of France's elite.  The referendum offers a 
large swath of voters a vehicle to express their alienation 
from and resentment toward that "political class."  For 
center-left voters, who were "forced" to vote for Chirac in 
his second round presidential run-off against extreme-right 
candidate Jean-Marie Le Pen in 2002, the reluctance to "vote 
for him again" by endorsing Chirac in his support of the EU 
Constitution is particularly strong.  In all, a fusion of 
anxiety about economic conditions, resistance to specific 
reform proposals, frustration at ineffective institutions, 
anger at the political class, and partisan opposition to 
Chirac and his party are transforming a referendum about a 
Constitution for Europe into a plebiscite about Jacques 
Chirac and his leadership.  END SUMMARY. 
 
AMALGAM OF MOTIVATIONS 
---------------------- 
2.  (SBU) The French electorate is in a particularly sour and 
anxious mood (reftels B and C).  Opponents of the proposed 
constitution cite a slew of reasons for voting against it, 
many of which are not related to the constitution, but rather 
to domestic political concerns.  This combination threatens 
to turn the May 29 referendum on the EU Constitution into a 
vote of no confidence in Jacques Chirac and his Presidency. 
Those who plan to vote 'no,' primarily out of domestic 
political concerns, offer a variety of reasons for doing so. 
Some oppose specific reform proposals of the government of 
Chirac's Prime Minister, Jean-Pierre Raffarin; others' 
partisan allegiance opposes them to Chirac and his party; 
still others -- in a way that goes beyond policy disagreement 
and partisan opposition -- are deeply discontented with 
Chirac's governance and with what they see as a declining 
quality of life in France.  This tendency cuts across 
political party lines, grouping elements of mainstream 
center-right and center-left voters with those further to the 
right and left, and with those on the extremes subject to the 
populist, xenophobic current always present on the French 
political scene. 
 
POPULIST FURY 
------------- 
3.  (SBU) The discontent that runs across the electorate, on 
the far right, becomes pure populist resentment against 
"them."  Its focus in connection with the referendum is on 
Jacques Chirac and the political class, but it quickly widens 
out to include Brussels technocrats, "pointy-headed 
intellectuals," immigrants, foreigners, etc.  For example, in 
a TV debate April 13 on the proposed Constitution, Marine le 
Pen, daughter of Jean-Marie le Pen, leader of the extremist 
National Front (FN) party, deploying the coded vitriol that 
is the FN's stock-in-trade, derided both the center-left, and 
Chirac and the center-right, for supporting the proposed 
Constitution only because they were interested in "serving 
the Europe of money." 
 
DISCONTENT ACROSS THE CENTER 
---------------------------- 
4.  (SBU) At a rally on April 16, Union for a Popular 
Movement (UMP) party President Nicolas Sarkozy summed up the 
electorate's restive mood saying, "The French feel like 
turning over the table" (and added, that if they reject the 
proposed Constitution they "will have turned it over on 
themselves").  Across the center of the electorate, 
discontent coalesces around a sense that France's 
institutions are not up to the job of addressing the 
country's economic and social problems and that the political 
class that presides over these institutions is too complacent 
and incapable of making effective use of them.  The 
often-heard complaint that the public education system -- 
which once held pride of place among the civic institutions 
of The Republic -- "is crumbling," is emblematic of these 
voters' deep disillusionment.  If many center-right and 
center-left voters, who share this feeling of being let down 
by their country and its leaders, vote 'no' to express it, 
the hopes of the 'yes' camp could well be bitterly 
disappointed May 29. 
 
REJECTION OF THE POLITICAL CLASS 
-------------------------------- 
5.  (SBU) France's political class, bred in a handful of 
state "grande ecoles" (like the National School of 
Administration (ENA) and private, feeder institutions (such 
as the Institute of Political Studies (Sciences-Po), and then 
drawn into long political careers, often near the very top of 
France's governmental institutions, is viewed with suspicion 
by ordinary people.  The "France of below" sees the "France 
of above" as inaccessible, unaccountable, inbred, and 
self-serving.  The relatively recent practice of 
"co-habitation" (president and prime minister from opposing 
parties) has boosted public perception of a single elite, 
blurring the distinction between left and right.  Jacques 
Chirac, and many of the figures closely associated with him, 
such as Interior Minister Dominique de Villepin, fit the mold 
of this elite to a tee.  Recently, Finance Minister Herve 
Gaymard was forced to resign (reftel E), for having rented a 
luxurious apartment to house himself and his family at state 
expense.  Scandals such as this one confirm popular 
suspicions that this French nomenklatura is out of touch with 
the lives of ordinary people.  President Chirac's evident 
incomprehension of young voters' concerns during a 
long-awaited television appearance April 14 (reftel A) 
confirmed for many viewers the gulf between elite and public. 
 Those particularly resentful of this class and its 
privileges, or outraged by its recent excesses, or just 
disappointed by its aloofness, could well vote 'no' on May 29 
to express their displeasure. 
 
AMONG SOCIALISTS -- REMEMBERING MAY 2002 
---------------------------------------- 
6.  (SBU) At Socialist Party (PS) vote-'yes' rallies, 
National Secretary Francois Hollande and supporters such as 
mayor of Lille Martine Aubry, hammer away at the theme that 
"2007 is the time to sanction Chirac and Raffarin."  For many 
center-left voters the prospect of -- again -- supporting 
Jacques Chirac and the "liberal" center-right is dismaying. 
Among them, the memory of May 2002 is still fresh; then, in a 
second-round presidential run-off, they were "forced" to vote 
for Chirac against right-wing extremist, Jean-Marie le Pen -- 
and they don't want to hand Chirac another "undeserved" 
victory.  These voters, who are not so much against the 
Constitution as they are repulsed by the idea of voting again 
in a way that supports Chirac, are being avidly courted by 
both Chirac and the PS' pro-'yes' leadership.  Focusing these 
voters on affirming their support for Europe and not their 
partisan opposition to Chirac and the center-right is key to 
preventing the referendum from becoming a plebiscite. 
Current polls, which show 'no' leading among center-left 
voters by nearly 60 percent, reflect how strongly the 
'sanction Chirac' feeling runs on the center-left.  That the 
center-left has already roundly punished Chirac and the 
center-right in two nationwide elections since 2002 (for 
Regional Councils and European Parliamentarians both in 
2004), is further evidence of the strength and persistence of 
anti-Chirac feeling. 
 
AGAINST RAFFARIN'S REFORMS 
-------------------------- 
7.  (SBU) The nationwide general strike on March 10 (reftel 
D), led by public sector unions revealed the range and 
variety of the constituencies opposed to specific reform 
proposals of the Raffarin government.  Employees from the 
beleaguered public health, public education and public 
transportation systems, abetted by high school students, 
farmers groups and clerical and staff employees of some key 
ministries (including the Foreign Ministry) are intent on 
voting 'no' in parochial opposition to government reform 
policies that would affect them. 
COMMENT 
------- 
8.  (SBU) Since President Chirac's disappointing TV 
performance April 14, Interior Minister Dominique de Villepin 
has emerged -- at Chirac's direction -- as the leading 
spokesperson of the government's pro-'yes' campaign.  In his 
public statements and debate appearances, Villepin has been 
insistently sounding the theme that, after the referendum, 
government domestic policy will be re-energized and 
re-focused because "we have heard what the French people are 
telling us."  This promise of committed attention to the 
domestic issues that dominate voter preoccupation is, 
clearly, an effort to deflect the discontented from their 
intention to use the referendum as a vote of no confidence. 
It remains to be seen if Villepin will be more successful 
than Chirac and Raffarin have been in pulling voters' 
attention away from the economic insecurities, political 
dissatisfactions and social resentments -- that Chirac and 
the Raffarin government have come to epitomize.  Recasting 
voters' current approach to the referendum -- convincing them 
to consider the proposed constitution and answer the question 
asked May 29 -- is key to reclaiming the referendum from the 
plebiscite on Jacques Chirac and his leadership that it is 
threatening to become.  END COMMENT. 
WOLFF