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Viewing cable 05NEWDELHI2475, DELHI EU MEMBER STATE MISSIONS TAKE ROSY VIEW OF

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
05NEWDELHI2475 2005-04-01 14:39 2011-04-24 00:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy New Delhi
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NEW DELHI 002475 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/31/2015 
TAGS: PREL PHUM MASS KDEM IN NP BT DA NL SW SZ CA FR UK FI NO CH PK
SUBJECT: DELHI EU MEMBER STATE MISSIONS TAKE ROSY VIEW OF 
NEPAL'S FUTURE 
 
REF: NEW DELHI 1553 (NOTAL) 
 
Classified By: A/PolCouns Matt Boyse. Reasons 1.4 (b, d) 
 
1.  (C) Summary: At a March 31 meeting of EU and "likeminded" 
countries hosted by the Danes, EU member state 
representatives evinced surprising optimism about the 
potential for a constituent assembly and constitutional 
changes to resolve the impasse in Nepal.  We noted a clear 
preference for an Item 19 resolution at the CHR, with a 
Special Rapporteur, international monitoring, and 
strengthening of the National Human Rights Commission.  The 
group also called for Bhutan to begin accepting Category 1 
refugees from Nepal.  End Summary. 
 
2.  (C) The Danish Embassy chaired a meeting on Nepal on 
March 31 to coincide with the visit to South Asia of Sus 
Ulbaek, Head of the Danish MFA's Asia Department, which 
gathered Ambassadors from Denmark, Switzerland, Sweden, the 
Netherlands, the European Union, and Canada (all accredited 
to Nepal as well), and representatives of the UK, France, 
Finland and Norway.  Poloff attended as well. 
 
Talk of a Constituent Assembly 
------------------------------ 
 
3.  (C) Summarizing her meetings with MEA Joint Secretary 
(Nepal and Bhutan) Ranjit Rae earlier that day, Ulbaek stated 
that the GOI position was "very close" to the Danish view of 
Nepal.  Both countries were focused on "how to reinstate 
democracy," and were seeking to identify what processes would 
lead to that goal.  She professed surprise that Rae even 
raised the idea of a constituent assembly, commenting that 
she hadn't heard this from the MEA before.  (Comment: Rae 
told A/PolCouns late on April 1 that this idea was being 
debated in Kathmandu, denied that the GOI was pushing it, and 
stressed that it was up to the Nepalese political actors to 
take such a step if they wanted to.  End Comment.) 
 
4.  (C) Ulbaek added that Denmark and the MEA had agreed that 
political parties were key to restoring democracy because 
they were "the most democratic forces there," and that the 
GOI was in the forefront of working with them because "the 
number 2 and number 3 in each are here in New Delhi." 
Working with the political parties was the only way to avoid 
having to back either the King or the Maoists.  After Ulbaek 
predicted that the next Nepalese PM is likely to come out of 
the group in New Delhi, the Canadian Ambassador reminded 
participants that the parties' credibility in Nepal is very 
low. 
 
Constitutional Changes 
---------------------- 
 
5.  (C) Asserting that "no one" (sic) in Nepal trusts the 
King or Crown Prince Paras, Ulbaek suggested that "we're 
heading toward a republic" in Nepal.  The international 
community, therefore, needs to create a constitutional 
process for "everyone" -- including the Maoists -- to discuss 
a future constitution.  Several participants noted obstacles 
to this approach, including the loyalty of the RNA to the 
King, and the political parties' poor record in government in 
the past. 
 
Military Assistance 
------------------- 
6.  (C) Several participants (DK, EU and NL) gently chided 
the USG for not explicitly suspending lethal military aid, 
suggesting that our "at risk" formulation gave hope to the 
King that a suspension could be avoided.  There was further 
agreement that Pakistan and China were unlikely to try to 
replace India as the chief arms supplier to the RNA. 
However, the EU Ambassador warned that China will take 
advantage of India's estrangement "to make slow progress in 
Nepal."  He also mentioned that the GOI had asked the EU to 
demarche Islamabad about supplying arms to Nepal (Reftel). 
UNCHR: India Abstaining on Item 9? 
---------------------------------- 
 
7.  (C) Ulbaek predicted that New Delhi, although preferring 
an Item 19 resolution in the UNCHR, would not oppose an Item 
9.  All participants, including the Swiss Ambassador, agreed 
that an Item 19 resolution would be preferable, but that 
Nepal must make concrete improvements in the coming weeks to 
avoid Item 9 action, a message he and Ulbaek agreed to 
deliver in meetings with HMGN in the next week.  They floated 
the following components of an Item 19 resolution: 
 
-- Appointment of a Special Rapporteur; 
 
-- Acceptance of international human rights monitors in 
Nepal; and 
 
-- Strengthening the National Human Rights Commission. 
 
Bhutan: At least take 200 
------------------------- 
 
8.  (C) Reviewing the difficulties of repatriating Bhutanese 
refugees in Nepal, Ulbaek suggested that the "Friends of 
Bhutan" needed to remind the RGOB that Bhutan may be "off the 
hook" on verification of refugees because of instability in 
Nepal, but it was important for them to start by accepting 
the roughly 200 identified Category 1 refugees.  She 
suggested that interlocutors could explain to HMGN that the 
departure of the first batch was part of a global solution 
and not the final action, thereby convincing Nepal to allow 
repatriation. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
9.  (C) We were surprised by the optimism that several EU 
member state representatives here expressed about both the 
capability of the political parties to fill a central 
governing role, and the willingness of the Maoists to 
permanently abandon the insurgency.  The Danish diplomat 
appears to have misread the MEA's views on a constituent 
assembly.  The MEA is not averse to one, but believes that 
the impetus must come from the Nepalese themselves. 
MULFORD