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Viewing cable 05MAPUTO467, SECURITY SURVEY OF MARRATANE REFUGEE CAMP -

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
05MAPUTO467 2005-04-13 11:49 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Maputo
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 MAPUTO 000467 
 
SIPDIS 
ROME FOR DHS/BCIS 
STATE FOR PRM/A, DS/IP/AF 
NAIROBI FOR REFCOORD AND RSO 
HOMELAND SECURITY FOR DHS/BCIS/IAO 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ASEC GV IT KE MO PREF
SUBJECT: SECURITY SURVEY OF MARRATANE REFUGEE CAMP - 
MOZAMBIQUE 
 
REF: STATE 00135 
 
1. As requested per reftel, a site security survey of the 
Marratane Refugee Camp in Mozambique was conducted on 12 
April 2005. The following information outlines the findings 
of the survey. 
A. Interview Site 
The Marratane Refugee Camp is located approximately 15 km 
outside of Nampula city. Travel to the site is primarily on 
unimproved dirt roads where speeds are often limited to 30 km 
per hour or less, requiring approximately 45 minutes from the 
UNHCR office in Nampula. 4x4 vehicles are recommended but not 
required during the dry season. Public transportation is 
limited to an informal and unregulated taxi service. American 
personnel are highly discouraged from using public 
transportation and visitors should arrange to hire a vehicle 
and driver for transportation to and from the camp and around 
Nampula. The camp consists of one primary dirt road 
surrounded by administrative buildings, dwellings, schools, 
and agricultural areas. 
Only registered vehicles are permitted to enter the camp and 
refugees must seek special permission to leave the camp. 
Control of entry and exit is managed by the Policia da 
Republica de Mocambique (PRM). There is no physical 
screening of vehicles or pedestrians entering or exiting the 
camp, and pedestrians are also capable of entering or exiting 
the camp via other paths through the bush. However, camp 
administration and the refugee community is well aware of who 
enters and exits the camp, and all refugees are supposed to 
be registered with the camp administration. 
Only one entry/exit point exists for the camp, which is 
controlled by the local police. This is likely the largest 
threat vulnerability of the camp. If rioting or strife were 
to occur, exit from the camp could be easily blocked in the 
event that an emergency evacuation of the interview team was 
required. There are no suitable safe havens within the camp. 
The closest safe haven would be the UNHCR office in Nampula 
or the police station in Nampula. Security at the camp is 
provided by ten police officers, four locally hired security 
guards, and ten refugee security guards. In an emergency, 
reinforcement security forces would be provided by the police 
from Nampula, and response time would be in excess of 45 
minutes, if a vehicle were available. The closest USG 
facility is the American Embassy in Maputo, which is two 
hours by commercial air from Nampula International Airport. 
There are no known terrorist groups active in Mozambique and 
no current indications that U.S. citizens are being targeted 
by terrorist organizations. Camp residents are primarily from 
neighboring countries currently or recently experiencing 
ethnic or political violence. Residents at the camp often 
include both sides of the conflicts from which they escaped. 
Thus, the potential for violence does exist, however, 
incidents of such violence have been sporadic at most. Camp 
administration officials stated that camp residents are 
peaceful and for the most part and are not seeking to 
continue the conflicts from their home nations. 
Two interview sites were surveyed. The interview site at the 
camp would be divided between the INAR administrative 
building and the UNHCR building. Each of these buildings 
contains two to three office spaces suitable for interviews 
while maintaining the confidentiality of each refugee. There 
is limited running water and no electricity in either 
building, although there are suitable bathroom facilities. 
Requests to UNCHR should be made for use of portable 
generators, or other arrangements should be made if 
electricity is required. All visitors must/must exit the camp 
by 1600 hours. The other interview location is at the UNHCR 
headquarters in Nampula. This location consists of one main 
building of approximately 1200 square feet, plus an 
additional back building of approximately 600 square feet. 
This location offers two to three possible offices for 
interviews, electricity, and running water. The UNHCR office 
is guarded by one local guard and is within close proximity 
to the police station. Police response time would be 5-10 
minutes if a vehicle were available. Although there is a back 
exit out of this facility, this exit leads to the front 
entrance of the facility. 
In the event of a medical emergency, patients would be taken 
to the Central Hospital in Nampula. The hospital would be 
able to offer basic care, although a thorough assessment of 
their capabilities, expertise, and level of competence was 
not possible during the assessment visit. First aid kits are 
supposed to be located in each UNHCR vehicle and at the UNHCR 
office in Nampula, but none were available for review during 
the assessment. There is a medical clinic at the camp with 
basic medical supplies and first aid equipment. UNHCR has 
also recently purchased a Land Rover Ambulance which will be 
in operation soon. The plan is for this ambulance to be 
located at the camp, however it is currently parked at the 
UNCHR office in Nampula. 
B. Communication 
UNHCR workers utilize fixed and handheld simplex VHF radios 
for communications. A base station is located at the office 
in Nampula and at the camp, and vehicles are equipped with 
high power radios. Communication is possible between Nampula 
and the camp. Cell phone communication is clear in Nampula 
city but very spotty at the camp. Cell calls from the camp 
were not possible during the assessment visit. UNCHR does not 
have any satellite phones in Nampula. 
The PRM provincial commandant is Mr. Fernando Pedro Saiete, 
fixed line 258-06-213290. The PRM director of public order is 
Mr. Julio Denja who can be contacted at the fixed number 
258-06-212273, or cell 258-82-629-0110. Mr. Denja should be 
the first point of contact in the event of an emergency and 
should only be contacted in the event of an emergency. Any 
other communication with the local police will be made 
through the RSO office at post. The PRM camp commandant is 
Mr. Mareriche Chicope who should be contacted in person while 
at the camp in the event of an emergency. The PRM forces at 
the camp communicate with headquarters in Nampula by the use 
of messengers or by utilizing the UNHCR radio to contact the 
UNHCR office in Nampula. 
C. Country Conditions 
The official State Department web site should be consulted 
about information regarding country conditions, travel 
warnings, and threat assessment. Anti-American sentiment is 
fairly low in Mozambique and especially in the camp. The 
biggest threat facing U.S. citizens visiting Mozambique is 
crime. The State Department has designated Mozambique a 
critical-threat post for crime. Street crime and vehicle 
hijackings are common and can be violent. Visitors must be 
vigilant when out in public areas and should not display 
jewelry or other items of high value. Visitors should avoid 
carrying backpacks or purses, as these can draw unwanted 
attention of would-be muggers. 
D. Hotel and Transportation 
Three hotels were evaluated during the site assessment. 
Transportation concerns were addressed in Section A of this 
communication. 
(1) Hotel Residencial Recol: This is a four-story structure 
with one entry/exit point. There are no fire alarms and fire 
suppression is limited to a few fire extinguishers throughout 
the building. The hotel is protected by one unarmed and one 
armed guard. The reception area is manned 24 hours. Rooms are 
of acceptable condition as compared to other local hotels. 
(2) Hotel Residencial Expresso: This is a two-story structure 
with one entry/exit point and one back ladder from the second 
story that could be used as an emergency exit. There are no 
fire alarms and fire suppression is limited to a several fire 
extinguishers on each floor and a fire hose on each floor. 
The hotel is protected by two unarmed guards. The reception 
area is manned 24 hours. Rooms are of acceptable condition as 
compared to other local hotels. 
(3) Hotel Brasilia: This is a three-story structure with one 
entry/exit point. There are no fire alarms and fire 
suppression is limited to a few fire extinguishers throughout 
the building. Close inspection showed these extinguishers to 
be old and in poor condition. The hotel is protected by three 
unarmed guards. The reception area is manned 24 hours. Rooms 
are of less than acceptable condition as compared to other 
local hotels. 
 
2. A limited number of photographs were taken during the site 
security assessment and will be furnished upon request via 
official channels. Official visitors to Mozambique are 
requested to provide a country clearance request with 
sufficient notice with a detailed overview of the nature, 
scope, location, and duration of the visit. 
LALIME