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Viewing cable 05MANILA1808, The "Masa" as a Political Force

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
05MANILA1808 2005-04-20 08:58 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Manila
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 MANILA 001808 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
STATE FOR EAP/PMBS, INR/EAP 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM SOCI RP
SUBJECT:  The "Masa" as a Political Force 
 
REF: A. Manila 1401  B. Manila 1195 
-    C. 04 Manila 3484 
 
1.  (SBU) Summary: The underprivileged and impoverished 
"masa" remains a potentially significant but largely 
unorganized political force.  The once-influential Pwersa ng 
Masang Pilipino (PMP) party of former President Estrada has 
claimed success in renewing the party's membership and 
effectiveness through new outreach programs for the urban 
poor.  Leftist parties, many associated with the Communist 
Party of the Philippines (CPP), have representatives in 
Congress under the "party-list" system and trumpet public 
victories in representing "masa" concerns, which focus on 
job scarcity, rising inflation, and feelings of inaction by 
the government to assist the poor.  Some religious groups 
reach out to this audience as well.  The "masa" appears to 
view the U.S. presence in the Philippines as generally 
favorable, while wishing for even more assistance.  Despite 
the enduring appeal of the Communist Party of the 
Philippines and other leftist groups, this unfortunate group 
will likely remain politically marginal, especially with so 
many of its potential leaders heading off every year as 
Overseas Filipino Workers.  End Summary. 
 
------------- 
Who are they? 
------------- 
 
2. (U) The popular appeal of actor Fernando Poe Jr. (FPJ) in 
the May 2004 Presidential elections -- which many Filipinos 
of all classes continue to believe he won, only to be 
"cheated" out of it by the Arroyo administration -- 
underscored the potential power of the "masa," the millions 
of underprivileged and impoverished Filipinos that make up 
nearly 75 percent of the voting population.  This group 
voted together as a bloc in 1998 in the successful campaign 
of President Joseph Estrada, another popular former actor. 
They were the core of the unsuccessful "EDSA 3" people power 
movement opposed to the removal of Estrada in May 2001. 
Significantly, however, it was Manila's middle class and not 
the "masa" fueling both the successful 1986 "EDSA 1" people 
power that drove Ferdinand Marcos out of power and the "EDSA 
2" movement that led to Vice President Gloria Macapagal- 
Arroyo's assumption of the presidency in January 2001. 
 
3.  (U)  President Arroyo, in her own 2004 campaign, sought 
to appeal to the "masa" with what she called a "pro-poor" 
political agenda.  In her "10-point plan," she notably 
included programs meant to benefit the "masa:" job creation, 
educational investment, and the provision of power to every 
neighborhood in the Philippines.  However, Arroyo's 
popularity among the "masa" has fallen steadily.  In a March 
30 national survey by Pulse Asia, Arroyo scored an average 
39 percent approval rating among the "masa," a full 17 
percentage points below her June 2004 rating and her lowest 
rating since she became President. 
 
--------------------------------- 
Political Party of the Urban Poor 
--------------------------------- 
 
4.  (SBU) The Pwersa ng Masang Pilipino (Force of the 
Filipino Masses, or PMP) was Estrada's main political force 
in winning the 1998 election, with a claimed card-carrying 
membership of over four million, mostly from Metro Manila. 
However, according to PMP political affairs adviser Rolando 
Ramirez and PMP Secretary General Horatio "Boy" Morales, 
shortly after the 1998 victory, Estrada lost interest in 
building the PMP as an institution and it quickly lost 
influence.  While partially re-vitalized in the "EDSA 3" 
uprising, PMP's ability effectively to mobilize mass numbers 
of supporters was constrained by what Morales admitted was 
"ineffectual party leadership at the municipal and 
neighborhood levels." 
 
5.  (SBU)  Morales and Ramirez claimed in a discussion with 
poloff that the current PMP Secretariat, with Estrada still 
acting as party President despite his house arrest, had now 
changed course and was again focused on recruiting and 
developing leaders in a drive to professionalize the party. 
Ramirez admitted that membership levels had dipped since 
1998, but predicted that the recent recruitment of 17 new, 
activist Manila chapter coordinators for the various 
municipalities in Metro Manila would reinvigorate the party. 
 
6.  (SBU) Ramirez cited as recent PMP successes an April 15 
conference in Rizal province, which drew almost 200 
participants, and a March 2005 national PMP conference for 
over 500 mid-level party organizers from not only Manila but 
also from Bulacan, Cavite, Rizal, and Laguna provinces. 
Beyond cultivating Manila and central Luzon's provincial 
coordinators, the PMP next hopes next to revive virtually 
moribund PMP offices in more far-flung provinces, according 
to these PMP officials. 
 
7.  (SBU)  PMP's current operational plan is to create a 
network among the urban poor that engages with the "masa" 
and provides a variety of self-help livelihood programs to 
address the main problem -- scarcity of work -- based on the 
Filipino concept of "bayanihan" or self-reliance.  In order 
words, the PMP officials explained, PMP hopes to position 
itself as a party that helps the "masa" to help themselves. 
Morales added that the PMP wants ordinary people to see the 
PMP as a "solution provider."  When asked how the PMP 
managed its relations with other political parties like 
Bayan Muna (see para 8) that also seek to represent the 
underprivileged, Morales -- a former member of the Communist 
Party of the Philippines (CPP) -- said that the PMP saw room 
for "tactical alliances but not strategic.  We don't think 
Bayan Muna and friends know how to solve the problems facing 
us." 
 
------------------------ 
Competition for the Poor 
------------------------ 
 
8.  (U)  Leftist parties, many associated with the CPP, have 
trumpeted public victories in representing "masa" concerns. 
Bayan Muna (BM) is pre-eminent, with three seats in 
Congress, having drawn over 1.2 million nationwide votes in 
the May 2004 election.  (Note: The 1987 Constitution 
provided for a limited number of "party-list 
representatives" who do not represent geographical 
constituencies.  End note)  Analysts have also credited BM 
with helping fellow CPP-related party-list groups elect 
three additional members to the House: Anakpawis obtained 
two seats, and Gabriela one.  Although none was willing to 
provide Embassy with membership information, these three CPP- 
related parties collectively garnered over two million votes 
in the May 2004 election. 
 
9.  (U)  Another leftist party-list group -- Akbayan -- has 
disassociated itself from both Bayan Muna and the CPP.  It 
reportedly has 87,000 members and several active grassroots 
outreach programs to encourage disadvantaged citizens to 
demand basic public services and land rights.  Akbayan 
received nearly one million votes in 2004 and now has three 
Congressional representatives, most notably Rep. Loretta 
Rosales, who has sponsored human rights and land reform 
legislation aimed at curbing violence and land disputes in 
the rural areas.  She has also been a strong supporter of 
anti-TIP efforts and played a key role in the founding of a 
new Philippine Myanmar Parliamentary Caucus to highlight 
human rights abuses in Burma and call for ASEAN to ensure 
Burma does not become ASEAN chair in 2006. 
 
10.  (U) BM representatives in particular recently were 
active in supporting a national transport strike on April 
18.  In a press interview, BM Representative Teodoro Casino 
accused major oil companies of operating as a "cartel" and 
called on the GRP to scrap the Oil Deregulation Law passed 
in 1998 in order to protect "masa" consumers hurt by 
inflationary pressures.  Additionally, media reports of the 
one-day national strike indicated militant union Kilosang 
Mayo Uno (KMU) -- also CPP-related -- helped support many 
chapters of the 500,000 member PISTON transport worker's 
union (Pinagkaisang Samahan ng Tsuper at Operator 
Nationwide), which was the primary union that led the 
strike.  BM's organizing activities have continued despite a 
series of killings of leftist activists, in what leftist 
leaders have called a "systematic campaign" by armed 
elements in the GRP (ref a). 
 
11.  (SBU) According to Joel Rocamora from the Institute of 
Popular Democracy (IPD), demographic trends favored 
continued growth of the "masa," but in many respects 
engaging many underprivileged sectors in domestic political 
activity was now more difficult because of the opportunities 
to become Overseas Filipino Workers (OFW).  While 
acknowledging efforts by party-list groups in particular to 
politicize OFW issues among the "masa," Rocamora lamented 
that many erstwhile grassroots "masa" organizers were 
themselves instead earning their living abroad as OFWs. 
Leftist groups sponsored numerous demonstrations and media 
campaigns during the July 2004 Filipino-Iraq hostage crisis 
that highlighted the plight of low-paid OFWs.  In a March 17 
rally, another small party related to the CPP-- Migrante -- 
again tried, unsuccessfully, to mobilize large crowds on 
behalf of yet another Filipino-Iraq hostage issue (refs b 
and c). 
 
12.  (U) Religious groups also reach out to elements of the 
"masa."  Influential Manila Archbishop Guadencio Rosales has 
recently promoted the national "Pondo ng Pinoy" - "Fund for 
the Filipino" -- program, which calls on all Catholics to 
donate 25 centavos (less than a penny) to support livelihood 
projects for impoverished Filipinos.  Money collected is 
funneled into micro-lending programs run by the Church or 
affiliated NGOs.  Since its launch in June 2004, this fund 
has raised about USD 300,000.  Archbishop Rosales has been 
less of a public political advocate than predecessor Jaime 
Cardinal Sin, whose outspoken views gave strong impetus to 
the EDSA 1 movement in 1986. 
 
13.  (U)  The Protestant "Jesus Is Lord" (JIL) movement, led 
by Brother Eddie Villanueva, provided thousands of pro- 
Arroyo demonstrators and mass media coverage of the EDSA 2 
event.  However, Villanueva ran against Arroyo in the 2004 
presidential race and drew large crowds during the campaign 
-- if not on election day -- with a focus on alleged 
corruption in the Arroyo administration and complaints about 
injustice for the common Filipino.  The powerful Christian 
group Iglesia Ni Cristo (INC), a strong supporter of former 
president Estrada, was instrumental in mobilizing street 
protesters and using radio and television to energize many 
"masa" and other supporters during the EDSA 3 event in May 
2001. 
 
----------------------------- 
From the Mouths of the "Masa" 
----------------------------- 
 
14.  (U) Recent informal, non-scientifically chosen 
discussions on the street in Metro Manila revealed common 
"masa" concerns including lack of jobs, rising cost of 
living, and feelings that the GRP had failed effectively to 
assist the poor.  A general consensus unfavorably contrasted 
President Arroyo as a leader who does not care about the 
"masa" as opposed to former presidents Estrada and Ferdinand 
Marcos as "good" leaders who did.  Some bemoaned what they 
said was the current administration's opposition to wage 
increases despite increasing inflation.  Many complained 
about land titling problems, which they blamed on a 
government that they said did not deal decisively with 
pressing issues among the poor.  (Note:  Most of these may 
have been actual squatters who had no right to land titles 
under current law.  End note.)  Several mentioned corruption 
in the bureaucracy as the principal reason for their 
distrust of politicians.  Others accepted some blame for 
their plight, while calling for a strong disciplinarian as 
President who would advocate a more rigorous work ethic, 
along with better livelihood programs.  Most expressed 
special concern about what they viewed as rising crime in 
urban poor areas, while at the same time admitting that many 
families actually encouraged their own children to steal in 
order to be able to eat. 
 
15.  (U) Views toward the U.S. and its role in the 
Philippines were generally positive.  Of special mention 
were favorable memories of U.S. assistance in fighting the 
Japanese in World War II.  Others were more non-committal, 
saying the U.S. "wasn't doing anything to harm us."  One 
respondent, however, complained that President Arroyo "nods 
her head when it comes to the USG."  A few criticized the 
U.S. for "not helping poor people" in the Philippines.  Many 
observers have noted, however, that a huge majority of 
Filipinos -- especially among the bottom layers of society - 
- would likely favor a return of U.S. bases if ever the 
choice were put to a referendum. 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
16.  (SBU) The "masa" have the numbers, but poverty and lack 
of education are constraints upon translating this into 
effective political representation and power.  The extent of 
poverty and poor governance helps explain the enduring 
appeal of the CPP as well as newer leftist groups.  But, as 
the IPD's Rocamora noted, "until now, the masa has shown the 
capacity to bring down a government, but not to build up a 
government."  The export of OFWs provides an enormous 
political-economic safety valve for the Philippines; not 
only by providing needed hard currency for the domestic 
economy, but also by exporting large numbers of ambitious 
individuals from the "masa" who might otherwise combine to 
force acute social-economic issues such as persistent 
poverty and unemployment to the political front burner and 
to take a pre-dominant political role against the entrenched 
elite.