Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 97115 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
ETRD EAGR ETTC EAID ECON EFIN ECIN EINV ELAB EAIR ENRG EPET EWWT ECPS EIND EMIN ELTN EC ETMIN EUC EZ ET ELECTIONS ENVR EU EUN EG EINT ER ECONOMICS ES EMS ENIV EEB EN ECE ECOSOC EK ENVIRONMENT EFIS EI EWT ENGRD ECPSN EXIM EIAD ERIN ECPC EDEV ENGY ECTRD EPA ESTH ECCT EINVECON ENGR ERTD EUR EAP EWWC ELTD EL EXIMOPIC EXTERNAL ETRDEC ESCAP ECO EGAD ELNT ECONOMIC ENV ETRN EIAR EUMEM ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID EREL ECOM ECONETRDEAGRJA ETCC ETRG ECONOMY EMED ETR ENERG EITC EFINOECD EURM EENG ERA EXPORT ENRD ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EGEN EBRD EVIN ETRAD ECOWAS EFTA ECONETRDBESPAR EGOVSY EPIN EID ECONENRG EDRC ESENV ETT EB ENER ELTNSNAR ECHEVARRIA ETRC EPIT EDUC ESA EFI ENRGY ESCI EE EAIDXMXAXBXFFR EETC ECIP EIAID EIVN EBEXP ESTN EING EGOV ETRA EPETEIND ELAN ETRDGK EAIDRW ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ENVI ELN EAG EPCS EPRT EPTED ETRB EUM EAIDS EFIC EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM EAIDAR ESF EIDN ELAM EDU EV EAIDAF ECN EDA EXBS EINTECPS ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EPREL EAC EINVEFIN ETA EAGER EINDIR ECA ECLAC ELAP EITI EUCOM ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID EARG ELDIN EINVKSCA ENNP EFINECONCS EFINTS ECCP ETC EAIRASECCASCID EINN ETRP EAIDNI EFQ ECOQKPKO EGPHUM EBUD ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ENERGY ELB EINDETRD EMI ECONEFIN EIB EURN ETRDEINVTINTCS EIN EFIM ETIO ELAINE EMN EATO EWTR EIPR EINVETC ETTD ETDR EIQ ECONCS EPPD ENRGIZ EISL ESPINOSA ELEC EAIG ESLCO EUREM ENTG ERD EINVECONSENVCSJA EEPET EUNCH ECINECONCS ETRO ETRDECONWTOCS ECUN EFND EPECO EAIRECONRP ERGR ETRDPGOV ECPN ENRGMO EPWR EET EAIS EAGRE EDUARDO EAGRRP EAIDPHUMPRELUG EICN ECONQH EVN EGHG ELBR EINF EAIDHO EENV ETEX ERNG ED
KMDR KPAO KPKO KJUS KCRM KGHG KFRD KWMN KDEM KTFN KHIV KGIC KIDE KSCA KNNP KHUM KIPR KSUM KISL KIRF KCOR KRCM KPAL KWBG KN KS KOMC KSEP KFLU KPWR KTIA KSEO KMPI KHLS KICC KSTH KMCA KVPR KPRM KE KU KZ KFLO KSAF KTIP KTEX KBCT KOCI KOLY KOR KAWC KACT KUNR KTDB KSTC KLIG KSKN KNN KCFE KCIP KGHA KHDP KPOW KUNC KDRL KV KPREL KCRS KPOL KRVC KRIM KGIT KWIR KT KIRC KOMO KRFD KUWAIT KG KFIN KSCI KTFIN KFTN KGOV KPRV KSAC KGIV KCRIM KPIR KSOC KBIO KW KGLB KMWN KPO KFSC KSEAO KSTCPL KSI KPRP KREC KFPC KUNH KCSA KMRS KNDP KR KICCPUR KPPAO KCSY KTBT KCIS KNEP KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNNB KGCC KINR KPOP KMFO KENV KNAR KVIR KDRG KDMR KFCE KNAO KDEN KGCN KICA KIMMITT KMCC KLFU KMSG KSEC KUM KCUL KMNP KSMT KCOM KOMCSG KSPR KPMI KRAD KIND KCRP KAUST KWAWC KTER KCHG KRDP KPAS KITA KTSC KPAOPREL KWGB KIRP KJUST KMIG KLAB KTFR KSEI KSTT KAPO KSTS KLSO KWNN KPOA KHSA KNPP KPAONZ KBTS KWWW KY KJRE KPAOKMDRKE KCRCM KSCS KWMNCI KESO KWUN KPLS KIIP KEDEM KPAOY KRIF KGICKS KREF KTRD KFRDSOCIRO KTAO KJU KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KEN KO KNEI KEMR KKIV KEAI KWAC KRCIM KWCI KFIU KWIC KCORR KOMS KNNO KPAI KBWG KTTB KTBD KTIALG KILS KFEM KTDM KESS KNUC KPA KOMCCO KCEM KRCS KWBGSY KNPPIS KNNPMNUC KWN KERG KLTN KALM KCCP KSUMPHUM KREL KGH KLIP KTLA KAWK KWMM KVRP KVRC KAID KSLG KDEMK KX KIF KNPR KCFC KFTFN KTFM KPDD KCERS KMOC KDEMAF KMEPI KEMS KDRM KEPREL KBTR KEDU KNP KIRL KNNR KMPT KISLPINR KTPN KA KJUSTH KPIN KDEV KTDD KAKA KFRP KWNM KTSD KINL KJUSKUNR KWWMN KECF KWBC KPRO KVBL KOM KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KEDM KFLD KLPM KRGY KNNF KICR KIFR KM KWMNCS KAWS KLAP KPAK KDDG KCGC KID KNSD KMPF KPFO KDP KCMR KRMS KNPT KNNNP KTIAPARM KDTB KNUP KPGOV KNAP KNNC KUK KSRE KREISLER KIVP KQ KTIAEUN KPALAOIS KRM KISLAO KWM KFLOA
PHUM PINR PTER PGOV PREL PREF PL PM PHSA PE PARM PINS PK PUNE PO PALESTINIAN PU PBTS PROP PTBS POL POLI PA PGOVZI POLMIL POLITICAL PARTIES POLM PD POLITICS POLICY PAS PMIL PINT PNAT PV PKO PPOL PERSONS PING PBIO PH PETR PARMS PRES PCON PETERS PRELBR PT PLAB PP PAK PDEM PKPA PSOCI PF PLO PTERM PJUS PSOE PELOSI PROPERTY PGOVPREL PARP PRL PNIR PHUMKPAL PG PREZ PGIC PBOV PAO PKK PROV PHSAK PHUMPREL PROTECTION PGOVBL PSI PRELPK PGOVENRG PUM PRELKPKO PATTY PSOC PRIVATIZATION PRELSP PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PMIG PREC PAIGH PROG PSHA PARK PETER POG PHUS PPREL PS PTERPREL PRELPGOV POV PKPO PGOVECON POUS PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PWBG PMAR PREM PAR PNR PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PARMIR PGOVGM PHUH PARTM PN PRE PTE PY POLUN PPEL PDOV PGOVSOCI PIRF PGOVPM PBST PRELEVU PGOR PBTSRU PRM PRELKPAOIZ PGVO PERL PGOC PAGR PMIN PHUMR PVIP PPD PGV PRAM PINL PKPAL PTERE PGOF PINO PHAS PODC PRHUM PHUMA PREO PPA PEPFAR PGO PRGOV PAC PRESL PORG PKFK PEPR PRELP PREFA PNG PGOVPHUMKPAO PRELECON PINOCHET PFOR PGOVLO PHUMBA PRELC PREK PHUME PHJM POLINT PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PGOVE PHALANAGE PARTY PECON PEACE PROCESS PLN PRELSW PAHO PEDRO PRELA PASS PPAO PGPV PNUM PCUL PGGV PSA PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PGIV PRFE POGOV PEL PBT PAMQ PINF PSEPC POSTS PHUMPGOV PVOV PHSAPREL PROLIFERATION PENA PRELTBIOBA PIN PRELL PGOVPTER PHAM PHYTRP PTEL PTERPGOV PHARM PROTESTS PRELAF PKBL PRELKPAO PKNP PARMP PHUML PFOV PERM PUOS PRELGOV PHUMPTER PARAGRAPH PERURENA PBTSEWWT PCI PETROL PINSO PINSCE PQL PEREZ PBS

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 05COLOMBO792, SRI LANKAN POST-TSUNAMI RECONSTRUCTION UPDATE

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #05COLOMBO792.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
05COLOMBO792 2005-04-27 11:06 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Colombo
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 COLOMBO 000792 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EB A/S ANTHONY WAYNE; SA/INS FOR J. BRENNIG, N. 
DEAN; PLEASE PASS TO TSUNAMI RECONSTRUCTION TASK FORCE; 
TREASURY FOR C. CARNES 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EAID ECON PGOV CE MV
SUBJECT: SRI LANKAN POST-TSUNAMI RECONSTRUCTION UPDATE 
(APRIL 27, 2005) 
1.  (U) This cable contains an action request, please see 
para 7.  Post-tsunami transition from relief to 
reconstruction continues.  The pace and organization of 
tsunami relief and reconstruction remains on par with 
 
SIPDIS 
previous reporting. 
 
Joint Mechanism with LTTE: Going nowhere fast 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
2.  (SBU) The mood surrounding a potential joint mechanism 
for tsunami aid distribution in the north and east is 
increasingly negative.  The Government's coalition partner, 
the Marxist-Nationalist Jamuna Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP), 
continues is criticisms of a potential mechanism, though we 
hear differing reports about whether they have threatened 
to pull out of the governing coalition over this issue. 
Charge plans to meet the Norwegian Ambassador this week to 
discuss Norway's impressions, though during Special Envoy 
Eric Solheim's recent visit the Norwegians were very 
positive about progress on the joint mechanism. President 
Kumaratunga's return from vacation is a key factor here. 
Septel to follow later this week. 
 
Temporary Shelter: USAID/DART Survey 
------------------------------------ 
 
3.  (U) USAID/OFDA is bringing in an OFDA Urban 
Planning/Urban Disaster Mitigation specialist to monitor 
the transitional shelter program, examine its relationship 
to the larger efforts to build permanent housing, and 
promote coastal zone management.  The issues plaguing the 
transitional shelter process continue to be slow land 
allocation (primarily in the east, a large area of land was 
cleared for the south last week) and a generally tight 
market for building supplies. 
 
GSL HR Commission Consultant: Aid Distribution Fair 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
4.  (SBU) In a recent conversation with Poloff, Lionel 
Fernando (a retired, senior civil servant who has 
previously served abroad in diplomatic assignments and as 
Foreign Secretary), who was appointed by the Human Rights 
Commission to review aid programs in the North and East, 
reported that aid was being distributed fairly in the 
tsunami affected areas of the North and East. He opined 
 
SIPDIS 
that while progress on the political front in Colombo has 
stagnated, cooperation between the various actors in the 
field has continued, although predictably not as 
efficiently as immediately after the tsunami hit. 
100 Meter Zone: GSL Needs Face Saving Way Out 
--------------------------------------------- 
5.  (SBU) The 100/200 meter coastal exclusion zone remains 
an impediment to rebuilding, but has the support of the 
President and, by extension, the rest of the GSL. 
Nonetheless, continued problems in finding land to relocate 
affected persons, as well as haphazard enforcement of the 
rules, has brought pressure on the Government to ease its 
restrictions.  This has become a hot-button political 
issue, however, with opposition politicians calling for the 
GSL to remove the exclusion zone, and the President digging 
in her heels over the issue. 
6.  (SBU) In our discussions with senior GSL officials on 
the exclusion zone, they generally recognize that they have 
an intractable problem and acknowledge there will be need 
for flexibility in implementation.  Some continue to hold 
to the fallacy that there is a "scientific" rationale for 
the exclusion zone, though no explanation based on 
scientific evidence has ever been provided.  Visits to the 
affected areas indicate that enforcement is spotty, with 
the exclusion being outright ignored in several areas. 
Further, the way the regulation was written, which allows 
homes or institutions that were not damaged beyond 40 
percent to remain, creates an equity issue that could 
inflame tensions on the ground. 
 
7.  (SBU) While on the one hand the donor community is 
stymied in its efforts to move forward with implementing 
projects, particularly on the housing front, as a result of 
this regulation, we think that any approach to the 
Government on the issue has to be handled with sensitivity 
to the President's primary concern that a public reversal 
would be used by the opposition to score political points. 
As we have seen on many other fronts, this Government in 
general (and the President in particular) does not respond 
well when cornered.  Therefore, we suggest the following 
path, and request Department and other agency support as 
required: 
 
--We believe it could be useful to host a small digital 
video conference (DVC) with key government players to 
discuss the coastal exclusion zone concept.  From the US 
side, we believe representatives from FEMA, USGS and other 
agencies that might have a perspective on coastal zone 
management would be useful.  Our initial discussions with 
representatives from the Tsunami Warning Center and other 
tsunami threatened areas have revealed that many coastal 
 
SIPDIS 
areas do not enforce building zones, per se, but instead 
focus on creating evacuation zones, with emergency 
preparedness efforts designed to removed people from harm's 
way in the event of an impending emergency.  This DVC 
should not be widely publicized, but merely provide input 
to Government decision makers to help increase their 
understanding of best practices. 
 
--We should avoid publicly chastising the GSL on this 
matter, but should look for ways to promote a proactive 
move by the Government, to abandon the zones in favor of 
another approach, at least in some areas, not just as a 
result of pressure from the opposition and the 
international community.  It could be couched in a decision 
to apply best practices, and could be touted as the result 
of consultations with affected communities and the need to 
be sensitive to their needs.  Such an approach could be 
pursued by the Ambassador and others at Post with key GSL 
officials, including the President, and should be followed 
by an effort to provide public support from key members of 
the international community for the decision. But any 
effort needs to be quiet and discreet devoid of public 
statements and chastising.  We imagine the exclusive zone 
will be discussed considerably at the mid-May development 
forum. 
 
8. (U) Post appreciates Department's consideration of this 
idea and requests support in the development of an 
appropriate DVC program. 
 
ENTWISTLE