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Viewing cable 05ROME821, IRAQ/ITALY: PM BERLUSCONI SPEAKS TO THE SENATE ON

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
05ROME821 2005-03-11 05:18 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Rome
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS  ROME 000821 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: MARR PREL PGOV MOPS EAID MCAP IZ IT IRAQI FREEDOM
SUBJECT:  IRAQ/ITALY: PM BERLUSCONI SPEAKS TO THE SENATE ON 
NICOLA CALIPARI INCIDENT 
 
REFTEL:  ROME 799 
 
1.  (U) Sensitive but unclassified, please protect accordingly. 
 
2.  (U) Summary: Italian PM Berlusconi stressed to the 
Senate March 9 the importance of the U.S.'s "unprecedented" 
decision to allow Italy to participate in the investigation 
of the circumstances that led to the March 4 killing of 
Italian SISMI official Nicola Calipari in Baghdad. 
Indicating that Italy would stay the course in Iraq, 
Berlusconi said there is no direct link between the 
presence of troops and the nationality of hostages.  He 
cautioned against traveling to Iraq, saying the Italian 
Government could not guarantee the safety of unessential 
personnel.  Berlusconi never broached the word ransom, but 
in the debate that followed, former PM Amato said paying 
ransoms could be "counterproductive" and that policy should 
be revisited.  In later TV statements, FM Fini denied that 
the Government had paid money to obtain the release of ex- 
hostage Sgrena.  End summary. 
 
3.  (U)  PM Silvio Berlusconi spoke for about 20 minutes 
March 9 to an almost full and very attentive Senate 
Assembly on the release of Italian journalist Giuliana 
Sgrena and the incident that followed, in which Italian 
SISMI official Nicola Calipari was killed.  Berlusconi's 
speech was well received, including by the majority of the 
leftist parties.  At the conclusion, the Senators stood up 
to observe a minute of silence in commemoration of the 
slain official.  Berlusconi was flanked by a number of 
Government Ministers, including FM Gianfranco Fini and MOD 
Antonio Martino. 
 
U.S. and Italy have different versions 
-------------------------------------- 
 
4.  (U) Berlusconi summarized the reconstruction of events 
FM Fini had exposed to the Chamber of Deputies the previous 
day, saying it was based on what Calipari's SISMI colleague 
-- the one driving -- had testified.  He too, like Fini, 
noted that this version did "not/not coincide totally with 
what the U.S. authorities have communicated so far." 
Underscoring his resolve to "demand from the U.S. its 
maximum cooperation to determine the truth and identify 
responsibilities" ("and even President Bush is convinced of 
this," he said), he mentioned his meeting with Ambassador 
Sembler the evening of the incident, as well as his "long 
telephone conversation" with President Bush, the telcons 
between Fini and Secretary Rice and MOD Martino and 
Secretary Rumsfeld, and President Bush's letter to Italian 
 
SIPDIS 
President Ciampi. 
 
Joint investigation is very important 
------------------------------------- 
 
5.  (U) Berlusconi underscored that the U.S.'s true 
"willingness to cooperate" was "concretized" with its 
"unprecedented" decision -- which he characterized as being 
of "maximum importance" -- to accept the request he made to 
President Bush that Italian officials be included in the 
investigation that would ascertain "facts and 
responsibilities."  He posited that this showed the U.S. 
would not "subtract itself from ascertaining the truth." 
Arguing that the "truth of facts cannot but be shared" both 
by Italy and the U.S., he remarked that the "unreasonable" 
incident would be closed only after "frank and mutual 
acknowledgement of possible responsibilities."  In a 
tribute to the U.S.'s true friendship for and admiration of 
Calipari, and to its sorrow for his death, he added, "we 
are certain that the grief the Americans feel, who that 
same day lost four of their own soldiers, is equal to 
ours." 
 
Italy not intimidated by kidnappings 
------------------------------------ 
 
6. (U) The PM also noted that, although there is no single 
hand behind kidnappings in Iraq, the end strategy is the 
same: to spread fear and induce foreign governments to 
 
 
abandon Iraq into the hands of terrorists.  "This strategy 
has failed," he said, "and Italy with its resolve has 
certainly contributed to its failure."  Italy, like the 
other countries committed to supporting Iraq's 
reconstruction, "did not allow itself to be intimidated and 
did not give in to the kidnappers' blackmail."  Saying that 
there is no direct connection between the presence of 
troops in Iraq and the nationality of the hostages taken 
captive, he suggested -- as Fini had during his speech the 
previous day -- that Italy would not withdraw its troops as 
long as the Iraqi government requested their presence 
there.  (Note: The lower house of parliament is scheduled 
to vote next week on the decree to extend funding for 
Italy's troops in Iraq to June 30.  The majority coalition 
has sufficient votes and Embassy is confident that the 
decree will be approved.  The Senate has already approved 
it.) 
 
Government can't protect unessential personnel 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
7. (U) On the issue of hostages, Berlusconi vowed for the 
Government's constant resolve to reject the captors' 
"political blackmail" -- meaning having the kidnappers 
determine the Government's political decisions.  He said 
that to obtain the release of its hostages the Government 
had always activated every possible "political, diplomatic 
and intelligence channel," that the Italian intelligence 
services are highly professional and effective and "have 
greater expertise of Iraq than others," and that the 
center-left opposition has shared this policy.  For the 
first time since kidnappings started in Iraq, he warned 
that the Government could not be held accountable for the 
safety of unessential personnel there, but could "guarantee 
the security" only of those who "operate in tight 
coordination with and under the protection of our military 
contingent," including humanitarian organizations. 
Referring to the MFA's travel warnings on Iraq, he asked 
Italians not to travel to that country.  (Note: after 
Sgrena's kidnapping February 4, the Government had ordered 
all Italian journalists to leave Iraq.  It lifted the ban 
on March 5.) 
 
Politicos question ransom payments; Fini denies them 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
8. (U) Berlusconi's statements on the Government's 
inability to protect all Italian nationals in Iraq opened a 
guessing game within political circles on "what he really 
meant."  Speaking for the center-left "Union" (Romano 
Prodi's political grouping) during the debate that 
followed, former PM Giuliano Amato voiced a common doubt 
that is beginning to surface among Italian politicians. 
After expressing appreciation for the Government's stance 
on the Sgrena kidnapping and the Calipari incident (the 
joint investigation "is an important precedent," Amato 
said), he queried whether politicians and the State should 
not ask themselves how to prevent these events from 
happening again.  Breaking an unspoken veil, Amato pointed 
to the "policy of ransoms, which we all shared for the 
safety of our nationals abroad, regardless of whether it 
was then implemented in specific circumstances."  He 
continued, "this policy in the long run can become 
counterproductive, because it can contaminate the necessary 
transparency and loyalty with other States with which we 
cooperate in these situations; and even more, because it 
can endanger the security of other Italians" in Iraq and 
elsewhere. 
 
9.  (U) Similarly, in an article in leading daily Corriere 
della Sera March 10, DPM Marco Follini -- a staunch 
Catholic -- made a strong case against negotiating with 
"the cut-throats of international terrorism," because "we 
have to do everything possible to protect future victims." 
He continued, "we have to be dramatically clear and declare 
with all due solemness that it is not possible to come to 
terms with terrorists, under no circumstances."  The debate 
is on. 
 
 
10.  (U) Responding to these allegations, DPM/FM Fini, 
during a late-night talk show March 9, categorically denied 
that "the Italian Government had authorized money payments" 
to facilitate the release of Giuliana Sgrena.  "The Italian 
Government never negotiated in exchange for money, I want 
this to be clear," he said. 
 
11.  (SBU) Press reactions to Berlusconi's presentation 
were strongly positive.  While this issue will not go away 
any time soon, Fini's and Berlusconi's presentations 
combined with the announcement of the joint investigation 
appeared to put things on a more positive footing, as 
demonstrated by Berlusconi's widely reported quote, "we 
can't ask for more." 
 
12.  (U) Embassy Baghdad minimize considered. 
 
Sembler 
 
 
NNNN 
 2005ROME00821 - Classification: UNCLASSIFIED