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Viewing cable 05ROME799, IRAQ/ITALY: FM FINI SPEAKS TO PARLIAMENT ON

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
05ROME799 2005-03-10 05:27 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Rome
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS  ROME 000799 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: MARR PREL PGOV MOPS EAID MCAP IZ IT IRAQI FREEDOM
SUBJECT:  IRAQ/ITALY: FM FINI SPEAKS TO PARLIAMENT ON 
NICOLA CALIPARI INCIDENT 
 
REFTEL:  ROME 781 
 
1.  (U) Sensitive but unclassified, please protect accordingly. 
 
2.  (U) Summary: DPM/FM Gianfranco Fini told the Chamber of 
Deputies March 8 that the March 4 killing by a U.S.patrol 
of Italian SISMI official Nicola Calipari near Camp Victory 
in Baghdad was "certainly an accident" but that there were 
discrepancies between the U.S. and Italy's reconstruction 
of events.  Fini underscored the need to shed full light on 
the incident, said U.S. Ambassador in Rome Mel Sembler is 
of the same opinion, and remarked that the U.S. is willing 
to cooperate.  Fini also said the incident should not be 
linked to Italy's military presence in Iraq.  End summary. 
 
3.  (U) FM Fini appeared before the Italian Lower House of 
Parliament the morning of March 8 to provide the Italian 
Government's reconstruction of the events on the evening of 
March 4 which led to the death of Italian military 
intelligence (SISMI) official Nicola Calipari as he was 
approaching Baghdad airport with just-released Italian 
hostage Giuliana Sgrena.  Fini gave a detailed account of 
Calipari's movements and those of his SISMI colleague since 
the moment of their arrival at Baghdad airport the 
afternoon of March 4.  Fini reported that in Baghdad "SISMI 
complied with the Government's instructions and according 
to procedures used in previous circumstances and acted in 
synergy with the allied forces and with the U.S. Embassy's 
hostage center."  He described the retrieval of hostage 
Giuliana Sgrena in an unidentified and dark part of 
Baghdad.  He then gave a meticulous account of their return 
trip to the airport, saying Calipari had decided to fly 
back to Italy immediately with the former hostage "because 
they assessed that it would have been more dangerous to go 
to the Italian Embassy instead, as they would have had to 
drive for at least thirty minutes at night in one of the 
most dangerous sectors of Baghdad."  Calipari sat on the 
back seat of the car with the ex-hostage.  The other SISMI 
official was in front, driving.  Both were Iraq experts, 
had been there numerous times before, and knew the roads. 
They had decided to travel in an unmarked car with Iraq 
plates -- a Toyota Corolla -- to be as undetectable as 
possible, for the safety of the ex-hostage. 
 
4.  (U) According to Fini, the Toyota was traveling at a 
speed of about 70 km/hr when it first entered the road to 
Camp Victory.  The headlights were on, as was the light 
inside the car "to make it easier for possible controls at 
checkpoints -- but there were no checkpoints -- and to 
allow Calipari to make several telephone calls."  Calipari 
called Italian Government Under Secretary Gianni Letta and 
SISMI Chief Nicolo' Pollari and "informed the American 
authorities of their proximate return to the airport area, 
in order to obtain all possible assistance for a smooth and 
direct entry." 
 
5.  (U) The car reduced its speed to go through a flooded 
underpass and further reduced it "in view of a road 
junction with a practically 90 degree turn."  At that 
point, it was on the left lane of the road, because the 
right lane was flooded and because it "was obstructed by 
two cement blocs that the driver knew were there from 
before."  By then, the car was going "not more than 40 
km/hr."  "About half way through the bend a very strong 
light, like a spotlight, was lit, higher than the car and 
about 10 meters away, probably on the right side of the 
road.  Shooting from more than one automatic weapon started 
practically immediately when the car braked and stopped, 
and lasted 10-15 seconds," Fini said. 
 
6.  (U) Describing those "hectic and tragic" moments, Fini 
said the driver saw tracing bullets pass in front of his 
chest and over his legs, before he was ordered to get out 
of the car and kneel on the ground about 10 meters away. 
When the driver, who spoke English, was finally able to 
identify himself and Calipari "as belonging to the Italian 
Embassy" and to say that the woman they were transporting 
was ex-hostage Sgrena "two young American soldiers 
approached him and dejectedly and repeatedly apologized for 
what happened."  "It is still not ascertained" whether the 
 
 
soldiers who opened fire "were truly operating within a 
complex mechanism of control" or whether they were 
operating alone.  Nevertheless, the hypothesis circulating 
in Italian leftist circles that it was an ambush to 
deliberately kill either Calipari or Sgrena is "absolutely 
unfounded."  It was, instead, "certainly an accident... 
determined by a series of circumstances... but this does 
not impede that clarity be made." 
 
7. (U) Recognizing that the Italian Government's 
reconstruction "does not completely coincide with what the 
American authorities have communicated," and on the 
strength of Italy's "ancient and reiterated friendship with 
the U.S.," Fini underscored the Italian Government's 
absolute determination to "claim truth and justice."  He 
indicated that the U.S. has shown an "immediate and real 
willingness to cooperate," which was transmitted during 
President Bush's telcon with Italian PM Berlusconi, 
Secretary Rice's telcon with Fini himself, and Secretary 
 
SIPDIS 
Rumsfeld's telcon with Italian MOD Antonio Martino, as well 
as during Ambassador Sembler's meeting with Berlusconi, 
where Sembler "underscored the need to shed light on Nicola 
Calipari's death and on the fact that there must be no 
shadows."  Fini also said there is no connection between 
the presence of Italian troops in Iraq and Sgrena's 
kidnapping.  He suggested that the Government's position on 
maintaining its troops in Iraq as long as the Iraqi 
government requests that they remain will not change. 
 
8. (U) Fini was applauded only by the center-right majority 
parties, who espoused his statements in full.  He was 
criticized by the left, but not too vehemently: they 
insisted on the need to investigate whether the incident 
was deliberate and was meant to kill.  Italian Communist 
(PdCI) and former Justice Minister Oliviero Diliberto asked 
for the withdrawal of the Italian troops from Iraq and 
noted that Fini "belied" the U.S. version of events.  Paolo 
Cento, for the Greens, characterized Fini's reconstruction 
as "insufficient and inadequate."  Ramon Mantovani, for 
Communist Renewal (RC), appreciated the Government's 
decision to negotiate with the kidnappers to save a human 
life, but said that the events happened "in a context of 
war" and RC is against war and against maintaining troops 
in Iraq.  But Luciano Violante, of the opposition's leading 
party, the Democrats of the Left (DS), gave the 
opposition's leading line, remarking that Fini's speech 
"merits respect," but that Fini did not address one key 
point -- on whether there is unity of intent between Italy 
and the U.S. in how to deal with hostage situations.  He 
also said he would wait for PM Berlusconi's speech at the 
Senate the afternoon of March 9 to know more, including on 
the U.S. Embassy Baghdad's Hostage Task Force, which Fini 
had briefly mentioned in his speech. 
 
9.  (SBU) Comment:  Fini presented in detail perhaps more 
complete than we would have liked the differences between 
the accounts of U.S. and Italian witnesses to the events, 
but did not attribute more veracity to either version.  He 
made clear that Italy would participate in an investigation 
into the causes of the tragedy, an important factor in 
answering the call from the Italian public for 
transparency.  While Italian and U.S. press (including CNN) 
may have focused on a "dispute" between U.S. and Italian 
explanations, in our view Fini simply noted the obvious: 
that discrepancies exist among the various versions of the 
events.  Fini underlined that Italy agreed with the U.S. 
that the accident was "a tragic mistake", and that the 
circumstances must be clarified. 
 
10.  (SBU) Comment continued.  We believe there was also an 
element of political theater in Fini's address.  His 
iteration of the Italian witness' account preempted any 
opposition thoughts of accusing the government of a cover- 
up, and set the stage for Berlusconi to underline that he 
has received from the U.S. assurances of full transparency 
and Italian participation in the investigation, and that 
Italy's promise to remain in Iraq as long as Baghdad 
requires remains firm. 
 
11.  (U) Embassy Baghdad minimize considered. 
 
 
Sembler 
 
 
NNNN 
2005ROME00799 - Classification: UNCLASSIFIED