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Viewing cable 05QUITO664, ATTY GEN'L DEBATE UNLEASHES WILD RIDE IN CONGRESS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
05QUITO664 2005-03-23 21:32 2011-05-02 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Quito
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 QUITO 000664 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL EC
SUBJECT: ATTY GEN'L DEBATE UNLEASHES WILD RIDE IN CONGRESS 
 
REF: QUITO 650 
 
1.  SUMMARY:  March 22 witnessed political mischief-making 
that far exceeded the (already high) Ecuadorian norm, with 
the battle for control of the Attorney General's office 
joining the conflict over the Supreme Court as principal 
catalysts.  President Gutierrez and his PRE allies, cognizant 
that a majority of Congressional deputies (including those of 
erstwhile partner PRIAN) oppose the leading AG candidate, 
have sought to delay a legislative vote, thus allowing him to 
take office March 30 sans Congressional approval.  A tactic 
favored recently, closing the legislature session due to lack 
of quorum, backfired mightily the morning of March 22. 
Minutes after Congressional President Omar Quintana issued 
the closure order, pro- and anti-GoE forces clashed outside 
the plenary, the first in a day of confrontations.  Later 
that evening, Gutierrez employed another thinly-disguised 
delaying tactic, declaring March 23 and 24 national holidays 
(during which Congress could not meet).  He rescinded the 
order just hours later, however.  A presidential insider 
contacted March 23 admitted the Congressional melee had 
spooked the administration.  Gutierrez, he claimed, must take 
bold steps if he wished to forestall even bolder opposition 
attempts to remove him.  END SUMMARY. 
 
------------------------ 
Court Solution Imminent? 
------------------------ 
 
2.  Political temperatures actually had dropped the last 
seven days, partly a product of UN envoy Leandro Despouy's 
fact-finding mission to Ecuador (Reftel).  Gutierrez had 
called for a March 23 dialog, inviting administration allies, 
opposition, media, and civil society to participate.  To an 
audience commemorating the foundation of Ecuador's Supreme 
Electoral Tribunal, he evinced further flexibility on his 
referendum, aimed at giving Ecuador a truly independent and 
functional judiciary.  Many Embassy contacts canvassed 
believed a Court compromise around the corner. 
 
------- 
Not Now 
------- 
 
3,  The blow-up surrounding the Attorney General election may 
have torpedoed nascent dialog, however.  Under Ecuador's 1998 
constitution, responsibility for naming the AG falls to 
Congress, which chooses a candidate from a three-person slate 
(terna) prepared by the National Judicial Council (CNJ).  If 
Congress fails to select a winner in the 30 days following 
the CNJ's list presentation, the candidate topping the terna 
takes office automatically.  The CNJ, many of whose members 
had been selected by the controversial Supreme Court, had 
proposed three jurists all linked to Gutierrez or his allies. 
 The opposition lambasted the lineup, even claiming 
unconstitutionality, since the CNJ presented its candidates 
two days before prescribed by law. 
 
4.  In recent days, opposition parties, led by the PSC, ID, 
and Pachakutik, claimed they had marshaled sufficient (51) 
votes in Congress to reject the entire terna (although the 
Constitution does not mention such an act).  In response, the 
GoE has sought to delay, or even forestall, a Congressional 
vote.  Pro-government deputies boycotted sessions, for 
example, making quorum difficult to reach.  Ally Quintana had 
even prohibited special Congressional sessions, although he 
couched his decision as a cost-savings measure. 
------------------------------------ 
Leader's Tactics Infuriate Opponents 
------------------------------------ 
 
5.  Congressional opposition frustration over Quintana's 
leadership peaked March 22 when, only minutes after deputies 
assembled, the legislative leader declared no quorum. 
Earlier, PRIAN leader Alvaro Noboa had announced his bloc 
would join the PSC, ID, and Pachakutik in rejection of the AG 
terna, arguing the CNJ should propose new, less politicized 
candidates. (Noboa's about-face reportedly is due to GoE 
authorities' efforts collect back taxes.  PRIAN leaders claim 
not to have abandoned Gutierrez completely, however, and will 
continue to support him on other matters).  The PRIAN's nine 
votes meant the opposition held nearly 60, more than enough 
to reject the slate.  "Down with the 'coup-ism,' open the 
session," the legislators screamed, calling on Congressional 
VP Jorge Montero to assume command. 
 
6.  Meanwhile, trouble was brewing outside the plenary. 
Judicial workers, striking to demand the current Supreme 
Court's dissolution, had assembled to present Congress a 
solution to the crisis.  Alongside, the pro-Court entity 
"Zero Corruption" had organized a counter-protest.  Tempers 
flared once Quintana shuttered the session, and the groups 
clashed.  Media report the workers' leader, Luis Munoz, 
suffered a puncture wound that required emergency abdominal 
surgery. 
 
7.  Hours later the situation worsened.  Judicial workers, 
joined by superior court judges and ID deputies, rushed the 
legislative president's offices, claiming they would remain 
until Congress re-installed to resolve the Court and AG 
crises.  Media reported that pro-government forces pelted 
them with coins and soaked them with water.  Sporadic verbal 
and physical confrontations continued throughout the day both 
inside and outside Congress, eventually forcing police to 
launch tear gas canisters to disperse the crowds. 
 
8.  It got even stranger.  In early evening, President 
Gutierrez issued a presidential decree making March 23 and 24 
national holidays.  Before skeptical media, Press Secretary 
Ivan Ona claimed the time off would benefit the tourist trade 
and (somehow) spur economic activity.  Opposition leaders 
cried foul, calling the decision another maneuver to prevent 
an AG vote.  Bowing to pressures from municipal leaders and 
the business community, the president rescinded the order 
three hours later (forcing the Embassy to activate its phone 
tree a second time, telling staff to report for work as 
normal March 23). 
 
------------------------------------- 
Insider Acknowledges Serious Problems 
------------------------------------- 
 
9.  "Chaos in Congress" topped newscasts and front pages 
March 23.  To gauge the GoE's reaction and again press for 
constructive dialog, the DCM telephoned Presidential 
Secretary and close Embassy contact Carlos Polit.  The 
 
SIPDIS 
previous night's brouhaha clearly troubled the presidential 
insider.  Winning a lion's share of Polit's ire was Alvaro 
Noboa, whose anti-Gutierrez diatribe over the AG terna had 
emboldened the opposition to take more extremist positions. 
In contrast, at breakfast a bloc of ID deputies had 
approached Polit and proclaimed their desires for a 
negotiated solution to the judicial impasse.  Polit therefore 
believed the time right for Gutierrez to make a bold gesture 
toward to opposition.  He offered no details, however. 
Septel will report Polit actions on the Oxy dispute. 
 
------------------------------------ 
Congress March 23:  Back to "Normal" 
------------------------------------ 
 
10.  The legislature reconvened March 23, with 55 deputies 
present (to ensure quorum, a number of opposition congressmen 
remained in the plenary room overnight, reportedly in 
complete darkness).  Political posturing reached 
near-farsical levels, with deputies cloaked in makeshift 
masks to fight the effects of yesterday's tear-gassing.  As 
is customary of late, there has been much debate, but no 
movement on substance. 
 
-------- 
COMMENT: 
-------- 
 
11.  Having seen so many "crises" during the president's 
26-month tenure, we're hesitant to say the Attorney General 
crisis, any more than the Court conflict, represents the 
beginning of Gutierrez's end.  Yet a full defection by 
Noboa's PRIAN would convert the opposition minority to 
majority status.  And as we've seen in recent months, with 51 
votes in Congress, you can do almost anything.  END COMMENT. 
CHACON