Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 97115 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
ETRD EAGR ETTC EAID ECON EFIN ECIN EINV ELAB EAIR ENRG EPET EWWT ECPS EIND EMIN ELTN EC ETMIN EUC EZ ET ELECTIONS ENVR EU EUN EG EINT ER ECONOMICS ES EMS ENIV EEB EN ECE ECOSOC EK ENVIRONMENT EFIS EI EWT ENGRD ECPSN EXIM EIAD ERIN ECPC EDEV ENGY ECTRD EPA ESTH ECCT EINVECON ENGR ERTD EUR EAP EWWC ELTD EL EXIMOPIC EXTERNAL ETRDEC ESCAP ECO EGAD ELNT ECONOMIC ENV ETRN EIAR EUMEM ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID EREL ECOM ECONETRDEAGRJA ETCC ETRG ECONOMY EMED ETR ENERG EITC EFINOECD EURM EENG ERA EXPORT ENRD ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EGEN EBRD EVIN ETRAD ECOWAS EFTA ECONETRDBESPAR EGOVSY EPIN EID ECONENRG EDRC ESENV ETT EB ENER ELTNSNAR ECHEVARRIA ETRC EPIT EDUC ESA EFI ENRGY ESCI EE EAIDXMXAXBXFFR EETC ECIP EIAID EIVN EBEXP ESTN EING EGOV ETRA EPETEIND ELAN ETRDGK EAIDRW ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ENVI ELN EAG EPCS EPRT EPTED ETRB EUM EAIDS EFIC EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM EAIDAR ESF EIDN ELAM EDU EV EAIDAF ECN EDA EXBS EINTECPS ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EPREL EAC EINVEFIN ETA EAGER EINDIR ECA ECLAC ELAP EITI EUCOM ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID EARG ELDIN EINVKSCA ENNP EFINECONCS EFINTS ECCP ETC EAIRASECCASCID EINN ETRP EAIDNI EFQ ECOQKPKO EGPHUM EBUD ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ENERGY ELB EINDETRD EMI ECONEFIN EIB EURN ETRDEINVTINTCS EIN EFIM ETIO ELAINE EMN EATO EWTR EIPR EINVETC ETTD ETDR EIQ ECONCS EPPD ENRGIZ EISL ESPINOSA ELEC EAIG ESLCO EUREM ENTG ERD EINVECONSENVCSJA EEPET EUNCH ECINECONCS ETRO ETRDECONWTOCS ECUN EFND EPECO EAIRECONRP ERGR ETRDPGOV ECPN ENRGMO EPWR EET EAIS EAGRE EDUARDO EAGRRP EAIDPHUMPRELUG EICN ECONQH EVN EGHG ELBR EINF EAIDHO EENV ETEX ERNG ED
KMDR KPAO KPKO KJUS KCRM KGHG KFRD KWMN KDEM KTFN KHIV KGIC KIDE KSCA KNNP KHUM KIPR KSUM KISL KIRF KCOR KRCM KPAL KWBG KN KS KOMC KSEP KFLU KPWR KTIA KSEO KMPI KHLS KICC KSTH KMCA KVPR KPRM KE KU KZ KFLO KSAF KTIP KTEX KBCT KOCI KOLY KOR KAWC KACT KUNR KTDB KSTC KLIG KSKN KNN KCFE KCIP KGHA KHDP KPOW KUNC KDRL KV KPREL KCRS KPOL KRVC KRIM KGIT KWIR KT KIRC KOMO KRFD KUWAIT KG KFIN KSCI KTFIN KFTN KGOV KPRV KSAC KGIV KCRIM KPIR KSOC KBIO KW KGLB KMWN KPO KFSC KSEAO KSTCPL KSI KPRP KREC KFPC KUNH KCSA KMRS KNDP KR KICCPUR KPPAO KCSY KTBT KCIS KNEP KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNNB KGCC KINR KPOP KMFO KENV KNAR KVIR KDRG KDMR KFCE KNAO KDEN KGCN KICA KIMMITT KMCC KLFU KMSG KSEC KUM KCUL KMNP KSMT KCOM KOMCSG KSPR KPMI KRAD KIND KCRP KAUST KWAWC KTER KCHG KRDP KPAS KITA KTSC KPAOPREL KWGB KIRP KJUST KMIG KLAB KTFR KSEI KSTT KAPO KSTS KLSO KWNN KPOA KHSA KNPP KPAONZ KBTS KWWW KY KJRE KPAOKMDRKE KCRCM KSCS KWMNCI KESO KWUN KPLS KIIP KEDEM KPAOY KRIF KGICKS KREF KTRD KFRDSOCIRO KTAO KJU KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KEN KO KNEI KEMR KKIV KEAI KWAC KRCIM KWCI KFIU KWIC KCORR KOMS KNNO KPAI KBWG KTTB KTBD KTIALG KILS KFEM KTDM KESS KNUC KPA KOMCCO KCEM KRCS KWBGSY KNPPIS KNNPMNUC KWN KERG KLTN KALM KCCP KSUMPHUM KREL KGH KLIP KTLA KAWK KWMM KVRP KVRC KAID KSLG KDEMK KX KIF KNPR KCFC KFTFN KTFM KPDD KCERS KMOC KDEMAF KMEPI KEMS KDRM KEPREL KBTR KEDU KNP KIRL KNNR KMPT KISLPINR KTPN KA KJUSTH KPIN KDEV KTDD KAKA KFRP KWNM KTSD KINL KJUSKUNR KWWMN KECF KWBC KPRO KVBL KOM KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KEDM KFLD KLPM KRGY KNNF KICR KIFR KM KWMNCS KAWS KLAP KPAK KDDG KCGC KID KNSD KMPF KPFO KDP KCMR KRMS KNPT KNNNP KTIAPARM KDTB KNUP KPGOV KNAP KNNC KUK KSRE KREISLER KIVP KQ KTIAEUN KPALAOIS KRM KISLAO KWM KFLOA
PHUM PINR PTER PGOV PREL PREF PL PM PHSA PE PARM PINS PK PUNE PO PALESTINIAN PU PBTS PROP PTBS POL POLI PA PGOVZI POLMIL POLITICAL PARTIES POLM PD POLITICS POLICY PAS PMIL PINT PNAT PV PKO PPOL PERSONS PING PBIO PH PETR PARMS PRES PCON PETERS PRELBR PT PLAB PP PAK PDEM PKPA PSOCI PF PLO PTERM PJUS PSOE PELOSI PROPERTY PGOVPREL PARP PRL PNIR PHUMKPAL PG PREZ PGIC PBOV PAO PKK PROV PHSAK PHUMPREL PROTECTION PGOVBL PSI PRELPK PGOVENRG PUM PRELKPKO PATTY PSOC PRIVATIZATION PRELSP PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PMIG PREC PAIGH PROG PSHA PARK PETER POG PHUS PPREL PS PTERPREL PRELPGOV POV PKPO PGOVECON POUS PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PWBG PMAR PREM PAR PNR PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PARMIR PGOVGM PHUH PARTM PN PRE PTE PY POLUN PPEL PDOV PGOVSOCI PIRF PGOVPM PBST PRELEVU PGOR PBTSRU PRM PRELKPAOIZ PGVO PERL PGOC PAGR PMIN PHUMR PVIP PPD PGV PRAM PINL PKPAL PTERE PGOF PINO PHAS PODC PRHUM PHUMA PREO PPA PEPFAR PGO PRGOV PAC PRESL PORG PKFK PEPR PRELP PREFA PNG PGOVPHUMKPAO PRELECON PINOCHET PFOR PGOVLO PHUMBA PRELC PREK PHUME PHJM POLINT PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PGOVE PHALANAGE PARTY PECON PEACE PROCESS PLN PRELSW PAHO PEDRO PRELA PASS PPAO PGPV PNUM PCUL PGGV PSA PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PGIV PRFE POGOV PEL PBT PAMQ PINF PSEPC POSTS PHUMPGOV PVOV PHSAPREL PROLIFERATION PENA PRELTBIOBA PIN PRELL PGOVPTER PHAM PHYTRP PTEL PTERPGOV PHARM PROTESTS PRELAF PKBL PRELKPAO PKNP PARMP PHUML PFOV PERM PUOS PRELGOV PHUMPTER PARAGRAPH PERURENA PBTSEWWT PCI PETROL PINSO PINSCE PQL PEREZ PBS

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 05PANAMA629, PANAMANIAN SUPREME COURT FRACAS BLURS GOVERNMENT

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #05PANAMA629.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
05PANAMA629 2005-03-18 21:46 2011-05-31 00:00 CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN Embassy Panama
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PANAMA 000629 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR WHA/CEN 
SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD 
VANCOUVER FOR CG ARREAGA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/17/2015 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM PM POL CHIEF
SUBJECT: PANAMANIAN SUPREME COURT FRACAS BLURS GOVERNMENT
FOCUS ON SOCIAL SECURITY REFORM
Classified By: Ambassador Linda E. Watt for reasons 1.4 (B) & (D).
1. (C) A public row pitting one Supreme Court Justice
against three others has incited vehement public demands for
the dismissal of all nine justices. On March 10 the
Panamanian government (GOP) institutionalized those demands
by forming a State Justice Commission (SJC) comprising state
officials and the National Bar Association president, with a
mandate requiring it to devise by early September a
structural solution to the Court "crisis." Panamanians
rightly view the Court as ineffectual, highly politicized,
and corrupt. Although the GOP could have seized this
opportunity to do some long‐overdue house cleaning at the
Court ‐‐ a key to fulfilling its anti‐corruption pledges ‐‐
it evidently fears spending political capital and distracting
its focus from its burgeoning, contentious domestic
legislative agenda. That agenda includes first of all reform
of Panama's Social Security system (CSS), which the GOP plans
to announce in coming weeks, as well as a planned referendum,
possibly early in 2006, to decide not‐yet‐announced plans to
widen the Panama Canal. The GOP is loath to endanger either
priority, which explains its reluctance at this moment to
take on the Court. End Summary.
2. (C) Unseemly public mudslinging among four Supreme Court
justices (three against one) in early March has provoked a
groundswell of popular demands for the dismissal of all nine
Justices. On March 2, Justices Hoyos, Salas, and Spadafora
publicly accused Justice Arjona of endangering the separation
of powers and the independence of the judicial branch of
government by engaging in "illegal" administrative practices.
Arjona shot back on March 3, charging the three with freeing
suspects in narcotrafficking and murder cases, impeding
access to public information, and countenancing international
arms trafficking. As charges and counter‐charges jostled for
space on the front pages of Panama's dailies, Attorney
General Ana Gomez in a March 4 letter asked National Assembly
President Jerry Wilson to invite Arjona to testify.
3. (C) Observers who thought AG Gomez's letter reflected a
concerted GOP strategy to eliminate Hoyos, Salas, and
Spadafora soon were proved wrong as media, NGOs, and
Panamanians from all walks of life vented their fury on the
Court's alleged incompetence and corruption. Amid strident
calls for the entire Court to resign, President Torrijos on
March 10 agreed to appoint Gomez and Wilson to a State
Justice Commission (SJC) that would include Chief Justice
Troyano, Ombudsman Tejada, and National Bar Association
President Carlos Vasquez. The SJC is charged with finding a
solution to the Court crisis within 180 days, that is by
early September 2005.
4. (C) (Comment: By forming the commission, Torrijos in
effect has decided to procrastinate. He has also given the
impression, which may not turn out to be true, that he will
give civil society a veto over his policy on the Court, when
it is eventually formulated. The Assembly has the
constitutional power to impeach Justices, who serve 10‐year
terms, but never successfully has exercised that power.
Salas and Spadafora are Moscoso nominees. Hoyos is a Perez
Balladares nominee whose term ends in December 2005. Arjona,
a Moscoso nominee who has proved to be an independent‐minded
political maverick, has been a long‐time Embassy confidant.
He has accused the other justices of accepting payoffs from
criminals and estimates that he has cast the lone dissent in
perhaps 50 Supreme Court votes where the majority showed "no
concern" for the evidence or the seriousness of the cases.
End comment.)
Where's the Beef?
‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐
5. (C) In a March 4 meeting with POL Counselor, Justice
Arjona claimed that the charges against him were frivolous
and based on personal vendettas stemming from the persistence
of his lone, dissenting votes on many Court decisions. The
other justices barely tolerate him, Arjona said. In a effort
to force him off the Court, Arjona recounted, former Supreme
Court President Pereira Burgos confiscated his Court‐paid car
in Spring 2004, then stopped paying his staff. In
desperation, Arjona turned to then‐Minister of Economy and
Finance Norberto Delgado, who proposed paying Arjona's staff
from the Attorney General's office. That is the purported
basis, Arjona explained, for the charges against him of
administrative impropriety and undermining the separation of
powers. Among Embassy contacts, none believe that the
accusations against Arjona are anything but political payback.
6. (C) Arjona's charges against Hoyos, Salas, and Spadafora
are much more serious and substantive. Specifically, Arjona
has questioned their April 2004 decision to free Lorena Henao
Montoya (sister of notorious drug trafficker Arcangel Henao
Montoya), who was subsequently arrested by Colombian
authorities. Also, Arjona is blaming the three for impeding
an investigation into the use of millions of dollars of
Taiwan‐donated funds in the Fundacion Mar del Sur, paid to
First Lady Ruby Moscoso, former President Moscoso's sister.
In addition, Arjona faults the three justices for freeing
suspected Israeli arms trafficker Shimon Yelinek in the
Otterloo case in March 2004,l presumably for payoffs.
Comment
‐‐‐‐‐‐‐
7. (C) The sudden and unexpected upsurge of popular
sentiment against Panama's Supreme Court presented the
Torrijos administration with an opportunity to grasp a
politically acceptable solution to its perceived corruption
and incompetence. Since winning office in May 2004, Torrijos
and his cabinet have agonized over the best way to reform the
Court in a way that would respect the constitution and be
seen as politically neutral while forcing some of the more
egregious Justices from the bench. Faced with the imminent
unfolding of one of its principal domestic priorities ‐‐ a
campaign to reform social security (CSS) is already underway,
while the details of the reforms and possibly violent street
demonstration are expected soon ‐‐ the GOP has refused to
allow itself to become distracted by lesser priorities, such
as the Court.
WATT