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Viewing cable 05LIMA1409, FUTURE OF OUR CN PROGRAMS AND OBJECTIVES IN PERU

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
05LIMA1409 2005-03-23 21:41 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Lima
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 LIMA 001409 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
NSC FOR CHRIS BARTON 
ONDCP FOR BRAD HITTLE 
INL FOR JOHNATHAN FARRAR 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: SNAR EAID PGOV PREL PE
SUBJECT: FUTURE OF OUR CN PROGRAMS AND OBJECTIVES IN PERU 
 
REF: A. LIMA 004   B. LIMA 353   C. LIMA 1288 
 
1. (SBU)  Summary:  As reported reftels, our Mission counter- 
drug strategy in the short term will be focused on holding the 
line against expansion of coca and opium cultivation and drawing 
the noose around no-go coca source zones through eradication and 
alternative development.  The advent in mid-2006 of a government 
with a fresh popular mandate will give us the opportunity to 
shift to the medium term strategy  converting Peru into a 
marginal narcotics producer.   That status might equate to as 
much as 15,000 hectares of coca and a few hundred hectares of 
opium poppy.  In the long term, we should expect to maintain 
some level of assistance to the GOP so that it can prevent 
resurgent narcotics trafficking.  If our efforts are successful, 
within 10 years we could achieve a stability point when illegal 
drug cultivation goes down and the income/institutional capacity 
of the government rises to the point that Peru can manage the 
problem on its own.  End Summary. 
 
-------------------- 
CN OUTLOOK 
------------------- 
2.  (SBU) Embassy Lima's overarching counter-narcotics objective 
is to help Peru become a marginal producer of illegal coca and 
opiates. Over the next 16 months, under a weak Toledo 
Government, holding the line against increased 
cultivation/production of coca is the best we are likely to 
achieve.  We can draw a noose around the traditional coca 
cultivation areas but see no prospect that the GOP will 
undertake serious eradication efforts there during a volatile 
electoral period.  (Extensive information indicates that 
cocaleros in the core cultivation areas are prepared to resist 
eradication with armed force.)  For now, we will focus on 
stamping out expansion.  The government that emerges from the 
April/May 2006 national elections will have a fresh popular 
mandate and a longer-term focus; its incentives to confront 
cultivation in the lawless no-go zones will be far stronger. 
Our goal will be to work with that Administration to make Peru a 
marginal narcotics producer within its term.  In the area of 
opium poppy, our short-term goals are more ambitious.  There are 
no political obstacles to eradication when we find poppy.  We 
will develop significantly improved human and technical 
intelligence on areas of cultivation in coming months that will 
guide more robust interdiction and eradication efforts. 
 
3.  (SBU) Marginal production of illegal coca might equate to as 
much as 15,000 hectares of total cultivation.  The benchmark for 
supplying traditional use is around 9,000 hectares; the residue 
would still go to the drug trade.  It would also entail a few 
hundred hectares of opium poppy (there are still no reliable 
estimates of how many hectares are currently under poppy 
cultivation in remote areas).   Even after reaching this point 
we would need continuing though reduced levels of assistance to 
help the GOP maintain a permanent capability to contain the 
illegal drug industry and to stop it from springing back.  Our 
operational goal is getting to the stability point, that is, 
when illegal drug cultivation goes down and the 
income/institutional capacity of the government rises so that 
Peru can manage the problem on its own. 
 
4.  (SBU) This stability point remains some way off.  The 
current political and economic realities of Peru do not point to 
a dramatic change in government or private sector investment in 
the Andean highlands or rainforest, which could dissuade farmers 
from growing coca.  There is weak public support for forced 
eradication; rather there is a tendency to view coca producers 
as poor farmers who are the least culpable in the drug- 
trafficking industry.  This is reflected in politicians' 
attitudes that tend towards appeasement of coca growers. 
Improved prices are causing a surge in new coca cultivation and 
production.   Historically, Lima-centric national governments 
have horribly neglected the hinterland.  The GOP is pressed by 
population growth in cities  growth that is the result of that 
neglect.  Lack of central government presence in rural areas, 
(i.e., little or no provision of social or economic services and 
infrastructure, scant or weak law enforcement, and a judicial 
vacuum), is fostering a climate of lawlessness and impunity 
within and beyond the coca source zones.  Newly decentralized 
regional governments lack authority, experience, resources and 
influence and are poorly equipped to deal with the problems of 
narcotics trafficking. 
 
5.  (SBU)  We can claim some areas of progress in strengthening 
government capabilities, such as new police resources coming on 
line east of the Andes that let us for the first time try 
sustained interdiction close to the source zone as a way of 
pushing down/disrupting leaf prices.  We successfully helped 
shape legislation on control of precursor chemicals and are 
working on implementing regulations.  We have made some inroads 
in disrupting drug production through logistical support for 
regular interdiction operations in the source zones.  Recent 
multi-ton seizures of cocaine destined for shipment to the US 
offer proof that our focus on ports is paying off.  Not 
surprisingly, narco-traffickers are adapting and using new 
tactics. 
6.  (SBU)  The Alternative Development Program is an essential 
element of the Embassy's counter-narcotics efforts, contributing 
directly to the containment approach outlined in this cable. 
Voluntary eradication has accounted for more than 8,000 hectares 
of coca reduction over the last two years, improving the social 
and economic conditions in coca-growing communities.  Of equal 
importance, it provides the GOP a useful tool in managing the 
internal politics of counter-narcotics.  (The cocaleros fully 
understand this, which is why they try to intimidate AD workers 
and communities on the one hand while louding asserting that 
alternative development doesn't work on the other.)  In CY 2005, 
it is likely that it will not be feasible to pursue voluntary 
eradication in hard-core areas, such as the VRAE.   However, 
opportunities exist to voluntarily eradicate up to 3,000 
hectares in traditional coca-growing areas, which in close 
operational collaboration with forced eradication and 
interdiction will permit the consolidation of broader coca-free 
areas.   These joint efforts will establish contiguous 
communities/jurisdictions in which sustainable licit economic 
development can be pursued, push out the coca-frontier, and 
further isolate hard-core coca-growing areas/populations.  With 
more aggressive and sustained a GOP interdiction and forced 
eradication in the future (especially after the 2006 elections), 
we expect that voluntary eradication will be feasible in more 
hard-core areas, and alternative development resources will 
focus increasingly on ensuring the sustainability of coca 
reduction and licit economic development in expanding coca-free 
areas. 
 
7.  (SBU)  In the medium term, the picture grows brighter.    A 
Free Trade Agreement with the United States would bolster Peru's 
exports.  A more prosperous economy and a stronger democratic 
government in Lima would be better equipped to shoulder the load 
of containing illegal coca and preventing an opium industry from 
taking off.  But, we estimate that for at least the next 10 
years, USG involvement in counter-narcotics will be critical. 
We will need to use our assistance to maintain policy influence 
in Peru, ensuring that improvements are sustained.  We must 
above all avoid the proliferation of no-go zones void of state 
presence that could end up creating a narco state-within-a- 
state. 
 
8.  (SBU)  Over the next 12 months, we will working hard to 
strengthen GOP counter-narcotics capabilities.  These efforts 
will include the creation of document review groups and cargo 
container inspection teams at key seaports and Lima's 
international airport - major cocaine transshipment points.  We 
will eradicate 8,000 hectares of managed coca focusing on new 
areas of expanded cultivation.  We will establish a 120-member 
Eradication Security Group within DINANDRO to provide effective 
security to CORAH workers.  Through our NAS-supported police 
academies, we will increase government law enforcement presence 
in coca-source zones by graduating 400 policemen, who will be 
assigned to anti-drug units for the next 3 years.  Another 400 
students will begin an 18-month course of study in 2005.  We 
will enhance infrastructure to accommodate 200 police at key 
forward operating bases in the VRAE and Monzon valleys.  These 
bases will permit sustained interdiction activities in areas 
where drug-trafficking and narco-terrorism activities have gone 
unchecked.  We will establish a Mobile Road Interdiction Group, 
trained to detect contraband  from precursor chemicals to drugs 
 using gamma ray equipment in the drug source zones. We will 
augment media and public relations campaigns to educate Peruvian 
politicians, opinion leaders and the public on the link between 
drug cultivation, narco-trafficking, and a growing domestic drug 
consumption problem in Peru. 
STRUBLE