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Viewing cable 05DJIBOUTI290, CLARIFICATION ON ATTACK ON U.S. SAILBOATS NEAR YEMEN

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
05DJIBOUTI290 2005-03-22 12:17 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Djibouti
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 DJIBOUTI 000290 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PTER EWWT PHSA KCRM PBTS YM CASC CMGT DJ
SUBJECT: CLARIFICATION ON ATTACK ON U.S. SAILBOATS NEAR YEMEN 
 
REF. Djibouti 259 
 
1. (U) Action requested paragraph 7. 
 
2. (U) ConOff followed up on the report of an attack on two 
American sailboats in the Gulf of Aden on March 8 (see ref) 
offering victims' assistance.  Between 15 March and 21 March, 
she received multiple emails from each of the sailboats 
involved. They indicated that they intended to continue their 
journey North through the Red Sea, without stopping in Djibouti. 
One of the AmCit victims also sent the following clarification 
of events.  This individual also concluded in a later message 
that he believed there was the possibility the attack against 
the boats was an attempt to take a group of Americans hostage. 
The text of the initial account follows: 
 
Begin text. 
 
Attached is a copy of the official report we gave to the Yemeni 
officials.  We are safe and sound in Aden and plan to continue 
our cruise up the Red Sea.  We are a private sailing yacht with 
3 people on board, all Americans.  We have had some damage to our 
vessel but nothing else. 
 
On 8 March 2005, two sailing yachts, Mahdi & Gandalf, were moving 
SW 30 miles off the coast of Yemen proceeding to the port of Aden 
from Salalah, Oman. 
 
At about 0900 two outboard powered boats, about 25 feet long with 
3 men in each one, passed off our stern moving south at about 25 
knots.  An hour or two later they returned, one coming quite close 
and looking us over carefully.  The second boat passed our bows but 
quite a ways away.  These boats were obviously not engaged in a 
normal activity such as fishing, etc.  At that time we were south 
of Al Mukalla, Yemen.  The area around Al Mukalla is well documented 
as being a piracy problem area and we started watching carefully 
for anything out of the ordinary.  The position of the attack was 
13 degrees 28 N, 48 degrees 07 E. At about 1600 we observed two 
different boats approaching us head on from the SW. These boats 
were 25-30 feet long, had higher freeboard and diesel powered. 
They were coming very fast directly at us. There were 4 men in each 
boat.  The boats separated at about 200 yards, one boat ahead of the 
other, coming down Mahdi's port side and firing into the cockpit. 
The other boat was firing an automatic weapon at both Gandalf and 
Mahdi from ahead, more at Gandalf.  These guys were shooting directly 
at the cockpits, and obviously intended to kill us.  The first boat 
swung around behind Mahdi's stern to come up and board us.  At that 
point I, Rod Nowlin aboard Mahdi and armed with a 12 gage shotgun 
loaded with 00 buckshot, started shooting into their boat.  I forced 
them to keep their heads down so that they could not shoot at us.  I 
am not sure I hit anyone at that point although I could see the driver 
of the boat crouched down behind a steering console.  After firing 3 
shots at them their engine started to smoke and I swung around to 
shoot at the boat ahead.  At that point, I saw Jay Barry on Gandalf 
ram that boat amidships almost cutting it in two and turning it 
almost completely over.  I turned back around to shoot again at the 
boat behind Mahdi and that is when they turned away from Mahdi and 
were heading toward the stern of Gandalf.  Gandalf was beside us, 
about 100 feet away.  The bow of the pirate's boat came right up 
against Gandalf's stern and two men stood up on the bow to board 
Gandalf.  That was a serious and probably fateful error on their 
part.  I shot both of them.  That boat then veered away and I shot 
the driver, although I am not sure of the outcome because they 
were farther away and I did not knock him down like the other two. 
 
Mahdi and Gandalf kept going at full speed to put as much distance 
between the pirates and us as possible.  As soon as we were out of 
rifle range we looked back and both boats were drifting and appeared 
to be disabled. 
 
If Jay on Gandalf had not had the presence of mind to veer over 
into one boat and ram it, the outcome of this attack would have been 
totally different.  All they needed to do was stand off a ways and 
shoot us to pieces with automatic weapons.  We were extremely lucky. 
We broadcast Mayday calls on all VHF and HF radio frequencies, 
including two HF emergency frequencies supplied by the US Coast Guard 
a few days before. The Coalition Forces in the area were supposed to 
be monitoring these frequencies. There was no response except from 
a commercial ship in the area on VHF 16 who approached and observed 
the disabled pirates for a bit, then sailed along side of us for 
2-4 hours until dark to make sure we would be all right. 
 
The pirates were well organized and well armed.  There were at least 
4 boats involved.  They had set up a picket line out from the Yemen 
coast probably at least for 50-75 miles, so if you transited the area 
during the day they wouldn't miss you.  The two boats that attacked 
us appeared to have come from the south. 
 
There has been speculation in the past that this ongoing piracy 
problem off the Yemen coast was being carried out by Somali pirates. 
Given the number, type of boats involved, and the direction the spotter 
boats came from, this does not appear to be correct in this case. 
This problem is getting worse and the pirate attacks are getting 
deadly. 
One could only expect that the Yemen Government will take more direct 
action.  At the very least, allow yachts to group in Salalah, Oman 
and at some point on the NW Yemen coast to request an escort along the 
Yemen coast. 
 
End text. 
 
3. (U) This account has also been posted on the Web at: 
http://www.noonsite.com/Members/doina/R2005-0 3-14-1. Although signed 
by one of the AmCit victims, it is not clear who posted the account. 
 
4. (U) In an additional email, another of the victims indicated that 
they believed the same attackers may have attempted another approach 
later.  How much later is unclear from the email, possibly several days 
later.  They cannot confirm the same individuals or boats were 
involved, because it was dark out.  Twenty miles offshore, a power 
boat with no running lights approached the stern of one of the boats, 
but pulled away after the AmCits made contact via VHF with a merchant 
ship who then contacted the Coalition Fleet. The sailboats were then 
radioed by a French coalition ship who stayed in contact with them unti 
they reached the Straights of Bab el Mandeb. 
 
5. (SBU) As of 18 March the sailboats were reportedly anchored at 
13degrees 52N/41 degrees 56E in Eritrea. 
 
6. (U) A separate email our interlocutor indicated that the group had 
been in contact with the Fifth fleet "in preparation for 50-100 yachts 
to make this passage from Salalah Oman through 'Pirate Alley' in the 
Gulf of Aden into the Red Sea to Massawa, Eritrea."  This is the first 
time AmEmbassy Djibouti received word of the plans of private American 
boats to pass through the area. 
 
7. (U) Post recommends a travel warning be issued for the Gulf of Aden 
and the Red Sea, specifying the danger of hostile attacks and criminal 
activity in unpatrolled international waters. 
 
RAGSDALE