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Viewing cable 05COLOMBO502, USAID/OFDA DART TEAM MONITORING VISIT TO TSUNAMI-

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
05COLOMBO502 2005-03-09 10:47 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Colombo
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 COLOMBO 000502 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE ALSO PASS TO USAID 
STATE FOR TSUNAMI TASK FORCE 1 
USAID/W FOR A/AID ANDREW NATSIOS, MMERTENS 
AID/W FOR DCHA/OFDA 
DCHA/OFDA KISAACS, GGOTTLIEB, MMARX, RTHAYER, BDEEMER 
DCHA/FFP FOR LAUREN LANDIS 
DCHA DEPUTY ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR WILLIAM GARVELINK 
ANE DEPUTY ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR MARK WARD 
BANGKOK FOR OFDA SENIOR REGIONAL ADVISOR TOM DOLAN 
KATHMANDU FOR OFDA REGIONAL ADVISOR WILLIAM BERGER 
GENEVA FOR USAID KYLOH 
ROME PASS FODAG 
NSC FOR JMELINE 
CDR USPACOM FOR J3/J4/POLAD 
USEU PASS USEC 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EAID AEMR PREL PGOV CE
SUBJECT: USAID/OFDA DART TEAM MONITORING VISIT TO TSUNAMI- 
AFFECTED EAST AND SOUTH COASTS OF SRI LANKA 
 
SUMMARY 
 
1.  MEMBERS OF THE USAID/OFDA DART TEAM VISITED THE HEAVILY 
AFFECTED EAST AND SOUTH COASTS OF SRI LANKA MARCH 2-7 TO 
MONITOR PROGRESS OF RELIEF ACTIVITIES AND ASSESS PROSPECTS 
FOR CONTINUED RECOVERY. AVAILABLE FUNDS ARE SUFFICIENT TO 
MEET RELIEF NEEDS IN THE DISTRICTS VISITED BUT 
IMPLEMENTATION FALLS SHORT. CASH-FOR-WORK PROJECTS FUNDED BY 
USAID/OFDA AND OTHER DONORS ARE HAVING A SUBSTANTIAL AND 
HIGHLY VISIBLE IMPACT IN ALL OF THE WORST HIT COASTAL AREAS. 
QUICK IMPACT PROJECTS IMPLEMENTED BY DAI ARE AMONG THE MOST 
SUCCESSFUL AND COST-EFFECTIVE OFDA-FUNDED ACTIVITIES. THE 
MAIN OBSTACLE TO RECOVERY ALONG THE TSUNAMI-AFFECTED 
COASTLINE AT PRESENT IS UNCERTAINTY OVER GOSL RESTRICTIONS 
ON REBUILDING IN THE COASTAL ZONE. EVENTUAL RETURN OF 
DISPLACED PERSONS TO THEIR ORIGINAL LOCATIONS MAY BE 
INEVITABLE DESPITE CURRENT GOSL RESTRICTIONS. COORDINATION 
OF ASSISTANCE HAS BEEN DIFFICULT BUT IS NOW IMPROVING AT THE 
LOCAL LEVEL. SURVIVORS ARE EMERGING FROM THE INITIAL TRAUMA 
OF THE DISASTER AND, WITH MANY VILLAGES BENEFITING FROM 
CLEAN-UP EFFORTS, ARE INCREASINGLY INCLINED TO RETURN AND 
REBUILD THEIR LIVES AND LIVELIHOODS. 
 
DART MONITORING VISIT 
 
2.  TWO USAID/OFDA DART TEAM MEMBERS JOINED BY MISSION FSN 
STAFF TRAVELED THE LENGTH OF THE TSUNAMI-AFFECTED COAST FROM 
TRINCOMALEE DISTRICT SOUTH TO HAMBANTOTA DISTRICT MARCH 2-7 
TO MONITOR PROGRESS OF USAID/OFDA-FUNDED RELIEF PROJECTS AND 
ASSESS PROSPECTS FOR CONTINUED RECOVERY. THE TEAM MET WITH 
LOCAL AND INTERNATIONAL IMPLEMENTING PARTNERS, SPOKE WITH 
AFFECTED FAMILIES, AND VISITED NUMEROUS OFDA-FUNDED PROJECT 
SITES IN TRINCOMALEE, BATTICALOA, AMPARA, AND HAMBANTOTA 
DISTRICTS. ABOUT 20,000 LIVES WERE LOST IN THESE FOUR 
DISTRICTS, NEARLY TWO-THIRDS OF CONFIRMED DEATHS NATIONWIDE. 
BEYOND HAMBANTOTA THE TEAM CONTINUED TO COLOMBO ALONG THE 
HEAVILY-AFFECTED SOUTH AND SOUTHEAST COASTLINE BUT DID NOT 
CONDUCT SITE VISITS AS THIS AREA HAS BEEN WELL-MONITORED BY 
MISSION AND DART STAFF. USAID/OFDA DISASTER ASSISTANCE TO 
SRI LANKA FOR THE TSUNAMI TOTALS APPROXIMATELY USD 37 
MILLION. 
 
RELIEF PHASE: FULLY FUNDED BUT NOT FULLY IMPLEMENTED 
 
3.  AVAILABLE FUNDING FOR HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE PROJECTS 
IS CLEARLY SUFFICIENT TO MEET RELIEF REQUIREMENTS IN THE 
DISTRICTS VISITED, BUT IMPLEMENTATION STILL FALLS SHORT DUE 
TO LOGISTICAL DELAYS (E.G. TIMBER FOR TRANSITIONAL SHELTER 
IS BACK-ORDERED), COORDINATION DIFFICULTIES, AND CONTINUED 
UNCERTAINTY ABOUT THE GOSL POLICY ON THE RETURN OF DISPLACED 
PEOPLE TO THE COASTAL ZONE (SEE PARAGRAPH SIX). IN SHORT THE 
RELIEF PHASE IS FULLY FUNDED BUT NOT FULLY IMPLEMENTED. 
 
IMPACT OF CASH-FOR-WORK 
 
4.  ONGOING CASH-FOR-WORK PROJECTS FUNDED BY USAID/OFDA AND 
OTHER DONORS ARE HAVING A SUBSTANTIAL AND HIGHLY VISIBLE 
IMPACT IN ALL OF THE WORST HIT AREAS OF THE EAST AND SOUTH 
COASTS. REMOVAL OF DEBRIS, INCLUDING THOUSANDS OF TRUCKLOADS 
OF BRICK AND CONCRETE RUBBLE, COLLAPSED ROOFING, AND OTHER 
REMAINS OF DWELLINGS AND INFRASTRUCTURE, HAS BEEN A CRITICAL 
FIRST STEP ENABLING RENEWED ACCESS TO RESIDENTIAL AREAS, 
ROADWAYS, MARKET AREAS, AND PUBLIC BUILDINGS. IN AREAS WHICH 
HAVE BEEN CLEARED OF DEBRIS, RESIDENTS CAN BE SEEN RETURNING 
TO SURVEY LOSSES, SALVAGE PROPERTY, OR ERECT MAKESHIFT 
FENCES TO DEMARCATE LAND IN HOPES OF EVENTUALLY REBUILDING 
ON IT. 
 
DAI QUICK IMPACT PROJECTS 
 
5.  AMONG THE MOST SUCCESSFUL AND COST-EFFECTIVE OFDA-FUNDED 
PROJECTS ARE THOSE IMPLEMENTED BY DEVELOPMENT ALTERNATIVES 
INCORPORATED (DAI) THROUGH THE USAID/OTI SWIFT CONTRACT 
MECHANISM. DAI HAS RAPIDLY IMPLEMENTED AN IMPRESSIVE ARRAY 
OF SMALL GRANTS FOR INFRASTRUCTURE REPAIR, CLEAN-UP, AND 
LIVELIHOOD RECOVERY. IN MANY CASES USAID CONTRIBUTIONS OF 
MATERIAL, EQUIPMENT, OR TECHNICAL EXPERTISE ARE MATCHED WITH 
THE VOLUNTEER LABOR OF LOCAL COMMUNITIES, AND ADDITIONAL 
SUPPORT FROM LOCAL GOVERNMENTS OR POLITICAL PARTIES. 
 
MAJOR OBSTACLE TO RECOVERY 
 
6.  THE MAIN OBSTACLE TO RECOVERY ALONG THE TSUNAMI-AFFECTED 
COASTLINE AT PRESENT IS CONTINUED UNCERTAINTY ABOUT 
PROSPECTS FOR RETURN OF DISPLACED TO THEIR LAND WITHIN THE 
SO-CALLED "BUFFER ZONE" OR COASTAL CONSERVATION ZONE, WHICH 
HAS BEEN DESIGNATED BY THE GOSL AS EITHER 100 OR 200 METERS 
FROM MEAN HIGH TIDE, DEPENDING ON THE DISTRICT. THIS 
UNCERTAINTY IS HOLDING UP SHELTER CONSTRUCTION (TRANSITIONAL 
AND PERMANENT) AND LIVELIHOOD RECOVERY, AS INVESTMENTS IN 
LIVELIHOODS ASSETS ARE CONTINGENT ON PROXIMITY TO THE COAST 
FOR FISHING FAMILIES AND OTHERS. IN THE DISTRICTS VISITED, 
THE COASTAL ZONE POLICY WAS THE SUBJECT OF INCESSANT 
DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS AMONG AFFECTED COMMUNITIES, 
HUMANITARIAN ORGANIZATIONS, AND LOCAL OFFICIALS WHO 
REPORTEDLY LONG FOR CLARITY FROM THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT IN 
COLOMBO. AMIDST ALL THE TALK AND GOSL PRONOUNCEMENTS IT WAS 
THE PREDICTION OF THE CARE COORDINATOR IN AMPARA DISTRICT 
THAT RESONATED WITH THE VISITING DART TEAM AND IS PERHAPS 
THE MOST LIKELY SCENARIO: THE CURRENT GOVERNMENT POSITION 
WILL INEVITABLY HAVE TO GIVE WAY TO THE OVERWHELMING DESIRE 
OF TENS OF THOUSANDS OF DISPLACED FAMILIES TO RETURN TO THE 
SITES OF THEIR ORIGINAL HOMES, EVEN WITHIN THE DEVASTATED 
100 METER ZONE. SOME OF THESE FAMILIES ARE INDEED ALREADY 
RETURNING. 
 
COORDINATION 
 
7.  INTERNATIONAL AND LOCAL NGO PARTNERS IN THE EASTERN 
DISTRICTS REPORT THAT COORDINATION HAS IMPROVED CONSIDERABLY 
IN RECENT WEEKS. COORDINATION OF SECTORAL ACTIVITIES IS 
BEING PUSHED DOWN FROM THE DISTRICT LEVEL (DISTRICT AGENT) 
TO THE SUB-DISTRICT LEVEL (DIVISION SECRETARIAT). IN THE 
EARLY WEEKS COORDINATION MEETINGS HOSTED BY THE DISTRICT 
AGENTS REPORTEDLY DREW AS MANY AS 200 PEOPLE, MAKING 
EFFECTIVE COORDINATION NEARLY IMPOSSIBLE. THE UNPRECEDENTED 
LEVELS OF PRIVATE FUNDS RAISED BY NGOS HAVE ALSO POSED 
CHALLENGES FOR COORDINATION. LESS BEHOLDEN TO USAID AND 
OTHER DONORS, AND UNDER PRESSURE TO SPEND QUICKLY, MANY NGOS 
WERE LESS INCLINED TO COORDINATE EFFORTS. INTERNATIONAL NGOS 
(INGO) RECEIVING USAID TSUNAMI FUNDING IN SRI LANKA REPORT 
MATCHING THEIR USAID CONTRIBUTIONS FOUR OR FIVE FOLD WITH 
PRIVATE DONATIONS. 
 
LOCAL NGO CAPACITY 
 
8.  EARLY REPORTS THAT LOCAL NGOS (LNGO) WERE UNDER-FUNDED 
OR IN SOME CASES EVEN IDLE WHILE MONEY POURED INTO 
INTERNATIONAL NGO OPERATIONS APPEAR TO BE NO LONGER VALID. 
ON THE CONTRARY, AT THIS POINT THE MAJOR LNGOS ARE GENERALLY 
BELIEVED TO BE FUNDED TO THE LIMIT OF THEIR ABSORPTION 
CAPACITY. SEWALANKA, SRI LANKA'S SECOND LARGEST, FOR 
EXAMPLE, HAS STOPPED ACCEPTING TSUNAMI DONATIONS. ONE 
UNFORTUNATE TREND HAS BEEN THE MIGRATION OF SOME OF THE BEST 
LNGO STAFF TO BETTER PAYING INGOS. 
 
THE INITIAL TRAUMA FADES 
 
9.  THE DART HEARD REPORTS FROM NUMEROUS SOURCES THAT THE 
TRAUMA OF THE INITIAL PERIOD IS LESSENING TO THE POINT THAT 
SURVIVORS ARE INCREASINGLY INCLINED TO RETURN (EVEN THOSE 
WITHIN THE 100 METER ZONE) AND REBUILD THEIR LIVES AND 
LIVELIHOODS. MANY AFFECTED VILLAGES, WHILE NOT YET REBUILT, 
HAVE BEEN VISUALLY TRANSFORMED BY THE CLEAN-UP EFFORTS. THE 
BUZZ OF HEAVY EQUIPMENT AND CLEAN-UP CREWS GIVES AN 
IMPRESSION OF PROGRESS AND THAT A GRADUAL RETURN TO NORMALCY 
IS POSSIBLE. CLEAN-UP EFFORTS ON THE SOUTH AND SOUTHEAST 
COASTS HAVE GENERALLY PROGRESSED FURTHER THAN THEY HAVE IN 
THE EAST. 
 
LUNSTEAD