Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 97115 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
ETRD EAGR ETTC EAID ECON EFIN ECIN EINV ELAB EAIR ENRG EPET EWWT ECPS EIND EMIN ELTN EC ETMIN EUC EZ ET ELECTIONS ENVR EU EUN EG EINT ER ECONOMICS ES EMS ENIV EEB EN ECE ECOSOC EK ENVIRONMENT EFIS EI EWT ENGRD ECPSN EXIM EIAD ERIN ECPC EDEV ENGY ECTRD EPA ESTH ECCT EINVECON ENGR ERTD EUR EAP EWWC ELTD EL EXIMOPIC EXTERNAL ETRDEC ESCAP ECO EGAD ELNT ECONOMIC ENV ETRN EIAR EUMEM ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID EREL ECOM ECONETRDEAGRJA ETCC ETRG ECONOMY EMED ETR ENERG EITC EFINOECD EURM EENG ERA EXPORT ENRD ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EGEN EBRD EVIN ETRAD ECOWAS EFTA ECONETRDBESPAR EGOVSY EPIN EID ECONENRG EDRC ESENV ETT EB ENER ELTNSNAR ECHEVARRIA ETRC EPIT EDUC ESA EFI ENRGY ESCI EE EAIDXMXAXBXFFR EETC ECIP EIAID EIVN EBEXP ESTN EING EGOV ETRA EPETEIND ELAN ETRDGK EAIDRW ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ENVI ELN EAG EPCS EPRT EPTED ETRB EUM EAIDS EFIC EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM EAIDAR ESF EIDN ELAM EDU EV EAIDAF ECN EDA EXBS EINTECPS ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EPREL EAC EINVEFIN ETA EAGER EINDIR ECA ECLAC ELAP EITI EUCOM ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID EARG ELDIN EINVKSCA ENNP EFINECONCS EFINTS ECCP ETC EAIRASECCASCID EINN ETRP EAIDNI EFQ ECOQKPKO EGPHUM EBUD ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ENERGY ELB EINDETRD EMI ECONEFIN EIB EURN ETRDEINVTINTCS EIN EFIM ETIO ELAINE EMN EATO EWTR EIPR EINVETC ETTD ETDR EIQ ECONCS EPPD ENRGIZ EISL ESPINOSA ELEC EAIG ESLCO EUREM ENTG ERD EINVECONSENVCSJA EEPET EUNCH ECINECONCS ETRO ETRDECONWTOCS ECUN EFND EPECO EAIRECONRP ERGR ETRDPGOV ECPN ENRGMO EPWR EET EAIS EAGRE EDUARDO EAGRRP EAIDPHUMPRELUG EICN ECONQH EVN EGHG ELBR EINF EAIDHO EENV ETEX ERNG ED
KMDR KPAO KPKO KJUS KCRM KGHG KFRD KWMN KDEM KTFN KHIV KGIC KIDE KSCA KNNP KHUM KIPR KSUM KISL KIRF KCOR KRCM KPAL KWBG KN KS KOMC KSEP KFLU KPWR KTIA KSEO KMPI KHLS KICC KSTH KMCA KVPR KPRM KE KU KZ KFLO KSAF KTIP KTEX KBCT KOCI KOLY KOR KAWC KACT KUNR KTDB KSTC KLIG KSKN KNN KCFE KCIP KGHA KHDP KPOW KUNC KDRL KV KPREL KCRS KPOL KRVC KRIM KGIT KWIR KT KIRC KOMO KRFD KUWAIT KG KFIN KSCI KTFIN KFTN KGOV KPRV KSAC KGIV KCRIM KPIR KSOC KBIO KW KGLB KMWN KPO KFSC KSEAO KSTCPL KSI KPRP KREC KFPC KUNH KCSA KMRS KNDP KR KICCPUR KPPAO KCSY KTBT KCIS KNEP KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNNB KGCC KINR KPOP KMFO KENV KNAR KVIR KDRG KDMR KFCE KNAO KDEN KGCN KICA KIMMITT KMCC KLFU KMSG KSEC KUM KCUL KMNP KSMT KCOM KOMCSG KSPR KPMI KRAD KIND KCRP KAUST KWAWC KTER KCHG KRDP KPAS KITA KTSC KPAOPREL KWGB KIRP KJUST KMIG KLAB KTFR KSEI KSTT KAPO KSTS KLSO KWNN KPOA KHSA KNPP KPAONZ KBTS KWWW KY KJRE KPAOKMDRKE KCRCM KSCS KWMNCI KESO KWUN KPLS KIIP KEDEM KPAOY KRIF KGICKS KREF KTRD KFRDSOCIRO KTAO KJU KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KEN KO KNEI KEMR KKIV KEAI KWAC KRCIM KWCI KFIU KWIC KCORR KOMS KNNO KPAI KBWG KTTB KTBD KTIALG KILS KFEM KTDM KESS KNUC KPA KOMCCO KCEM KRCS KWBGSY KNPPIS KNNPMNUC KWN KERG KLTN KALM KCCP KSUMPHUM KREL KGH KLIP KTLA KAWK KWMM KVRP KVRC KAID KSLG KDEMK KX KIF KNPR KCFC KFTFN KTFM KPDD KCERS KMOC KDEMAF KMEPI KEMS KDRM KEPREL KBTR KEDU KNP KIRL KNNR KMPT KISLPINR KTPN KA KJUSTH KPIN KDEV KTDD KAKA KFRP KWNM KTSD KINL KJUSKUNR KWWMN KECF KWBC KPRO KVBL KOM KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KEDM KFLD KLPM KRGY KNNF KICR KIFR KM KWMNCS KAWS KLAP KPAK KDDG KCGC KID KNSD KMPF KPFO KDP KCMR KRMS KNPT KNNNP KTIAPARM KDTB KNUP KPGOV KNAP KNNC KUK KSRE KREISLER KIVP KQ KTIAEUN KPALAOIS KRM KISLAO KWM KFLOA
PHUM PINR PTER PGOV PREL PREF PL PM PHSA PE PARM PINS PK PUNE PO PALESTINIAN PU PBTS PROP PTBS POL POLI PA PGOVZI POLMIL POLITICAL PARTIES POLM PD POLITICS POLICY PAS PMIL PINT PNAT PV PKO PPOL PERSONS PING PBIO PH PETR PARMS PRES PCON PETERS PRELBR PT PLAB PP PAK PDEM PKPA PSOCI PF PLO PTERM PJUS PSOE PELOSI PROPERTY PGOVPREL PARP PRL PNIR PHUMKPAL PG PREZ PGIC PBOV PAO PKK PROV PHSAK PHUMPREL PROTECTION PGOVBL PSI PRELPK PGOVENRG PUM PRELKPKO PATTY PSOC PRIVATIZATION PRELSP PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PMIG PREC PAIGH PROG PSHA PARK PETER POG PHUS PPREL PS PTERPREL PRELPGOV POV PKPO PGOVECON POUS PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PWBG PMAR PREM PAR PNR PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PARMIR PGOVGM PHUH PARTM PN PRE PTE PY POLUN PPEL PDOV PGOVSOCI PIRF PGOVPM PBST PRELEVU PGOR PBTSRU PRM PRELKPAOIZ PGVO PERL PGOC PAGR PMIN PHUMR PVIP PPD PGV PRAM PINL PKPAL PTERE PGOF PINO PHAS PODC PRHUM PHUMA PREO PPA PEPFAR PGO PRGOV PAC PRESL PORG PKFK PEPR PRELP PREFA PNG PGOVPHUMKPAO PRELECON PINOCHET PFOR PGOVLO PHUMBA PRELC PREK PHUME PHJM POLINT PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PGOVE PHALANAGE PARTY PECON PEACE PROCESS PLN PRELSW PAHO PEDRO PRELA PASS PPAO PGPV PNUM PCUL PGGV PSA PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PGIV PRFE POGOV PEL PBT PAMQ PINF PSEPC POSTS PHUMPGOV PVOV PHSAPREL PROLIFERATION PENA PRELTBIOBA PIN PRELL PGOVPTER PHAM PHYTRP PTEL PTERPGOV PHARM PROTESTS PRELAF PKBL PRELKPAO PKNP PARMP PHUML PFOV PERM PUOS PRELGOV PHUMPTER PARAGRAPH PERURENA PBTSEWWT PCI PETROL PINSO PINSCE PQL PEREZ PBS

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 05BRASILIA574, BRAZIL: AMBASSADOR'S DEMARCHE ON ARAB SUMMIT AND

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #05BRASILIA574.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
05BRASILIA574 2005-03-03 17:02 2011-07-11 00:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Brasilia
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRASILIA 000574 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/03/2015 
TAGS: PREL PTER KPAL KSUM XF XM BR
SUBJECT: BRAZIL: AMBASSADOR'S DEMARCHE ON ARAB SUMMIT AND 
IMPROVING USG-GOB COORDINATION 
 
REF: A. STATE 35934 
     B. STATE 18160 
     C. BRASILIA 432 
     D. BRASILIA 564 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR JOHN J. DANILOVICH. REASON: 1.4 (B)(D) 
 
1. (C) Ambassador delivered ref A demarche late on 2 March to 
Ambassador Antonio de Aguiar Patriota, chief of staff to 
Foreign Minister Amorim. (Note: Ambassador had planned to 
demarche Acting FM Guimaraes, but the meeting was postponed 
by Guimaraes until 8 March; Ambassador will reiterate key 
reftel points in that meeting as well. End note.) 
 
2. (C) Patriota was clearly prepared for the content of the 
demarche, having received reports from Ambassador Abdenur of 
his meeting at the NSC on 25 February with DNSA Abrams and 
Senior WHA Director Shannon, and Patriota appeared tense and 
defensive.  Indeed, Ambassador had progressed through only a 
few of the demarche points when Patriota interrupted and said 
there was no need to go further, that the GOB knew the sense 
of the USG position and the GOB's response remained the same 
as that provided earlier by Abdenur:  i.e., Brazil is an 
independent country that has "no need to ask permission" of 
the United States in carrying out foreign policy initiatives, 
and it will not start now.  He added that the GOB believes 
Brazil plays a constructive role in global affairs, including 
in the Middle East.  Patriota said the purpose of Amorim's 
Middle East trip was delivery of Lula's invitations to Arab 
capitals for the planned South America-Arab summit, Patriota 
said, adding that Amorim will visit Israel in June, that 
Brazil had heard no complaints from the their Ambassador in 
Israel, and that the GOB was not aware of offical protests 
from the Israeli Government, although he acknowledged there 
had been reports in Brazil's media of Israeli discontent. 
 
3. (C) Patriota said that the USG should be prepared for 
additional GOB statements about the Middle East, and referred 
specifically to a May meeting in Capetown between Brazil, 
India and South Africa at which those governments (the IPSA 
group) may announce their intention to form a "support group" 
for the Quartet in the peace process. Patriota insisted 
Brazil is playing a "balanced role" and offered to brief the 
Ambassador on private conversations between Amorim and Arab 
leaders, including his meeting in Damascas where he "urged 
the Syrians to comply with UNSC resolution 1559." Ambassador 
rejoined that Brazil had not supported 1559, but perhaps 
would next try to claim credit for Syria's decision to 
withdraw. Patriota said that, despite Amorim's private 
counsel to the Syrians to withdraw, the GOB would not 
publicly join the U.S.-French statement calling for Syrian 
withdrawal because the GOB has concerns that France, as the 
former colonial power, intends to fill any void left by Syria. 
 
4. (C) Ambassador told Patriota that the USG is not trying to 
impose terms or tell the GOB to seek U.S. permission for 
initiatives.  However, he stated clearly that the peace 
process is at a delicate pass, with a window for possible 
success that is unprecedented in recent years.  The USG is 
taking a leading role, Secretary Rice is engaging directly, 
and therefore the GOB needs to coordinate with the U.S. more 
effectively.  Amorim's trip had created confusion and sent 
mixed signals, and it pointed up the danger that a "rear 
guard support group" such as Brazil wants to establish could 
inadvertently become "a rear guard sabotage group." 
Returning to the summit question, Ambassador stressed that 
there is concern about both the timing and apparent lack of 
precise focus, with a risk that the meeting could become a 
broad brush affair, with a rambling agenda of items on UN 
reform, non-proliferation, Iraq, terrorism, none of which 
mesh with the GOB's stated intention of addressing social and 
economic issues, and some of which could prove detrimental to 
Middle East peace discussions.  On that point, Ambassador 
asked Patriota whether there had been progress in meetings in 
Cairo between Brazil and Arab representatives in revising the 
draft summit statement. 
 
5. (C)  Patriota would not be drawn out on the issue of the 
Cairo discussions, saying only that "progress was being 
made."  Patriota reiterated Brazil's intent to seek balance, 
but said the GOB ultimately could not control what 
delegations say.  He noted that Arab delegations had told the 
GOB that they welcome the summit as an opportunity to express 
themselves in a "alternative forum," since they feel they are 
being "demonized" in other international meetings.   Patriota 
confirmed that Iraq and Somalia will be invited to the 
summit, but that the Arab League, not the GOB will issue 
those invitations.  Ambassador also asked about the 
possibility of invitations for observers (i.e., meaning for 
himself), and Patriota said that is being considered. 
 
6. (C)  In closing, Ambassador reiterated the importance of 
enhanced coordination.  As an apparent result of Ambassador's 
comments, Patriota spoke immediately following the meeting by 
phone with FM Amorim, and then relayed the following points 
from Amorim back to Ambassador the same evening: 
 
-- Amorim had nothing to add with reference to his trip or 
the summit, but said he wants to demonstrate GOB willingness 
to be cooperative and consultative; 
 
-- In that regard, Amorim passed on that, per a request made 
by the NSC's Abrams and Shannon to Ambassador Abdenur, 
President Lula had told Venezuelan President Chavez during 
meetings this week in Uruguay that Chavez needs to tone down 
his rhetoric; 
 
-- Brazil is planning to organize a meeting on Brazilian 
territory between Chavez, Colombian President Uribe and 
Spanish representatives (NFI).  That meeting's timing could 
conflict with FM Amorim's planned visit to Washington on 31 
March, for which he has sought a meeting with Secretary Rice. 
 
-- On that question, Amorim -- apparently in response to 
Ambassador's appeal for better coordination -- said he seeks 
a longer and more substantive discussion with the Secretary 
than would be possible in the half-hour meeting currently 
scheduled for 31 March.  For that reason, and because of the 
possible conflict with the Chavez-Uribe-GOS meeting noted 
above, Amorim said he may seek a meeting with the Secretary 
on a different date, possibly in early April, and he 
requested that Mission keep him apprised of the possibilities 
of a stopover by the Secretary in Brazil en route to the 
Community of Democracies summit. 
 
7. (C) Comment.  The candid and direct conversations seen in 
both this demarche and the earlier NSC meeting with Abdenur 
seem to have registered with the GOB both our continuing, 
intense concern about the South America-Arab summit and our 
frustration that our communication with the GOB on key issues 
has been, too often, reactive and driven by events.  A more 
deliberate and strategic approach could produce benefits for 
both sides, move the ball forward on shared goals, and limit 
damage on issues where we may have to agree to disagree. 
Indeed, Amorim seems to have taken our concern to heart, and 
he is now going us one better by seeking a very substantial 
first meeting with the Secretary. 
 
DANILOVICH