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Viewing cable 05BOGOTA2582, LIVELY DEBATE UNDERWAY ON DEMOBILIZATION

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
05BOGOTA2582 2005-03-17 21:24 2011-04-29 00:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Bogota
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
id: 29078
date: 3/17/2005 21:24
refid: 05BOGOTA2582
origin: Embassy Bogota
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination: 
header:
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.



----------------- header ends ----------------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BOGOTA 002582 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SOUTHCOM FOR POLAD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/17/2015 
TAGS: PGOV KJUS PTER CO
SUBJECT: LIVELY DEBATE UNDERWAY ON DEMOBILIZATION 
LEGISLATION 
 
REF: BOGOTA 2306 AND PREVIOUS 
 
Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
1. (C) Summary: The week of March 8 saw heated public debate 
over important aspects of demobilization legislation.  The 
three principal issues that captured attention were: (A) 
whether the GOC's bill could complicate the extradition of 
paramilitaries on drug trafficking charges; (B) the 
desirability of across-the-board prison sentence reductions 
for paramilitaries already incarcerated; and (C) legal issues 
related to the concept of confession.  After criticism from 
several members of Congress, President Uribe made a radio 
address on March 10 defending his Administration's record in 
fighting drug trafficking and reiterating his commitment to 
extradition.  Peace Commissioner Restrepo refuted claims by 
Inspector General Maya and members of Congress that the GOC 
was going soft on the paramilitaries.  The start of 
article-by-article voting in the House and Senate First 
Committees, originally planned for March 14, was abruptly 
rescheduled for the following day.  Voting is expected to 
take several days.  End Summary. 
 
2. (U) The First Committees of the House and Senate, which 
focus on constitutional and legal affairs, met in joint 
session for three days and roughly 20 hours of formal debate 
during the week of March 8 to discuss proposed demobilization 
legislation (reftel).  Voting on the 67-article GOC text, 
which will take place on an article-by-article basis (e.g. 
the Congress can modify any article in its entirety by 
majority vote), was scheduled to begin on March 14, but 
re-scheduled for the morning of March 15.  Three days of 
voting are expected.  Provided a bill passes both Committees, 
which vote separately, the full House and Senate could start 
debate in joint session eight calendar days after the final 
Committee vote.  (Note:  The President does not have a formal 
veto.  If he objects to a bill on constitutional grounds, and 
the Congress insists on approving it, the Constitutional 
Court has six days to rule.  If the Court declares the 
legislation constitutional, the President must promulgate it. 
 The President may return a bill to Congress, noting his 
concerns, but if majorities of members of both houses insist 
on their version, the President must promulgate it.  End 
Note.) 
 
3. (U) Media attention has focused on the differences between 
the GOC and its critics in Congress over various aspects of 
the Government's latest draft.  In most cases, the loudest 
critics have been members of the anti-Uribe Liberals, the 
"Officialist" Liberal Party (PLC), or leftist parties such as 
the Independent Democratic Pole (PDI).  However, some Uribe 
allies, including former Senate President German Vargas 
Lleras, have criticized some aspects of the GOC's bill. 
 
----------- 
EXTRADITION 
----------- 
 
4. (U) The most high-profile debate centered around Article 
64 of the GOC bill, modifying the Penal Code to treat 
paramilitaries as guilty of "sedition," which carries the 
same punishment as "rebellion."  Several PLC senators 
suggested the language would impede the extradition of 
paramilitaries on drug trafficking charges, since the bill 
would broadly define paramilitary activities as political in 
nature.  Colombian law prohibits extradition for political 
crimes.  On March 10, President Uribe made a radio address in 
which he defended his commitment to extradition and combating 
drug trafficking.  Uribe categorically denied the existence 
of any potential extradition loophole for paramilitaries in 
the GOC's bill. 
 
5. (SBU) On March 13, Inspector General ("Procurador") 
Edgardo Maya expressed concern about the alleged extradition 
loophole and questioned Peace Commissioner Luis Carlos 
Restrepo's commitment to impose significant punishments on 
the paramilitaries.  Restrepo later refuted Maya's 
allegations and questioned the bona fides of several members 
of Congress.  Representative Adalberto Jaimes, a 14-year 
House veteran and leading member of the First Committee, told 
poloff on March 11 that he expected the Article 64 language 
to be modified slightly to prevent any impression of a legal 
loophole on extradition.  In an expected move, Representative 
Rocio Arias, a known paramilitary sympathizer, announced 
plans to introduce a bill that would prohibit the extradition 
of any individual engaged in peace process negotiations with 
the Government.  Restrepo immediately dismissed the measure 
and said the GOC would reject it out-of-hand.  In a meeting 
with the diplomatic corps on March 14, Interior and Justice 
Minister Sabas Pretelt reiterated the GOC's commitment to 
maintaining the excellent U.S.-Colombian extradition 
relationship. 
 
------------------ 
SENTENCE REDUCTION 
------------------ 
 
6. (SBU) A second major issue has been the GOC's proposal to 
reduce sentences for individuals currently incarcerated, an 
equity provision parallel to the eight-year maximum sentence 
under the GOC bill.  Detractors, including Senators German 
Vargas Lleras and Andres Gonzalez (a former GOC Justice 
Minister), have complained that such a reduction would send a 
negative message to Colombian society, and that it has 
nothing to do with demobilization.  However, prominent 
jurists in the Congress state that the Constitution requires 
equity in sentencing, and the measure is most likely designed 
to stave off legal challenges.  During debate, arguments for 
or against the measure appeared to be split.  The Ombudsman 
(Defensor del Pueblo) questioned the validity of the clause 
and Sabas Pretelt indicated the GOC was not wedded to it. 
 
7. (SBU) Several members of Congress also continued to call 
for stronger language on truth and confessions.  The 
strongest voice on this remains Senator Rafael Pardo.  Both 
Senate President Luis Humberto Gomez Gallo and Senator Vargas 
Lleras have urged the GOC to include tougher language, 
although they generally support the GOC text.  The GOC 
continues to resist use of the term "confession," noting that 
the Constitution prohibits forced confession.  Again, the GOC 
appears to be attempting to avoid potential legal battles 
down the road, particularly with the politically-charged 
Constitutional Court.  Nevertheless, Pardo and Sabas Pretelt 
met at length over the March 12 weekend, a potential sign of 
an attempt to bridge differences. 
 
--------- 
PROSPECTS 
--------- 
 
8. (C) As of March 14, many First Committee Congressional 
contacts and the Vice-Minister of Interior continue to tell 
us the committees will pass a bill before the start of Holy 
Week.  They are less confident regarding the full House and 
Senate.  Officialist Liberal Senator Rodrigo Rivera, who 
insists the GOC measure remains lax on drug trafficking, told 
poloffs on March 14 that the GOC nevertheless has majorities 
in both First Committees.  Even doctrinaire leftist and 
strong Pardo version supporter Senator Carlos Gaviria stated 
publicly that he is willing to compromise with the GOC in the 
search for peace.  There appears to be much less agreement on 
what the version coming out of the committees will look like. 
 Many insist that Article 64 is still potentially problematic 
for extradition.  The GOC has not yet agreed to modify 
Article 64, and it appears ready to let the issue be decided 
by the votes of the First Committees. 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
9.  (C) For now there seems to be no provision that would 
impede extradition, although the draft law's provisions could 
put a cap on sentencing.  Despite the apparent lack of 
opposition to extradition, we will be on the lookout for 
subtle changes or deletions in the text that would cloud 
Colombia's ability to extradite drug traffickers in a 
"sedition" mantle. 
WOOD 

=======================CABLE ENDS============================