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Viewing cable 05SANAA307, YEMENI VIEWS ON ELECTIONS AND THE FUTURE OF IRAQ

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
05SANAA307 2005-02-14 18:17 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Sanaa
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 SANAA 000307 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
STATE FOR DAS PHILO DIBBLE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KMDR KPAO IZ YM
SUBJECT: YEMENI VIEWS ON ELECTIONS AND THE FUTURE OF IRAQ 
 
-------- 
 Summary: 
 -------- 
 
1. (SBU) Liberal elites, moderate Islamists, ROYG officials 
as well as civil society activists and journalists in Yemen 
are unanimous in considering the recent elections held in 
Iraq as a step in the right direction. All are equally 
unanimous, however, in expressing skepticism that these 
elections, in and of themselves, could guarantee a peaceful 
progress towards full-fledged democracy in Iraq. The ROYG, in 
particular, has been eerily silent in terms of official 
commentary and very low-key in unofficial discussions of the 
elections. Having at first expressed their intent to send 
observers to the elections, the ROYG pulled out of a proposed 
partnership with a Canadian delegation to Baghdad at the 
eleventh hour. The Yemeni street has not reacted in any 
obvious manner to the elections, reflecting perhaps the same 
wait-and-see attitude of their government. Amidst a 
realization that developments in Iraq would ultimately impact 
the Gulf region and Yemen, all discussions of Iraq's future 
remain tinged with a Sunni Arab weariness of a Shia majority 
assuming power in Baghdad. End Summary. 
 
-------------------------------------- 
On the positive side, "What a relief!" 
-------------------------------------- 
 
2. (SBU) Local journalists and intellectuals expressed relief 
that election-related violence was much less than had been 
forecast. Most were willing to admit that the mere fact that 
the elections took place despite all the violence and 
political complications was an important achievement. The 
main challenge remained, according to many of our media 
interlocutors, the task of including the Sunni community in 
the next steps in shaping Iraq's future, agreeing on a 
constitution and, not incidentally, ending U.S. occupation. 
 
4. (SBU) The majority of educated, reform-minded Yemeni 
elite, including those within the ROYG, embrace the hope that 
democracy will one day take root in Iraq and thereby boosting 
the chances of economic and democratic reform in the region. 
A senior Yemeni diplomat exclaimed, in a private meeting with 
embassy officers, "The elections were great! I'm glad they 
took place." The same diplomat, however, was certain that his 
government would not be forthcoming any time soon with any 
encouraging statement to the IIG on its efforts.  Civil 
society activists have expressed similar sentiments towards 
the elections but remained skeptical about the ultimate 
success of the Iraqi democratic experiment.  One minor-tribal 
leader pointing to Lebanon as the most democratic Arab state, 
perhaps followed by Yemen, concluded that even in these two 
small and not very influential countries, democracy was not 
exactly secure.  Some of our interlocutors expressed the hope 
that the U.S. would do more for democracy in the region and 
be more aggressive in pursuing democratic reform than it has 
hitherto been. 
 
-------------------------------- 
Shia-Phobia raises its ugly head 
-------------------------------- 
 
5. (SBU) All our interlocutors voiced concerns about the very 
low turnout of Sunni voters in Iraq. While most phrased their 
concern in terms of the balance that was needed in any 
emerging political system, some were blunt in voicing their 
apprehension about the emergence of a Shia majority in 
Baghdad and the possibility of another Khomeni-style 
theocracy taking hold.  Contacts in Aden, known for their 
less conservative views, share the same skepticism about a 
Shia-dominated government as their northern counterparts. 
They fear, despite Allawi's assurances, that a 
non-representative Iraqi Parliament will fail to produce a 
viable constitution with protection of minority-Sunni rights. 
Interspersed with seemingly rational political arguments, an 
outright admission of distrust of Shia Muslims in general was 
also expressed. Despite Yemeni-Sunni reformers' expressed 
support for democracy, many could not mask their 
disappointment that the Sistani-block swept the elections, 
unconvinced by Sistani's claims of support for a secularist 
government. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
"U.S. occupation" remains a hard pill to swallow 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
7. (SBU) Official media reacted reflexively the day after the 
election, leading with headlines about "a bloody day in 
Iraq," and focused mainly on the violence that took place in 
various locations across Iraq. In the days that followed, 
coverage became more guarded and factual, providing the facts 
and figures that appeared in the international media and 
ending with election results and percentages. Most 
newspapers, official, opposition and independent, lamented 
the poor Sunni turnout fearing that under-representation of 
ethnic minorities could fuel continued violence and 
ultimately threaten the unity of Iraq. Anti-American 
sentiment was manifested in editorials and columns in several 
papers, including the official "al-Thawra," in which Yemen's 
most popular poet and intellectual asked rhetorically how any 
election process could have any credibility under continued 
American occupation.  America's motives, remaining suspect in 
the eyes of most commentators, colored most reports on the 
future of Iraq. Official, opposition and independent media 
alike, still referred to American and coalition presence in 
Iraq as an odious occupation regardless of any positive 
outcome that may or may not result from the elections. 
 
8. (SBU) Some self-deprecating academics in Sanaa hailed the 
Iraqi elections and pointed, only half-jokingly, to the irony 
of an Arab world that experiences more freedom under foreign 
occupation and internal chaos than under the more 
"independent and stable" conditions in the rest of the 
region.  Man-in-the-street reactions have not been very 
pronounced but, anecdotally, we've heard that the average 
Yemeni has bought into the conspiracy theories that dismiss 
the Iraqi election as an "American film," a totally rigged 
affair that can only result in the empowerment of an Iraqi 
leadershiop that the U.S. wanted all along. 
 
9. (SBU) Comment:  In the absence of official ROYG 
endorsement and a dearth of bold  champions among Yemeni 
elites, Iraqi elections and, indeed, the entire Iraqi 
democratic experiment, remain vague, problematic and of very 
questionable value, in the eyes of most Yemenis - at least 
until the next chapter unfolds.  End Comment. 
Krajeski