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Viewing cable 05QUITO254, ECUADOR: PROTESTS GROW, BUT GOVERNMENT STABLE

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
05QUITO254 2005-02-01 21:13 2011-05-02 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Quito
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 QUITO 000254 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL EC
SUBJECT: ECUADOR: PROTESTS GROW, BUT GOVERNMENT STABLE 
 
REF: A. QUITO 236 
 
     B. GUAYAQUIL 132 
 
1.  (SBU) Summary:  The political scene is heating up again 
here, as pressure mounts on the government to reverse the 
overhaul of judicial institutions by the Ecuadorian congress. 
 The opposition is preparing a major protest march in Quito 
for February 17.  President Gutierrez' proposed referendum to 
select a new court is in trouble with his congressional 
allies.  Former vice president Leon Roldos is gathering 
signatures for a rival referendum, and some in the leftist 
opposition are suggesting a compromise with Gutierrez. 
Though none of these proposals are yet politically viable, we 
are encouraging the GoE and the opposition toward dialogue 
and compromise.  We continue to support civil society efforts 
to defend democratic institutions, and have warned the GoE to 
discard any options which would dissolve the Ecuadorian 
congress.  End Summary. 
 
President's Referendum in Trouble 
--------------------------------- 
 
2.  (U) President Gutierrez introduced his proposed 
referendum to congress on January 21.  The ten-question 
referendum was sent to the Constitutional Affairs committee, 
with a request that it be declared a matter of national 
urgency.  The referendum includes measures to select a new 
de-politicized Supreme Court, Supreme Electoral Tribunal, 
Constitutional Court, and National Electoral Court, through a 
new electoral college including representation from civil 
society.  If congress agrees, by a simple majority vote, that 
the president's referendum is a matter of national urgency, a 
procedural clock would start ticking, which would lead to a 
binding referendum within 60 days. 
 
3.  (SBU) It is unlikely that the president's referendum 
proposal, at least in its current form, will actually take 
this route.  The opposition is solidly against it, declaring 
it a hoax and move to extend presidential powers.  More 
seriously for the president, the president's referendum is in 
trouble within his governing alliance (Ref A). 
 
4.  (SBU) Most notably, Abdala Bucaram's PRE and Alvaro 
Noboa's PRIAN object to further changes in the court.  The 
PRE wishes to use this court to clear its fugitive leader of 
pending legal charges.  The PRIAN, which currently has the 
judges to block any such move, objects to what it perceives 
to be the leftist composition of the electoral colleges 
proposed by Gutierrez.  Intense negotiations within the 
governing alliance are ongoing, and Gutierrez released to the 
press a letter to his political partners threatening to end 
the alliance if congress refuses to act on the referendum. 
Presidential insiders assure us privately that Gutierrez has 
no such intention.  He is, however, considering alternate 
means to move forward, including proposing a referendum on 
whether to dissolve congress.  We have and will continue to 
warn the GOE against any such move. 
 
Opposition Rallying Themselves 
------------------------------ 
 
5.  (SBU) On January 26, Guayaquil mayor Jaime Nebot led an 
anti-government march in Guayaquil, focused on local 
complaints, which attracted around 70,000 participants (Ref 
B).  The march was deemed a success by opposition and media 
commentators, despite the announced goal of mustering 200,000 
protesters.  Civil society and opposition leaders in Quito 
promptly postponed a Quito anti-government protest scheduled 
for February 2 to February 17, to attract greater support and 
permit better planning.  Organizers include a civil society 
umbrella protest group called Civic Convergence for 
Democracy; the Quito municipality, under mayor Paco Moncayo; 
and the main political parties of the opposition: the 
Democratic Left (ID); Pachakutik; and, most recently, the 
Social Christian Party (PSC).  Organizers hope to attract at 
least 50,000 to a march in colonial Quito starting at 1500 on 
the 17th.  The opposition is being careful to say the march 
is in defense of Ecuadorian democracy, rather than to 
overthrow the Gutierrez government.  No government-sponsored 
counter-march has yet been announced, but one is expected. 
 
6.  (SBU) Meanwhile, Leon Roldos, a former vice president and 
the third-place finisher in the presidential contest in 2002, 
launched his own quixotic attempt to gather a million 
signatures on his own 4-point referendum proposal.  Roldos' 
referendum includes the replacement of the current Supreme 
Court with a new one selected by civil society, as well as 
other unrelated issues.  The constitution prohibits any such 
initiative from a private citizen, reserving the right to 
propose constitutional changes for the president only. 
Roldos has told us he believes that the moral force of a 
million signatures would compel authorities to permit his 
referendum to go forward.  Many interpret Roldos' campaign to 
be the opening salvo of his 2006 presidential campaign, which 
he has not denied. 
 
Room for Compromise? 
-------------------- 
 
7.  (SBU) Few if any political actors are openly discussing 
the possibility of compromise over the court issue. 
Opposition members generally urge the USG to apply 
international pressure to get Gutierrez to reverse the 
congressional stacking of the courts.  An interesting 
exception is Andres Vallejo, the Quito municipal council 
president and an 'eminence gris' in the ID. 
 
8.  (SBU) Vallejo told PolChief on January 28 that the ID 
(and some in the PSC) would be willing to offer President 
Gutierrez a "guarantee of stability" in exchange for real and 
immediate de-politicization of the courts.  The stability 
guarantee would permit Gutierrez to abandon his current 
allies without fear of another impeachment process supported 
by the main opposition.  This scenario would involve the 
members of the deposed Supreme Court resigning, permitting 
the selection of new magistrates by existing formulas, or 
even by the newly-formulated selection procedures 
incorporated in the president's referendum proposal.  Asked 
if talks were ongoing between the ID and the government along 
these lines, Vallejo said no.  The president would need to 
come to the opposition to pursue this option. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
9.  (SBU) Anti-government Ecuadorians have sought to enlist 
the USG to resolve their constitutional controversy, in the 
process demonizing Gutierrez alternately as an inept dolt or 
a Machiavellian schemer, with Chavez-like pretensions.  We 
have thus far resisted taking the bait, while reiterating the 
Ambassador's public and private statements of the imperative 
of political stability and strengthening democratic 
institutions.  We have encouraged Ecuadorians to work 
together to sort out their own constitutional issues.  We 
have also encouraged the government, opposition and civil 
society to seek alternatives to strengthen judicial 
independence.  It took some time for these haphazard efforts 
to get organized, but they now appear to be gathering steam. 
The February 17 march will showcase the re-activation of the 
main opposition parties, building on the momentum generated 
by Nebot's successful Guayaquil march.  In response, 
President Gutierrez has acknowledged mounting pressure for 
another change in the judiciary, and signaled his willingness 
to change the court again, through his proposed referendum. 
 
10.  (SBU) With the fate of the president's referendum 
proposal in trouble with his own allies, the Ambassador will 
encourage Gutierrez and selected members of his team 
(including presidential secretary Carlos Polit) toward 
compromise.  The first step in this direction would be for 
Gutierrez to re-open lines of communication with willing 
elements of the opposition to seek a workable compromise. 
The Ambassador will also warn again against any further 
democratic setbacks (i.e. no dissolving congress).  Assuming 
Gutierrez and his team can find a way to resolve the court 
issue, we see recent anti-government protests more as an 
opening salvo in the 2006 presidential race than a credible 
effort to bring down this government. 
Kenney